

THE NAZI CONSPIRACY IN SPAIN

by the Editor of

The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror

Translated from the German Manuscript

by

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CHAPTER I

THE SWASTIKA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

ON OCTOBER 5 and October 10, 1915, the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Marquis of Lema, received the German Ambassador in Madrid. The content of this discussion was embodied in manuscript notes by the Foreign Minister: if Spain would come into the war on the side of the Central Powers, Germany offered Spain Gibraltar and Portugal.

A month later, on November 17 and November 19, 1915, the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin received the same offer from the Wilhelmstrasse. He reported it to his Foreign Minister in a cipher telegram and a letter. The offers were repeated. On March 11, 1916, the Spanish Ambassador was again subjected to pressure at the German Foreign Office. The pearl of Gibraltar and the possession of Portugal were described to him in seductive terms.

The notes of the Marquis of Lema and the cipher reports of the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin have been preserved in the archives of the Madrid Foreign Office.

These important facts, which we publish for the first time, receive a new and greater significance in the

year 1936 because of the rebel rising in Spain. They not only reveal the desperate efforts of German diplomacy under the Kaiser to bring Spain on to the side of the Central Powers. They have their sequel in the decision of the National Socialists to take up the fight for Spain once more, in a new form which seemed to promise greater success.

The diplomatic protagonists of Germany and Spain, who played the leading parts in the dramatic struggle for Spain and in the conspiracy to secure Spain's entry into the World War, are no longer alive. General Primo de Rivera, War Minister in 1917, is dead. He was responsible for allowing the interned German submarine 49 to escape from the harbour of Cadiz; and in the period after the war, as dictator in Spain, he again established closer relations with pan-German and Nazi circles. But there are living in Spain people connected with conservative circles, with army generals and with the Church, of whom the newspaper *Deutsche Politik* wrote on February 14, 1919, that they had a real understanding of German interests. By the setting up of Fascist legions and parties, the big landowners, the generals and the Church have made a bridge with Nazi Germany. And the imperialist ambitions of the Kaiser's Germany are more than ever alive in the Third Reich. The Mediterranean policy of pan-Germanism is celebrating a jubilant revival under the Nazi regime.

Professor Herre, a pan-German, wrote in 1915 in his book *Spain and the World War*:

"It may be accepted with absolute certainty that the German government has a secret share in many of the steps taken by the Madrid government."

The Nazi government had no secret share in the steps taken by the legal government of Spain. But the Nazi government has had its share all the more actively and openly in many of the steps taken by the officers' junta of General Franco. Above all, it had a responsible share in their first step, the rebellion. Probably the Nazis are no longer offering General Franco possession of Portugal. They are looking forward to moving in there themselves. But it is different with Gibraltar. The Spanish "League for the Recovery of Gibraltar," supported by Nazi propagandists, is already taking its first steps.

LIFE-LINES

The journal of the German General Staff openly admits this propaganda attack on Gibraltar. On September 3, 1936, *Deutsche Woche* wrote of the historic part in world history which Spain is called upon to play. But only if Spain herself is clear that the resumption of her historic role

"... must begin at the Straits of Gibraltar, while her general field of activity is to be sought in Europe and North Africa. There, with a spirit of determination and good leadership, the Spanish people, twenty million strong, could make a good showing even to-day."

In a similar article *Deutsche Woche* describes Spanish Morocco as the most important part of Morocco from the standpoint of world history: "the northern coast, which faces the Straits of Gibraltar." Under good leadership—that is to say, under Nazi leadership—Spain can make a good show in the Straits of Gibraltar, the outlet from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean.

The life-lines of three States cross each other in the Mediterranean. If they were cut, this might have a decisive influence on the outcome of a war. The main link between France and her African colonies is through the Mediterranean. Italian ships must cross the Mediterranean in order to reach the open sea. For England, the chief line of communication with India, with Egypt and the Sudan, with Arabia and Persia, passes through the Mediterranean, through the ten-mile-wide Straits of Gibraltar.

The Spanish Balearic Islands, and the Spanish possessions in Northern Morocco, form the key position in relation to the Mediterranean. Further, the Canary Islands, which are a Spanish possession, flank the second line of communication with India, the route of the British Navy in the Atlantic. Rio de Oro, the Spanish Sahara territory, borders the French Sahara territories. Thus Spain's African possessions are important strategic positions against the French colonial empire and its connection with the mainland, as well as against England's chief lines of communication with

her dominions and dependencies. In the World War the French colonies sent a million coloured soldiers and workers to the European battlefields. The German General Staff estimates that in the next war the coloured army of France will reach a strength of one and a half million men.

AN ACTIVE MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

The German General Staff attributes the same importance to strategic preparations for the next war as to actual armaments. The rebuilding of the German navy is useless unless naval bases are secured. The German *Handbook of Modern Military Science* of 1936 states that "in the foreign policy of the great naval powers the naval base policy has played an important and often a decisive part." In these words too the line of policy of the new Germany is to be seen.

The Spanish policy of the Third Reich arises from its naval base policy. It follows logically from plans for the active prosecution of naval warfare, which the German General Staff is preparing for the next war. The policy of preparedness on the part of the German naval staff, which kept its attention in the World War focused on a decisive land battle, and therefore, as its critics have said, "succumbed to a passive naval campaign," is to be replaced in the next war by the utmost activity, which alone corresponds with German conditions and requirements. The new German naval strategy is dominated by the theory of the offensive.

The naval war is to be prosecuted not merely in the "dead end" of the North Sea, but in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean against the united French and English fleets. In a book called *Die grosse Lüge*, S. Erckner has brilliantly portrayed the revolutionised naval strategy cherished by the German General Staff, which does not care whether its Trafalgar is fought in the North Sea or in the Mediterranean.

An active naval campaign depends upon an active policy in the Mediterranean, upon the struggle for the actual possession of Spain. The Nazis have learnt from the experiences of the World War. They began the fight for the Mediterranean region before the actual declaration of war. They got Franco's Moorish legions and his Fascist phalanx to lead the struggle. They no longer offered Franco possession of Portugal, but they gave him aeroplanes, tanks, artillery, machine guns, arms and ammunition; they gave him officers, aviators, instructors and propagandists. Franco, as the deputy of the new German imperialism, was to hand over the naval bases which the German naval staff requires for its active campaign.

This Mediterranean policy has one decisive condition: an understanding with Italy. After the negotiations which the Italian Foreign Minister carried on with Hitler at Berchtesgaden in October, 1936, Mussolini declared, on November 1, 1936, that Italy's life depends on the Mediterranean. As both Italian and German officers were working on Franco's staff, as

Italy as well as Hitler Germany sent war materials to the rebels, it is safe to assume that an understanding on the question of the Mediterranean had been reached, at least temporarily, between Italy and Germany. The press reported in June 1936 that Mussolini was providing a naval base for the Third Reich in the Dodecanese. From the reports that were published from rebel headquarters it may be concluded that the Third Reich and Italy were proposing a division of spheres of influence in the Mediterranean region. Italy was to get the Balearic Islands, the largest of which, Majorca, was supplied by German firms in the year 1935 with heavy fortifications. The order for these fortifications was given by Gil Robles, who was then Spanish Minister for War. Spanish Morocco, the Canary Islands, the enclave of Ifni, Rio de Oro and Spanish Guinea were allotted to the Third Reich as spheres of influence.

In this way strategic positions were to be conquered before the war; in this way the life-lines of the democratic Western powers were to be brought into the danger zone of the Nazi war of aggression.

ENCIRCLEMENT OF FRANCE

Besides the question of strategic control of the Mediterranean, there is also the question of the Pyrenean frontier. A Fascist Spain in the peninsula beyond the Pyrenees would mean a tremendous step towards the isolation and encirclement of France. From the day

when the Nazis seized power, their foreign policy has never lost sight of this goal: to separate France from its friends and allies, and to set up round it a ring of Fascist dictatorships. This applies to the struggle in Spain, as well as to the attempts to put Degrelle in power in Belgium. Threatened on the Pyrenean border, which hitherto has been regarded as a secure frontier, her connections with the colonies endangered, surrounded on all sides by Fascist dictatorships—in this way France is to be at the mercy of the future Nazi war of aggression.

AN ACTIVE COLONIAL POLICY

To establish the influence of National Socialism in Spain's African possessions is an important condition for the carrying through of its colonial plans. About the middle of the year 1935 the Third Reich initiated what is known in Berlin as an "active colonial policy." General von Epp became the mouthpiece of the new colonial demands. The German Colonial Society and the Reich Colonial League were set up under Adolf Hitler's auspices. A school for colonial officials was established. The former German colonies were overrun with Nazi propagandists. At the Nuremberg Nazi congress Hitler proclaimed the demand for colonies, and thus gave it an official stamp.

The demand for colonies has become a key point of Nazi strategy in home and foreign policy. The man who was responsible for the new four-year plan—Prime Minister Goering—declared on October 30, 1936:

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Auslands-Organisation

Bankkonto: Berliner Stadtbank, Kasse II,
Berlin W 9, Linkstr. 7-8.
Girokonto: Nr. 2400 unter:
Willy Schneider
Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP
Fernsprecher: Sammelnummer B2 (Einkauf) 7941



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Einschreiben, Wertsendungen usw. an:
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Aussenhandelsamt
Buch-No. 17 819
Hd/U.

Berlin W 35, den 12. April 1935.
Tiergartenstraße 4

Landesgruppe
S p a n i e n .

für Wirtschaftsstelle.

Betr.: Dortige Wochenschrift "Lealtad".

Vom Deutschen Fichte-Bund geht uns folgende Mitteilung zu:

"Eine der rührigsten antisemitischen Zeitungen in Spanien ist die in Madrid erscheinende Wochenschrift "Aspiraciones". Diese ist das Organ einer etwa 40.000 Frauen umfassenden katholischen Vereinigung, die einen erbitterten Kampf gegen Juden und Freimaurer führt. Natürlich lassen die Juden sich dieses nicht lange gefallen und haben ein Verbot der Zeitung herbeigeführt, in der Absicht, deren Erscheinen für immer zu unterbinden und die Arbeit der Vereinigung lahmzulegen. Die jungen Damen haben aber sofort eine neue Zeitung unter dem Namen "Lealtad" gegründet und führen nun in dieser Schrift ihren Kampf unentwegt weiter."

Der Fichte-Bund steht mit der Schriftleiterin Frl. Velasco in Schriftwechsel und bittet die Dame um, ihr bei den jetzt entstandenen finanziellen Schwierigkeiten durch Beschaffung von Anzeigen deutscher Firmen zu helfen. Durch die dauernden Verfolgungen des Blattes durch Juden und Freimaurer sind die Geldmittel der Vereinigung erschöpft und das Eingehen der Zeitung voraussehen, wenn nicht von irgendeiner Seite eine Unterstützung einläuft. Die Anzeigenaufträge würden wesentlich zur Behebung all dieser Schwierigkeiten beitragen."

Wir wären Ihnen dankbar, wenn Sie uns über die fragliche Wochenschrift eine kurze Auskunft erteilen würden unter Angabe, ob eine Unterstützung derselben durch Anzeigenaufträge wirklich empfohlen werden kann.

Ferner wollen Sie uns mitteilen, ob die "Lealtad" bereits an Pg. Roder wegen Anzeigen herangetreten ist.

Heil Hitler!

Letter from Nazi Foreign Organisation, quoting appeal from Fichte League in Spain for assistance to anti-Semitic women's paper *Lealtad*.

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Stellvertretender Pressleiter:

Stellvertretender Pressleiter
der Ortsgr. Barcelona



Beauftragter:

Alfred Engling, C. Diputación, 239
Barcelona.

Barcelona, den 16. August 1935.

An den Ldpr.Lt. M a d r i d.

Betr.: Don Gerardo Isla, Berlin.

Dieser Herr haelt es fuer angebracht, neuerdings in etwas schaeferer Weise bzw. in offenerer Form als bisher in seinen woechentlichen Berichten aus Berlin gegen das Neue Deutschland zu hetzen.- (Isla ist als Nachfolger des sattem bekannten Augusto Assia, der vor ca. 1½ Jahren wegen seiner Schmutzfinkereien aus Deutschland ausgewiesen wurde und nun von London aus weiter Gift spritzt, Korrespondent der hiesigen "La Vanguardia" fuer Deutschland geworden und schreibt regelmæssig tendenzioes gefaehte Berichte, die sich bisher dadurch auszeichneten, dass sie in geschickter Form versteckte Andeutungen usw. brachten, niemals aber ausgesprochene Tatsachen, auf Grund deren man ihn haette packen koennen. Neuerdings wird er allerdings frecher und es erscheint uns an der Zeit, dem Burschen einmal auf die Finger zu klopfen.-)

Als Beispiel fuegen wir seine zwei letzten Artikel bei, die allerdings an Deutlichkeit nichts mehr zu wuenschen uebrig lassen.-

Wir ueberlassen es dem Ermessen der A.O. bzw. Ihnen, die erforderlichen Schritte zu unternehmen.-

Heil Hitler!

2 Anlagen.

Letter from Engling in Barcelona to Reder, Nazi press director in Madrid, asking for action against the Berlin correspondent of the Catalan paper *Vanguardia*.

"In these four years we Germans have tried to work to feed our people, although we have no colonies. Although raw materials are lacking, in spite of everything, Germany has become a land of peace, an island of orderliness, of peace and of constructive development. You know, my dear fellow-countrymen, and the Führer said this at Nüremberg, that in spite of all the increased security of our food supplies, not all our food requirements can be met in Germany, whatever efforts we make. In Germany there are 136 people to the square kilometre. In England there are 137 people to the square kilometre. For these 137 people to the square kilometre England owns a third of the world as colonies, and we own—nothing! If we had a fraction of these colonies, then we should have no need to talk of a shortage of raw materials and a lack of foodstuffs."

This was Goering's speech according to the official report. Those who listened to it, or followed it on the wireless, also heard the words:

"We have no colonies, because they have been stolen from us."

Goering was followed on November 1, 1936, by Goebbels, Minister for Propaganda, who announced in a speech at the Sportpalast:

"We must have raw materials, and because we do not possess them, we must be allowed to share in
Bs

the resources of the world. Let no one believe that the Führer and his followers will renounce Germany's claim to life. We intend to pursue our work honourably. We are not filled with thoughts of revenge. Let us be left in peace, but free entry into the world must not be closed against us."

The line is clear: France and England are to be made responsible for hunger and poverty in the Third Reich. The starvation of the German people is due, not to Nazi rearmament, which is consuming almost the whole income from the exports of the Third Reich, not to the Nazi economic policy, not to the Nazi war policy, which has thrown Europe into a state of extreme nervousness and unrest—it is due to the enemies of yesterday who are to be made the enemies of tomorrow.

The Spanish possessions in Africa have been chosen as the jumping-off ground for the German colonial struggle. The Nazis have carried their colonial propaganda into the whole of Africa from Spanish Morocco, Ifni and Rio de Oro. Just as Spanish Morocco is the key to the Mediterranean, so the colonial possessions of Spain are the decisive outposts for stirring up unrest in Africa.

COPPER, RUBBER AND MERCURY

The Spanish policy of the Third Reich has its basis also in the economic needs, the demand for raw

materials, of the Nazi armament programme. Spain and its African possessions are rich in minerals and raw materials. Only a small part of these has been developed. There are unexploited copper mines in Spanish Morocco and in the neighbourhood of Saragossa. The mercury workings of Almaden could be more highly exploited by the application of Nazi methods of work. Spanish Guinea is rich in rubber. Nazi economic experts state that increased quantities of tin could be mined in Spain.

The Nazis turned their covetous eyes towards these resources. If their influence were to become dominant in Spain, they could secure for themselves the wealth of the country. With Franco victorious in the civil war, the Nazis would be able to pocket the lion's share in the "reconstruction of the ruined districts" and in the rearmament of Spain. The Nazis could send specialists and workers to Spain for the building of motor roads, barracks, aerodromes, harbours and fortifications. A Fascist Spain would materially improve the export trade of Nazi Germany.

THE WHOLE OF GERMANY AN ALCAZAR

Strategic, colonial and economic considerations therefore led the Nazis to become the allies of the Spanish rebels. The alliance did not begin on the day when the rebellion started. It goes back to the years before Hitler's seizure of power; to the period of the World War. The same sections in Spain who were on

the side of the Kaiser's imperialism have allied themselves since the war with the Nazi expansionists. The ideological "Nazification" of the militarist junta became more evident day by day. Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess, declared in a speech on October 20, 1936, that the whole of Germany was an Alcazar. This phrase deserves special attention. It implies that the Nazis are prepared to attack Europe, as the rebels prepared to attack the legal government. It means also that the Nazi aggression will take place on the ground that the Third Reich is being attacked just as the rebels pretended that their rising was a measure of coercion against a Communist revolt.

And, not least, this phrase contains the threat that the Nazi war of conquest will be a war of unprecedented horror. The heroes of the Alcazar, who received special praise in a telegram from Reichsminister Hess, dragged the wives and children of republicans into the cellars of the Alcazar and exposed them to the terrors of the siege and death. The heroes of the Alcazar took no prisoners. Into every village and street that they captured the legions of General Franco not only brought the horrors of war, but after the battle they continued the slaughter and extermination of the civilian population, with unexampled brutality. The "Heroes of the Alcazar," the legionaries of General Franco, are blood-brothers of the Nazi blackshirts and the Nazi storm-troops, who carried on their "war of liberation against the enemy at home" in the prisons and concentration camps of Germany.

The Horst Wessel song was heard from Radio-Seville; the German broadcasts from Corunna, Seville and Santa Cruz in the Canary Islands ended with "Heil Hitler!" General Franco introduced a "one-course Sunday." In an interview with the German News Agency on October 12, 1936, General Cabanellas proclaimed Hitler as the guardian of peace in Europe, and described the common struggle against disruptive forces in Europe as the aim of the German Nazis and the Spanish Fascists.

THE WAR OF INTERVENTION

With the intervention of Germany, Italy and Portugal, the civil war in Spain became a war in the full sense. The government militia were no longer fighting only against rebel generals, Fascist Phalangists and Carlists. They were fighting against the Third Reich, Italy and Portugal. The German tanks which ploughed their furrows through the Spanish streets and buried brave militiamen under their caterpillar bodies, the German aviators who sent a hundred children to their death in Getafe, the Krupps guns which bombarded Irun—these were emissaries of German imperialism, which was stretching out its hand to Spain. A free people which would not submit to Fascist oppression was attacked in time of peace by foreign Fascist powers. Nazi militarists have said, in the privacy of their own rooms, that the Nazis will begin making war without any declaration of war. This forecast has been

surpassed by actual events. The Nazis and their allies made war in a foreign country, against a foreign people, without calling their operations by the name of war. They denied the sending of arms and men to the Spanish generals, and they denied that they were making war, while tens of thousands were being mown down by their murderous weapons. The victims of Nazi propaganda, who had not yet got over their illusions, and the allies of National Socialism in the democratic countries, were only too willing to accept this hypocritical pretence.

THE PREPARATION OF THE REBELLION

Just as the alliance between the Nazis and the Spanish rebels was no new thing, so also the rising in Spain, with the active participation of the Third Reich, had been in preparation for a long time. During years of work the Nazis had been building up their own Foreign Legion, the Nazi groups in Spain, which were thoroughly organised and equipped for action. They worked persistently, by legal and illegal methods, to undermine Spanish democracy, as they are working to undermine democracy in Belgium, France and England and lay it open to a successful onslaught. The work of the Nazis abroad is an integral part of their war preparations. It is no less important to follow their methods, their channels and subterfuges and connections, than it is to reveal the real aims of Nazi rearmament.

On the third day of the rebellion the militia in Barcelona carried out a house-to-house search of the Spanish headquarters of the Nazis, their subsidiary organisations and certain of their individual members. The material which came into the hands of the militia in the course of the search was unexpectedly informative, and its most important contents deserve to be made generally known.

It is the first time since the Nazis came to power that such extensive and such incriminating material has been found. From tens of thousands of letters, circulars and reports we can follow and examine in their furthest ramifications the activities of the Nazis abroad, their conspiracy against peace and against democracy. The ambitions of the Third Reich in Spain, the struggle in the Mediterranean region, would be unthinkable but for the day-to-day detailed work of the Nazi conspirators. This is inseparably bound up with the rebel rising; it is part of the main war plan which entered on the first phase of its intended realisation with the events in Spain.

This book describes the detailed work, the day-to-day activities of the Nazis in Spain. It is precisely the same as their work in other countries. The material from Barcelona is a warning to democratic countries which must be heard if the work of the Nazis abroad is not to be carried through to its destructive end.

CHAPTER II

PRESS AND PROPAGANDA

“A GLANCE AT THE MAP shows the strategic importance of Spain in a German war with France.”

This is the opening sentence of a “Memorandum on the setting up of a press agency in Spain,” written by the head of the press section of the Nazi headquarters¹ in Spain. The memorandum was drafted in May 1935. At that time, as the correspondence shows, reports to Nazi headquarters in Spain began constantly to emphasise the fact that the Spanish people’s resistance to fascism was increasing in strength. A covering letter, written by Reder on May 10, 1935, and sent with the memorandum, makes it clear that headquarters was extremely alarmed at the Leftward swing then becoming obvious, and was preparing an extensive press campaign. “The strategic importance of Spain” was to be the central theme of this press attack.

Even before their seizure of power the Nazis set up press centres at the same time as they set up their organisations abroad in nearly every country in the world. After their seizure of power these centres were

¹ The word “headquarters” is used for simplicity. The term used by the Nazis is “Landesgruppenleitung,” literally, “leadership of the group of the country.”

plentifully supplied with funds. In this way a base was established in Spain from which the Nazis were constantly attacking, with the aim of disturbing, confusing and winning over public opinion.

Friedrich Burbach, the first head of the Nazi organisation in Spain and Portugal, maintained the closest relations with the reactionary anti-republican press in these two countries even before Hitler came to power. In a letter dated June 6, 1932, to Schulz in Madrid he was able to boast:

“ I have got the official organ of the government completely under my thumb. But this was only done after a first-class fight. I had to go the whole hog with these people. But I managed it all right. I let the President and other gentlemen in the government know that the Germany that is to be has a good memory, and that every article in which we are attacked will be carefully forwarded to the authoritative quarter, where it will not be forgotten.”

In this case the reference is to the official government journal of the Portuguese dictatorship. This letter solves a number of Portuguese “ riddles.” The Portuguese press is a close competitor of the Nazi press itself in the spreading of atrocity stories and lies about the republican government in Spain; Burbach's letter shows that it received its instructions from the Nazis.

The letter gives us a direct insight into the methods used by the Nazis to “ win ” the foreign press (“ I have

got the official organ of the government completely under my thumb"). Corruption and blackmail—these were the precepts for the press department which were left by Burbach to his successors. They faithfully observed the maxims of their master.

THE PRESS SUPERINTENDENT

Every local Nazi group abroad has its own "Press Superintendent," who deals with the foreign press. Zuchristian, head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, outlined the work of the press superintendents as follows in a circular dated February 1, 1934:

" 1. To watch the local press.

" 2. To keep in touch with directors and editors, irrespective of their political tendency, in order to ensure that they refrain from publishing anti-German articles and print articles placed at their disposal."

A fortnight later Hans Zeberer, head of the press and propaganda service of the Nazi Foreign Organisation in Berlin, issued a circular (45/34) extending the duties of the press superintendents; they were required not only to look after the press, but to keep an eye on private individuals visiting Germany. He put this as follows:

" If nationals of the country, or other foreigners, go back to other countries after visiting the new Germany, what sort of reports do they give, either publicly or privately, with regard to the impressions they have gained here? "

In Spain the Nazis had fifty press superintendents, or, as they were called later, press directors, who worked in accordance with these instructions. Fifty men were engaged in corrupting, threatening, blackmailing, observing, spying, denouncing: fifty men were conducting the "press service in Spain." At their head was the press director at Nazi headquarters in Spain. Until May 1936 this post of honour was filled by Herr Gustav Reder in Madrid. He was followed, up to the time of the rebellion, by Dr. Hans Sauter in Barcelona.

THE NETWORK OF THE PRESS

The Nazis are opposed to the holding of dual positions—and so Gustav Reder held three paid jobs at the same time. He was Nazi press director, he was publicity director to the "Madrid agency of the Reich Railways Centre for German tourist traffic," and he was press consultant to the German Embassy in Madrid, which, in addition, had another "press consultant." In this way he could appear, at his own discretion, as the strict Nazi, as the distinguished specialist on tourist traffic, or as the diplomat attached to the German Embassy. And if none of these was appropriate he pulled out of his pocket his credentials as representative of the *Deutsche Wochenschau* (German Weekly Review) and became simply an independent journalist. In a report of January 3, 1934, to the Foreign Organisation he himself described his work on the *Deutsche Wochenschau* in the following terms:

“He considers his collaboration as being above all a cloak for his official party activity in connection with the press. In this way he can prove that he is not carrying on any ‘Fascist propaganda,’ but is contributing to foreign as well as to Spanish newspapers.”

The case of Reder gives us an opportunity of studying the network of the Nazi press in Spain in its furthest ramifications. The formula of “press activity” covers work with Nazi institutions of the most varied kinds. As press and propaganda director, Reder received his instructions from the Foreign Organisation and from the Ministry of Propaganda. As observer he worked for the Gestapo. A German newspaper provided him with press credentials as “a cloak for his official party activity in connection with the press.” The German railways—ostensibly a purely commercial concern—put their offices and their numerous connections at his disposal. The German Embassy provided him with money for his agitational work. Over and over again we come across this interlacing of diplomatic Mission, Ministry of Propaganda, Gestapo, press activities and commercial enterprises in the operations of the Nazis.

FOR PURPOSES OF CAMOUFLAGE . . .

Gustav Reder's memorandum quoted above is a guide to Nazi methods of work in foreign countries—it shows Reder's threefold activity. We learn from it that the Nazi press service was carried out:

“in contact with the Embassy, and to some extent administering its funds.”

The memorandum also reveals how the money used for bribery was distributed. Reder tells us how the source of the money was concealed:

“In order to avoid possible enquiries as to the source of supplies it is advisable to rely upon an established Spanish agency.”

This Spanish agency sends in the articles and notes; on a purely commercial basis of course. Reder writes:

“For purposes of camouflage it is necessary to ask for a fee for publication: about 5 pesetas for ordinary articles, 10 for contributions from well-known writers.”

The fee is not actually collected. On the contrary. According to Reder, the journalists who place articles are paid for them. The newspapers that publish articles receive a fixed rate. Reder's information was supplemented by his successor, Dr. A. H. Sauter in Barcelona, in a memorandum which he wrote in May 1936:

“Now, what is the general procedure for placing articles? It can be put in this way: the press bureaux of the Embassy and the Consul-General, after looking through the material and rejecting what is quite unsuitable, pass on the articles to agencies (for

example the Servicio Prensa press service) which undertake to place them in the provincial press, in return for fixed payments. These little second and third rate papers are not particular, they get material to fill up their space, and a little something into the bargain, and they accept it."

The "little something," moreover, is quite considerable. It appears from the accounts that one small provincial paper received 250 pesetas for each issue.

Reder reported regularly how many contributions he had placed in the Spanish press. In the year 1934, 164 Nazi propaganda articles appeared in 30 different Spanish journals. In 1935 there was a great increase. Sixty-eight articles appeared in 25 journals in the first four months of 1935, and in the month of September, at the time of the German Nazi Congress at Nuremberg, 145 National Socialist articles and notices were published in the Spanish press. We learn also how much these publications cost. In the month of September alone the budget for articles, submitted by Reder as press director in Spain, amounted to 22,450 pesetas.

He not only paid newspapers and journalists for placing contributions, but he also asked important Spanish newspaper men for articles for German papers; these were paid for in advance at an average rate of 75 marks, and only in very rare cases did they ever appear in the German press. In the same month of September 1935 Reder spent 900 marks in payments

to Spanish journalists for articles of this kind. He was prudent enough, unfortunately, not to give the names of these journalists in his statement of accounts, and therefore we do not know what eminent men earned this money.

In addition to direct money payments, there were invitations to Spanish journalists from the Ministry of Propaganda and the diplomatic representatives to visit Germany. These were only effective for a certain time, and then it became necessary to resort once more to direct bribery. In his memorandum Dr. A. H. Sauter observes sadly:

“ Though certain editors, who have visited Germany as guests of the German Reich and had a very good time there, or others who have pleasant memories of invitations from the Embassy and Consul-General, are subsequently prepared to place such articles in their press for a certain time, in this sphere too I can only speak of superficial results, particularly having regard to the amount of money that has been spent.”

BRIBERY BY ADVERTISING

The whole range of Goebbels' devices is by no means covered by the methods of corruption outlined above. He called on German trade to finance his propaganda in Spain. For a long time Spain has been an important market for German industry. Large-scale German export enterprises, such as the chemical and medical

supplies industry, the electrical and motor trades, have had their own agencies in Spain. They had at their disposal considerable funds allocated for publicity, in order to advertise their goods. These advertising funds were now used to bribe the newspapers to support the policy of National Socialism. On March 11, 1935, the Nazi Foreign Trade Office issued the following circular, which shows that even apparently innocent German trade announcements abroad were being directed by the Nazis, and made use of for their military and political aims:

“ Foreign Trade Office,
22, Harvesterhuderweg,
Hamburg 13.

March 11, 1935.

To Spanish Headquarters
For Economic Section.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Advertising Contracts for German Industries in the Foreign Press.

Our previous information shows that there are increasing numbers of German firms, subsidiaries and agencies abroad, which advertise in papers hostile to Germany.

We are of opinion that it is not possible to interfere in all cases without injuring the market for the goods concerned—that is, without affecting German national economy; but under any circumstances it is possible

in many cases to transfer the advertisements in question to newspapers which are friendly to Germany without running any risk of injuring German export interests. We therefore request you to send us as soon as possible lists giving the following information:

1. German newspapers and journals friendly to Germany.
2. Journals hostile to Germany.
3. Journals that are neutral towards the new Germany.
4. German firms whose agencies and subsidiaries are at present advertising in journals hostile to Germany, or which are interested in advertising in the foreign press.

With this information we shall be able to examine in each case whether a transfer of the payments from hostile to friendly journals is possible, and whether the agency or subsidiary of one firm or another can be induced to place additional advertising funds at the disposal of a friendly newspaper abroad.

Heil Hitler !

(Signature)."

The reader who glances at an Opel advertisement or examines an advertisement of German wireless sets certainly does not realise that by means of a series of such advertisements the political tendencies of quite a number of newspapers in Spain have been "converted." By means of advertisements of this kind anti-Semitic publications were prevented from going out of

existence. A women's anti-Jewish organisation ran a weekly publication, *Lealtad*, which was the successor of the prohibited paper *Aspiraciones*. *Lealtad* got into difficulties, and the Fichte League in Spain, which is responsible for anti-Semitic propaganda, appealed to the Foreign Organisation with a request

“to help one of the most active anti-Semitic newspapers in Spain, *Lealtad*, which finds itself in difficulties.”

A letter of April 12, 1935, states explicitly:

“Advertising contracts would contribute materially to the solution of all these difficulties.”

BLACK AND WHITE

Complete special numbers for propaganda for Nazi Germany were financed out of the advertisements of German firms. The publishers of the great reactionary Catholic newspaper *A B C* issued a journal called *Blanco y Negro* (*Black and White*). The publishers of *A B C* were among Reder's “clients.” So it was decided to bring out a special German number of *Blanco y Negro*. How was it to be financed? One of the chief officials of the German Ministry of Propaganda, an engineer named Schubert, suggested the answer. Why not make use of Goebbels's “Publicity Board for German Industry,” the institution which concentrates all advertising in Germany? The Publicity Board was

instructed to supply *Blanco y Negro* with advertisements. The president of the Publicity Board complied with this order at once. On August 17, 1935, he sent the following letter to the Reich Industrial Section, and the tone of resignation suggests that the Foreign Organisation and the Propaganda Ministry were constantly bleeding this "Publicity Board" for the purposes of their financial operations:

"Although I do not regard special editions of newspapers as a particularly promising medium for publicity (see my statement at the 7th and 8th Sessions of the Supervisory Committee), it is often advisable for political reasons to give support in special cases to foreign publishers, who have done good service in connection with German affairs, by placing advertisements in special numbers which they propose to bring out. I regard these political considerations as applying particularly to the publishers of the newspaper *A B C*, a Spanish paper with a large circulation, which has adopted a consistently friendly attitude towards Germany. . . .

"As it is a question of the publishers of the newspaper *A B C*, however, I should welcome the participation of industrial firms in placing advertisements with the special edition, in the interests of maintaining the friendly attitude of the journal. . . ."

The maintenance of the friendly attitude of *A B C* was assured by means of these large advertising contracts.

GOEBBELS'S MOUTHPIECE IN SPAIN

With bureaucratic thoroughness, Reder made a card-index of the whole of the Spanish press, some 250 journals.

The publishers of the paper, its political standpoint, the names of the editors, its financial supporters and backers, as well as its attitude towards Hitler Germany, were entered up in this card-index. Bureaucratic thoroughness was their undoing.

We learn from the card-index that twenty-two leading newspapers in Spain are to be regarded as journals friendly to Germany. Among them we find *A B C*, mentioned above, which is the biggest Spanish paper; we find *Epoca* in Madrid and *Renovacion* in Barcelona. And the fact is established that, without exception, the most important journals of the monarchists, of Catholic reactionary and conservative circles, and of the Gil Robles party, were in the service of National Socialism. The collaboration of reactionary Catholicism and Gil Robles Fascism with National Socialism is proved beyond dispute by Reder's entries in his press card-index. National Socialism persecutes Catholicism only where it is democratic and on the side of the people. German Catholic priests who stand for the rights of the people, religious liberty and the observance of the Concordat in Germany, are persecuted, tortured and condemned by the same methods as their fellow-victims who are pacifists, socialists and

communists. But where Catholicism is against the people, where it allies itself with Fascism, directs and finances it, then it becomes the ally of National Socialism. Its journals are noted in Reder's card-index as "friendly to Germany."

The card-index reveals a further point. The card referring to the newspaper *Informaciones*, one of Gil Robles's papers, contains the entry: "May be regarded as Germany's mouthpiece." It is also recorded on the card who mainly financed this "German mouthpiece." Juan March, the man who as far back as during the war was charged with being in communication with the German War Command, the man whom the leading sections of the foreign press describe as the person who has financed the rebels. This man was the chief financial backer of Goebbels's mouthpiece in Spain. Here his direct connection with the rebels is revealed. The journal *Informaciones* published more National Socialist material than any other Spanish newspaper. Goebbels, the Lord Privy Seal of Race doctrine, and Juan March, whose ancestry does not stand investigation by the "Race Department," find themselves in alliance against the Spanish people for the setting up of a Fascist dictatorship in Spain.

HAMBURG-BREMEN INFORMATION COMMITTEE

Where did Reder and his colleagues obtain material to supply to the bought Spanish press, which included, in

the course of the year 1935, as many as fifty journals?

On the third floor of the Stock Exchange building in Hamburg is to be found a "Hamburg-Bremen Information Committee," with the title in brackets: "Authorised Agency of Various Ministries of the Reich." Its general manager is Dr. G. Kurt Johannsen. He is "Pg" (party comrade) in communications to the Foreign Organisation in Germany; in communications to foreign countries he is called "Herr Dr. Johannsen." What is this "agency" authorised to do? To influence public opinion abroad. At regular intervals, once or twice a week, Dr. Johannsen despatches several articles, which are placed in the foreign press by the press directors of the Nazi Division of each country. Among them are some very harmless articles, such as "On the growth and development of a social science of dentistry." Naturally this science "grows and develops" only in Nazi Germany. But the "Johannsen service"—as the press service of the Information Committee was called—is not merely engaged in carrying on propaganda for German dentistry; in every batch of articles we find contributions directed against France, against England, against democracy. The reader in Spain generally had these contributions presented to him with the signature of a Spaniard attached. He did not suspect that these efforts first saw the light in an office in Hamburg, and were translated into Spanish in a tourist office in Madrid.

There were certain difficulties in placing the contributions of the "Johannsen service." The articles were too dull and too abstract. In several letters Reder complains that he and his colleagues have had a lot of trouble in adapting the articles "to give them a touch of Spanish superficiality."

GESTAPO JOURNALISM

While papers that are favourable to Hitler receive money, journals which give objective or actually hostile reports are "supervised and subjected to pressure." Sincere Spanish journalists who told the truth about the Third Reich were denounced by Reder to the Foreign Organisation and the Ministry of Propaganda. This correspondence contains several denunciations which led to the expulsion of Spanish journalists from Germany.

Thus on August 16, 1935, Reder made a report on the journalist Don Gerardo Isla, who was the representative in Germany of the leading Catalan paper *Vanguardia*. It is stated that as a rule Isla only gives veiled hints in a very skilful form, so that it is impossible to catch him, but the report continues:

"Lately he has been getting more audacious, and it seems to us that it is time to rap him over the knuckles."

The "rapping" was carried out in Berlin.

The journalist agent of the Gestapo not only kept the

Spanish newspapers under observation; he also exercised the strictest control over the activities of German press representatives in Spain. Information Bulletin 15, 281/34, gave instructions for the first time to the press directors abroad to report on German press representatives. Gustav Reder was particularly delighted to accept this commission, and sent reports regularly. From these we learn who married Jewesses or Spaniards, or even simply became friendly with them. The representative of the *Berliner Tageblatt* is described as bohemian; it is alleged about another man that his expenses are out of all proportion to his income. A third is under suspicion because he often lunches with a well-known Republican. From among many "cases" we select that of Frau Elma Mahlau-Mann, who represented the *Kölnische Zeitung* in Madrid. In the year 1933 she was accused of having passed on a confidential document from the German Embassy to a foreign colleague of left tendencies, and, together with her husband, of having taken part in socialist activities. The accusations came from Herr von Goss, the Madrid representative of the German News Agency. The German Embassy in Madrid reported them to the Ministry of Propaganda, which thereupon gave orders to the *Kölnische Zeitung* for the instant dismissal of Frau Mahlau-Mann. Frau Mahlau-Mann attempted at least to have the man who had denounced her brought face-to-face with her. Dr. Mey, counsellor to the Embassy, and Zuchristian, head of the Nazi organisation in

Spain, refused to arrange this. In addition, Frau Mahlau-Mann was charged with having received visits from the former press attaché of the Austrian Embassy, Dr. Wasserbeck, who had been arrested in Germany and expelled. In a letter, a copy of which was found in the files of the Spanish headquarters, Frau Mahlau-Mann's husband described what had happened in the following words:

"To-day a member of the National Socialist Party has only to denounce us, and we lose our jobs. But that is not enough; the government has recommended the man who denounced us as our successor."

A classical case of Nazi denunciation. No chance for the accused to clear herself. She was not only removed from her post, but it was made impossible for her to continue to work for the German press, and Dr. Goebbels recommended as her successor the man who had denounced her.

TRAVELLING SPEAKERS IN SPAIN

Gustav Reder had also been made responsible for National Socialist propaganda by means other than the press. This propaganda was carried on by means of films, wireless lectures, so-called cultural institutions, etc.

In 1935, Hans Zeberer, who was head of the Press and Propaganda Section of the Foreign Organisation,

was appointed head of the "Agency for Speakers," which was responsible for sending out propaganda speakers to the various countries. Speakers were arranged for January 30, the day of the "National Revolution," for Hitler's birthday and for May 1st.

The Foreign Office provides the money for these travelling speakers. It appears from a letter of Zeberer's dated May 29, 1935, that the Foreign Office established a special fund for these propagandists of National Socialism in foreign countries. The highest diplomatic authority in the Third Reich, therefore, considers that it is its function to finance propaganda tours to democratic countries abroad which are directed against the constitution and stability of the democratic form of the State. It sent out its emissaries with official instructions to undermine the foundations of the government and constitution of the country, regardless of the fact that the Third Reich had an Embassy in Madrid, and that there was not a state of war, but that, as the phrase runs, "friendly relations were maintained with the Spanish republic." These propaganda tours of Nazi celebrities in Spain were a part of the "Non-intervention" in the internal affairs of the Spanish republic.

THE CULTURE DEPARTMENT

The Foreign Organisation has its own "Culture Department," which not only has to spread abroad Rosenberg's conceptions of culture, but also attempts

to use for its own aims the admiration which the heritage of German culture inspires all over the world. The Culture Department cleansed the German libraries in Spain. In the middle of June, 1935, the foreign missions were instructed to send in information as to books that were available. This information was examined by the Culture Department. The foreign missions were then told which of the books were to disappear. In this way it was possible to do without a black list, against which the Culture Department had political scruples; but nevertheless the dangerous books were removed from the libraries, on instructions from the Culture Department.

“WE HAVE HARNESSSED _____”

This same Culture Department is in charge of German musical activities abroad. A statement issued by the Department on September 20, 1935, to all Foreign Headquarters begins with the words:

“For the purpose of carrying out effective cultural propaganda for the Third Reich, in the sphere of music as well as others, Department 9 has harnessed in its service the leading orchestras and choirs, as well as the best-known soloists.”

NAZI FILMS IN SPAIN

The head of the film section of the Nazi Division in Spain has by no means an easy job. Since Dr. Goebbels took charge of German films they are hardly ever to

be seen in cinemas abroad. The head of the film section therefore has to concentrate his attention chiefly on discovering Jews and freemasons in the Spanish film industry, so as at any rate to provide scapegoats for the failure of German films. A circular from the Film Department of the Foreign Organisation, dated November 22, 1935, throws some light on this hunt after Jews and freemasons:

“(1) Which German film company or renter does the above-mentioned firm represent? (Ilfa, Tobis, Cine Allianz, etc.)

(2) Who are the owner and manager of the above firm?

(3) Are they Jews or freemasons?

(4) Nationality of owner and directors?

(5) What are the commercial relations between the above firm and the owners of cinemas in the country where you are stationed?

(6) In whose hands are the majority of cinemas there, i.e. under Jewish or Aryan ownership?

(7) On what basis does the firm operate; does it rent German films direct to cinema owners, or is it to be regarded solely as an agency, which is itself connected with the renting firms established in the particular place?

(8) Do the owners and directors of the above firm carry on any kind of provocative activities against the new Germany, or have they frequently expressed themselves unfavourably towards it?

(9) Is a change absolutely necessary in the interests of German film exports?

(10) What Aryan firm can you suggest to take their place? In this connection it must be noted that only those firms can be considered which are actually in a position to handle German films successfully in the country where you are stationed. The German film export industry cannot afford any further decline in exports to this country."

The enquiry relates to the "A C E" film company in Madrid. It did not lead to an increase in the turnover of films.

PRIVATE FILM SHOWS

Once or twice a month the Propaganda Ministry smuggled pure propaganda films into Spain, by way of the German Embassy, and these films made the round of the local sections. Not censored, and paying no duty, they were exhibited at private shows. The most exact records were kept of every show. From the film reports which have been found it appears that over sixty per cent of those who attended these shows were Spaniards, mostly members of the Fascist Phalanx and of the Gil Robles party. In the first half of 1936, 397 private film shows took place in Spain.

Among others the German Embassy circulated the film *Hereditary Disease*, which was to bring before the eyes of the Spaniards the horrors of "race-betrayal."

In another film "Labour Service" was presented as a paradise. It goes without saying that "Will-power Triumphant" also found a place among the smuggled films. But this favourite of the Führer's had to submit to some cuts; there was rather too much marching in the film, even for the Phalangists. This was cautiously pointed out by Schulenberg, head of the film section, in a letter of March 1936:

"The film, however, would have to be somewhat shortened for the audiences here, not so as to cut out with a view to the mentality of a Spanish audience, just those parts that are essential for us, but on the contrary, so as not to relax the interest of the audience in the very long and continually recurring incidents of the march past."

REICH RAILWAYS CENTRE FOR TOURIST TRAFFIC

It would naturally be expected that the Madrid agency of the Reich Railways Centre would sell tickets. Not a bit of it. Every possible sort of business was transacted at this agency, but railway tickets were not to be had. We know from the secret instructions which Dr. Goebbels issued in 1933 that tourist offices were established as auxiliaries for the political propaganda of National Socialism. In Madrid this was carried so far that, as was previously stated, the Nazi press director was also made propaganda chief of the Reich Railways agency. At his suggestion a circular was issued by the head of the Nazi organisation in

Spain, on March 8, 1935, dealing with the Reich Railways Centre, and revealing the real nature of this enterprise:

" 1. All local sections and supporting units must send in by March 25 at latest a list and one copy of every newspaper and important journal appearing in the area concerned, in so far as it deals with tourist traffic and is worth considering with a view to sending the regular press service of the Reich Railways Centre for German Tourist Traffic. The circulation should be given in the list.

2. By March 30 a list must be prepared, based on general enquiries, of people, whatever their nationality, who are in a position to visit Germany. In addition to christian name and surname the list must show: (a) rank or academic title and profession; (b) special interests such as politics, music, art and architecture, science, health resorts, purchase of goods and so on; (c) whether the person concerned has already been to Germany . . ."

Reder sent some of his political material to the press through the press service of the Reich Railways Centre which is mentioned here. Point 2 of the circular shows that the Nazis regarded tours to Germany by foreign visitors as a political factor. The demand for information showing the political interests of the tourist in question can have no other meaning.

NO MARKET IN SPAIN FOR DR. GOEBBELS

It was also one of the duties of the head of the press and propaganda section to disseminate theoretical books on National Socialism in Spanish. A duty which was not easily performed, particularly as many authors, for example Dr. Goebbels, wished to combine pleasure with profit, and to extract high royalties from Spain. There is an entertaining correspondence on the attempts to get Dr. Goebbels' book *Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei* placed with a Spanish publisher. Whether the following letter of Reder's ever came to the knowledge of Dr. Goebbels cannot be discovered from the files. At any rate let it come to light here:

" Re Press Section Hou /Coe /

Dr. Goebbels

Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei.

Referring to your letter of April 4, I must inform you that there is probably hardly a single publisher in Spain who will take the risk of publishing the above-mentioned book in the Spanish language, particularly if, as appears to be the case, the Eher Verlag is demanding high royalties. On the contrary every publisher, under the pretext that it is 'propaganda' for us, would require either that we should take a large number of copies, or that we should pay for publication. This fact unfortunately cannot be disputed, however regrettable it may be, and if we

Der Reichsminister
für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda

Berlin NS, den 19. Dezember 1934
Wilhelmplatz 8-9
Telefon Nr. 11 24 21

Sachverhalt: VII 7040/24.11.34.
(In der Statistik angegeben) (He 11/2)

20. Dez. 1934

An die

Reichsleitung der NSDAP
Auslands-Organisation

Hamburg 13
Harvestenaderweg 22.

76204/2

betrifft: Literatur über die Geschichte
u. Organisation der NSDAP.

St. V. 11/11
11/11
mit Prof. Dr. H. H. H. H. H.
H. H. H. H. H.

In der Anlage übersende ich abschriftlich ein von der Reichspropagandaleitung der NSDAP München hierher weitergeleitetes Schreiben eines Reginaldo Hernandez in Salamanca, Spanien, mit dem Antrag auf Übersendung von Literatur über die Geschichte und Organisation der NSDAP.

Ich bitte um Weiterleitung des Antrages an die für Hernandez zuständige Ortsgruppe der NSDAP mit dem Anheimstellen, unter Beachtung der erforderlichen Vorsicht dem Eingeklägten ein geeignetes Material zur Verfügung zu stellen.

Ich verweise hierbei auf das Werk „La Revolucion Nacional-socialista“ von Vicente Gay, welches im spanischen Buchhandel-Verlag v. Libreria Bosch, Barcelona erhältlich ist und für vorliegenden Zweck besonders geeignet erscheint.

Im Auftrag

[Signature]

Letter from German Reich Ministry of Propaganda to the Nazi Foreign Organisation, asking the Nazi local section at Salamanca to give propaganda material, "with the necessary precautions," to Reginaldo Hernandez.

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Stabschef: Weiler
Ortsgruppe Barcelona
Hafendienstleiter



Stabschef:
Alfred Engling

Barcelona, d. 14.2.1936

Landeshafendienstleiter Hg. Cords

Apartado 579

Madrid

Betrifft: Thofern

Anbei erhalten die 2 Bilder des Vg. Bernhard Thofern, die Sie bitte nach Berlin zur Vervielfältigung für die Grenzbehörden weiterleiten wollen.

Hell d. Gef.

Hafendienstleiter.



Letter from Engling, "Harbour Service leader" in Barcelona, sending Cords, his superior in Madrid, photograph of an anti-Nazi, Thofern, to be sent on to German frontier authorities.

want this and other fundamental works on National Socialism to be published in Spanish-speaking countries, we shall have to put our hands pretty deep in our pockets."

GERMAN RADIO PROPAGANDA IN SPAIN

The press and propaganda work of the press directors in Spain receives powerful support through the direct influencing of the Spanish people from Germany itself. The German radio sends out every week a number of Spanish talks on the successes and the "real nature" of National Socialism. At the end of each broadcast listeners are asked to send the Radio Company their opinion of the broadcast and suggestions for improving the programme. The same thing is done by French and English stations at the end of their international talks. But the German radio is not concerned with getting suggestions for improving its programme; its real aim is to get the names and addresses of Spanish citizens on whom regular Nazi propaganda can be brought to bear. Every Spaniard who writes to the German radio in connection with its broadcasts is notified to the Nazi Foreign Organisation. The Foreign Organisation then passes on the name and address to the Nazi organisation in the country concerned. Thenceforward the writer of the letter is constantly receiving Nazi propaganda material. The following letter, dated January 6, 1936, from the Nazi Foreign Organisation to Nazi headquarters in Spain, shows this process:

Ds

“To headquarters in Spain.

An office here writes to the Foreign Organisation as follows: ‘Further to my letter of July 1, 1935—vii 7040/14.6.35 (1) I send you the attached copy of a further letter from Juan Perez Martin—fully described above—for your information, with the request to pass on to him through the appropriate local section the enclosed educational material. Annexed you will find, for your information, a letter sent by the above on 27.11 to the Reich Radio Company.’

The pamphlets referred to are being sent under separate cover. . . .”

The man mentioned in the letter, Juan Perez Martin, was a resident of Melilla, Spanish Morocco. On instructions from Nazi headquarters in Spain, the Nazi supporting unit in Melilla got into touch with Perez Martin. After a number of talks with the head of the Nazi unit Perez Martin became the Nazi liaison officer with the Fascist Phalanx; and Melilla subsequently informed Spanish headquarters, in a letter dated May 6, 1936, that it had to thank Perez Martin for “valuable information.” This is an example of how the German radio was used to mobilise Spanish fighters against the Spanish Republic.

IBERIAN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE

The “Iberian-American Institute” was also busy spreading Nazi influence in Spain. All Nazi local sections were required to send a monthly list of names

and addresses to which the Institute's journal should be sent. Spaniards who made any enquiries of the Institute were also reported to the Nazi Foreign Organisation, which passed on the names to the Nazi headquarters in Spain "for further action."

The festival of the Spanish race which is celebrated in October of each year was used by the Iberian-American Institute as an occasion for undertaking special propaganda: it organised a special celebration at which there were speeches by prominent National Socialists. The Nazi race theory was the central theme of the main speeches. In 1935 von Ribbentrop delivered the chief speech, and stressed the cultural mission of the race idea and race purity. The celebration was relayed over the wireless, Ribbentrop's speech being specially translated into Spanish. And it did not fall on barren ground. In 1936 the rebels in Saragossa celebrated the Feast of the Spanish Race by murdering one Jew and persecuting the few other Jewish inhabitants of that town.

THE PROPAGANDA MINISTRY INTERVENES

The Reich Ministry of Propaganda, too, did not stick at direct intervention in Spanish politics and striving to win Spaniards for the Nazi fight against the Spanish Republic. The material found at Barcelona shows that the Ministry of Propaganda sent material to a number of Spaniards whose names it had picked up in one way or another. The Ministry was fully

conscious of the fact that this was direct intervention in Spain's internal affairs, and therefore in its letters to the Foreign Organisation always pointed out that the propaganda material was to be sent on "with the necessary precautions." A letter from the Reich Ministry of National Enlightenment and Propaganda, dated February 19, 1934, is specially enlightening as to its methods of work:

"Attached please find copy of a letter from Reginaldo Hernandez in Salamanca, Spain, sent on by the head of the Reich Propaganda Department of the N.S.D.A.P. in Munich, with the request for literature on the history and organisation of the N.S.D.A.P. to be despatched.

Please send on the instruction to the appropriate local section of the N.S.D.A.P., asking them to place at the disposal of the applicant, with the necessary precautions, some material of a suitable kind. . . ."

The Nazi Foreign Organisation passed on this letter from the Ministry of Propaganda to Nazi headquarters in Spain on January 9, 1935, with the observation:

" that such matters should be handled with great care."

They knew very well why care was necessary. The name of Reginaldo Hernandez kept cropping up in subsequent correspondence. He established close associations with the Nazi organisation and became one of their most important links with Spanish Fascism.

Even the "Private Chancellery of Adolf Hitler" was represented in the documents found at Nazi headquarters in Spain. There were a number of letters from it to Spanish citizens, which were transmitted by the Foreign Organisation to Spanish headquarters with instructions to pass them on to the addressee—"if he's worth receiving such letters." On July 6, 1936, the Foreign Organisation wrote to Nazi headquarters in Spain:

"Re Chancellery of the Führer.

Attached please find 6 letters from the Chancellery of the Führer, as listed below, which please pass on after you have noted and *considered* them.

W. Messer, Barcelona.

Marguerite Larroque, Orthez.

Garcia Garrido, Olleria, Valencia.

Al Diaz Vinnesa, Alfaro.

Mario & José del Amo, Pampliege.

Pedro A. Rullen, Palma di Mallorca."

THE GERMAN FICHTE LEAGUE

The German Fichte League, ostensibly independent of the N.S.D.A.P., but actually working strictly under its direction, carried on its activities in Spain. The Nazis gave it the title of "Union for World Truth." Previously it was called "Reich League against Versailles." During the war the Fichte League was the propaganda organisation of pan-Germanism at home and abroad. A prospectus describing the "Revisionist

Propaganda of the German Fichte League " contains the following :

" The German Fichte League was founded in January 1914 with the object of achieving the high ideals of Fichte. In 1919, after the dictatorial treaty of Versailles, with its extortionate reparations, came into force, the League took up the struggle against the Versailles Treaty."

In the same statement the following " Important Notes " are to be found :

" (1) In view of the difficult economic position we are continuing to issue all our pamphlets free of charge as hitherto. . . .

(4) The names of those responsible are not given, on principle.

(5) You are requested to put a pamphlet into each of your letters abroad.

(6) Commerical firms or other enterprises which might be afraid of some adverse results from sending out the pamphlets of the Fichte League should arrange to send them in wrappers without the address of the sender.

(7) To individuals who are still to be won over, one pamphlet should be sent each week, not several pamphlets together.

(8) It is very desirable to make a practice of putting one of our pamphlets into all communications."

The annual report of the Fichte League for the year 1935 shows that this organisation issued 75 pamphlets, 64 of them in foreign languages, in that year alone. In the same year it sent abroad five million copies of pamphlets, and five tons of books.

The Fichte League is under the control of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Office. Rosenberg's agent in the League is the head of the propaganda department, Kessemeier, who is closely related to the founder of the League. Its headquarters are in Hamburg.

The chief representative of the Fichte League in Spain was A. Kroeger in Barcelona; we shall come across his name again in the chapter which deals with the sending of arms to Spain by the Nazis. There is an extensive correspondence between him and the headquarters of the Nazi Spanish Division from which it can be seen in particular that National Socialism made a great point of accepting as members of the Fichte League only those who were not National Socialists. The reasons for this are obvious. The Fichte League was sent out as an advance guard to engage in the boldest and most open propaganda actions. It distributed pamphlets in Spanish. It permeated Spanish Morocco, and from there extended to French Morocco, where its activities led to certain German ships being forbidden to moor in Moroccan harbours. The Fichte League was the most open propagandist of the new German imperialism. Hence the apparent separation from the Nazi organisation, and the decision that only

those who were not National Socialists were to work for the Fichte League in Spain. The Nazis were not to compromise themselves. But a letter which the former head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, Walter Zuchristian, wrote to the Foreign Organisation on May 25, 1935, proves that an intimate connection existed. The letter is marked "Urgent. Confidential. Concerns the German Fichte League and the Foreign Office":

"Yesterday I received a telephone call from Kroeger, when he gave me the following information: In a regulation issued by Hess, representative of the Führer, it is expressly stated that propaganda abroad and the influencing of foreigners has been transferred in the main to the Foreign Political Office. As Kessemeier of the Fichte League simultaneously becomes an official of the Foreign Political Office in Hamburg the conclusion is drawn that the Fichte League here is entitled, and considers itself charged by the party, to take over press propaganda. . . ."

The letter then deals with the friction between the Nazi headquarters and the representatives of the Fichte League in Spain. This was settled. The Fichte League took over the issuing of pamphlets, the Nazi organisation retained its responsibility for the press. In the records of the Fichte League a card-index was found, which included over 100,000 names. The Spanish Fichte League pamphlets were sent to these addresses.

In a period of only six months the Fichte League distributed 23 different pamphlets in Spanish, in editions of 25,000 to 150,000. Among them were speeches of Hitler, Hess, Goebbels and Schacht; among them too was an article by the English Lord Rothermere in support of the Hitler regime; a pamphlet called "Sven Hedin's call for Colonial Restitution"; and not least, five pamphlets against the "Lying Politics" of France. The pamphlets were published by the Falken Verlag in Hamburg, and printed by Hermanns Erben, also in Hamburg. From 1934 the pamphlets were produced without a publisher's or printer's imprint.

In the letter just quoted we came across traces of Alfred Rosenberg and his Foreign Political Office. This theoretician of the new German imperialism was responsible for decisive activities abroad. He had a hand in the rising in Austria, in the actions of the Henlein movement in Czecho-Slovakia, in the work of the Rexists in Belgium, in Nazi activities in the Baltic States. He had a hand in the game in Spain: we find Rosenberg's deputies in important towns in Spain and Spanish Morocco. The press and propaganda directors of the Nazi organisation in Spain and the Fichte League prepared the ground for these activities. Rosenberg's agents organised them and helped to carry them through. We shall have more to say about them.

CHAPTER III

THE "HOHEITSTRÄGER"

"Everywhere in the world to-day there are firmly-knit local groups of the National Socialist German Labour Party, willing instruments of the Leader."

—State Councillor Schmidt-Bodenstedt,
Member of the Reichstag, on January 30, 1935,
addressing the German colony in Madrid.

"IT WAS MY ORIGINAL intention not to undertake political activity here, as I did not know how things stood here. But here too such intensive work is being carried on that, as an old Nazi, I could not let myself be kept out of it."

The "old Nazi" who could not let himself be kept out of the work was Hans Hellermann, 28 years of age, who since April 1936 was leader of the Nazi organisation in Spain. The passage quoted above is from a letter which he wrote on March 24, 1934, to a friend in his native town, Schwelm.

Hans Hellermann was the fourth of Hitler's viceroys in the Iberian Peninsula. The first leader of the Nazi organisation in Spain and Portugal was Friedhelm Burbach, who was working as an "export merchant" in Lisbon from 1930. The article of export for which he sought a market was National Socialism. Burbach, too, was an old Nazi. A successful and rapid career in the

Nazi Party brought him in 1934 promotion to the post of leader of Foreign Section No. IV. (later No. II.) of the "Foreign Organisation of the National Socialist German Labour Party."

In 1930 Friedhelm Burbach began to build up a Nazi organisation in Portugal, receiving not inconsiderable help from the official representatives of the German Republic in Portugal. In pamphlets and articles in the press he waged a campaign against the "Jewish Republic," while he had his post sent to the address of the Lisbon diplomatic representative of this "Jewish Republic." Even before Hitler's seizure of power, registered members of the National Socialist Party were in the Lisbon Embassy as in all other Embassies of the German Reich; these members kept the Nazi leaders informed in the most precise detail of every action taken by the German Republic in foreign affairs, and worked zealously to help in discrediting the Republic abroad and eventually abolishing it.

Many of Burbach's letters show that he maintained extremely close relations with the Portuguese authorities, and with their help he extended his connections from Portugal into Spain as early as 1931 and 1932. He worked in conjunction with Walter Zuchristian, an employee of the Siemens agency in Madrid, to spread the brown net in Spain.

After January 30, 1933, Burbach was promoted to be the Nazi Foreign Commissioner for Spain and Portugal. A certain Hermann Sack took over the leadership of

the Spanish organisation, while Walter Zuchristian was responsible for the area of Southern and Central Spain.

After Burbach's appointment to the Foreign Section he got rid of Sack in the usual way. Sack was involved in an inner-Party financial scandal, and he was replaced by Walter Zuchristian, who was thus rewarded by Burbach for the help he had given in building up the organisation.

According to the confidential "Information Bulletin of the Foreign Organisation," the Nazi organisations in Great Britain and Ireland, France, Spain, Portugal, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, Algeria, Tunis, Spanish Morocco and French Morocco were entrusted to Burbach's care. In this way important experiences gained in France and England were conveyed to Spain and *vice versa*.

NAZI WORK IN SPAIN

Immediately after its accession to power, National Socialism began to develop its work abroad on a very wide basis. It was now no longer dependent on grants or on what it could extort. National Socialism was now in full control of the State Treasury, and poured out German marks abroad in a most lavish style. A letter from Burbach to Zuchristian, dated August 12, 1933, says: "The organisation in Spain can count on a large subsidy." At the time when Burbach wrote this letter the Spanish pendulum was already clearly swinging to the Right. In the early days of the Spanish Republic

National Socialism, fearing reprisals and over-estimating the watchfulness of the Republicans, had worked with caution, and concentrated its activity mainly on setting up Nazi cells and supporting units. The following extract from Zuchristian's letter to Burbach, dated June 12, 1933, indicates the nature of the Nazi activities of that period:

"We are biding our time. For the time being we are keeping quiet and making all preparations to be in a position to become active when the swing comes. All the signs indicate that the people are sick of the Left regime and will shake it off. Don't worry; our 'Og's' (local sections) are ready for that moment."

That moment came soon. The 1933 elections brought victory to Gil Robles. The "Radical" Lerroux, who held the premiership as regent for Fascism, made provision for the entry of the Gil Robles Party into the State machine. Just as the Nazis, before they seized power, had already crept into the vital strategic positions in the German Republic, so Gil Robles's agents took possession of the vital posts of command in the Spanish Republic.

Political murder directed against the Left was on the orders of the day. It was legalised in October 1934, when Gil Robles, through his deputy Lerroux, strangled the autonomy of the Catalan Republic, sent the "Tercio" to carry out its bloody work in Asturias, organised the closing down and burning of Trade

Union buildings, and inflicted the torments of Spanish prisons on thirty thousand adherents of the Left.

The "old Nazis" were in their element in such political conditions. As early as June 1933, Zuchristian issued a circular instructing the local groups to establish close connections with the "Fascio" organisation. Gil Robles went to the Nazi Congress at Nuremberg as representative of his Party, putting an official seal on the alliance between National Socialism and Spanish Fascism. Selected leaders of the Gil Robles Party were sent to Hitler Germany for training courses, while "old Nazis," who were carrying on their mischievous activities in Spain, became instructors to the different varieties of Spanish Fascism.

Letters written by the leaders of the Nazi organisation in Spain during that period prove the blood-relationship between Spanish Fascism and National Socialism. In a letter dated October 18, 1934, Zuchristian expresses his approval of the bloody suppression of the Asturias rising by the "Tercio" and the Moors in the following words: "Now they're setting about it the right way! The Red fraternity is getting its *coup de grâce*!" And in another letter Zuchristian made the following comment on President Azana's arrest: "This agitator has only got the fate he deserved!"

The years of the Gil Robles regime were the most prosperous years for the Nazis in Spain. A powerful organisation was built up. Some fifty local sections and

supporting units were established in Spain and Spanish Morocco. As in all other countries, the Nazi organisation in Spain was built on the following principle: the local section and the supporting unit form the core for local activities, and round these are grouped the subsidiary organisations, such as the German Labour Front, the German School Associations, the German Church Associations, the League of German Women Abroad, and so on. The Nazi cells do not come into the open; this is the function of the so-called "German colony" in each place.

One precautionary measure, of which use has been made, particularly in France, was also applied in Spain. The chief Nazi leaders received posts in large German firms or the agencies of German firms in Spain. Zuchristian was "employed" at the Siemens agency in Madrid, together with his Gestapo chief, Carl Cords, head of the "Harbour Service." Hans Hellermann, head of the Barcelona local section and later of the whole Nazi organisation in Spain, was enabled, through his Party connections, to cloak his activities behind the "Import Merchants" Hellermann & Philippi. Engling, Harbour Service leader in Barcelona, and his assistant were employees of the firm "Gutermann Silks." Kindler von Knobloch, head of the supporting unit at Alicante, "worked" for the Sloman Steamship Line. By these means Nazified German commerce both financed and cloaked the activities of National Socialism in Spain.

The Nazi headquarters in Spain and the local sections were organised on the military pattern. To begin with, the Foreign Organisation issued "Orders of the Day." There are "Service Regulations" and a "Service Routine" which must be strictly observed. Every year the so-called political leaders have to renew their oath. The Party has its own courts and penalties. The heads of the Nazi organisation in each country and of the local sections have their "staffs" and their "adjutants." (How could an organisation built on military lines manage without its adjutants?) They have their "Harbour Service Leaders"—a harmless title which serves to conceal the Gestapo chiefs. There is an Economic Department, whose task can be simply and plainly described as economic espionage. The Director of Training has to see that the members are theoretically seasoned. The Press Director corrupts the press; the Film Section smuggles films. The Treasurer of the Nazi organisation in each country keeps his books in such a form that the subsidies from Germany and from industrial concerns cannot be recognised as such. The treasurer for "Nazi Social Welfare" supervises the collection of funds, which are then devoted to any purpose other than social welfare. Later chapters will bring out in greater detail the labours of this whole "staff."

The head of the organisation in each country and the heads of the local groups are absolute masters in their own sphere. The "Führer" has bestowed on them the title of "Hoheitsträger" (literally, bearers of

greatness), and even the diplomatic representatives of the Third Reich are subordinate to their "greatness"—they are the real representatives of the Third Reich abroad. The political leaders—this is what the most important functionaries down to the heads of the local sections are styled—receive their political directives partly through various Information Bulletins which are issued regularly. The most important of these bulletins is the "Information Bulletin of the Foreign Organisation," which has been issued regularly since 1934 and is printed on thin paper. It contains strictly confidential service regulations in the form of "Orders issued by the Regional Leader." The following order is typical of many hundreds issued:

"Foreign Trade Office, 152/35.

Cover names in circulars.

Please in future, when answering *Circulars from the Foreign Trade Office*, use the following cover names:

Aryans : Group 1.

Party Members : Group 50.

Freemasons : Group M.

Jews : Group U.

For normal correspondence, however, the terms Aryan, Party Member, Freemason and Jew are to be used as previously.

Berlin, May 17, 1935.

W. BISSE."

Apart from this Information Bulletin there are twenty other special bulletins issued by sections of the Foreign
Es

Organisation to convey their special instructions to the "political leaders" in Spain.

The dependence of some of these special sections and organisations on the head of the Nazi organisation in Spain was carefully covered up. This was the case particularly with the German Labour Front, the German Fichte League and the organisations grouped together in the "League of German Associations"—such as the School Association, the Sports Association, the Mutual Help Association, the Scientific Exchange Service, the Catholic and Evangelical Communities, and so on. The concealment of the real relations was also intended to deceive the members of these German organisations abroad, many of whom were not at all in sympathy with National Socialism.

NO TRUST IN THE PARTY LEADERS

About the middle of 1935 signs of a crisis began to appear in the Nazi organisation in Spain. The Nazis began to be influenced by the information they received from Germany of the deterioration of the economic situation there. The Leftward swing then developing in Spanish politics had a demoralising effect on the Nazi groups; and by no means the least important factor was that the head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, who had maintained a haughty isolation from the members, had lost their confidence. Splits developed in the local sections, as at Barcelona, Bilbao and Malaga. Scandals came to light. The groups were

torn asunder by intrigues, ambitions and envy. Steffin, leader of the Madrid local section, was accused of peculation and had to resign his post; the Party court held that he had in fact committed some defalcation at the Osram concern, but contented itself with giving him a reprimand. Steffin disappeared from the leadership of the Madrid local section, and subsequently "fell up the stairs," undertaking an important piece of work for the German Labour Front, and in June 1936 even being the selected candidate for the leadership of the German Labour Front in South America. A conviction on a charge of peculation is thus seen to be a qualification for the most exalted posts.

The head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, Zuchristian, was unable to cope with the problems presented by the developing splits in the Nazi ranks. Erich Schnaus, in a letter dated March 27, 1936, states with regard to Zuchristian:

"It has become clear from all the cells that the present condition of the Groups is due to the inadequate contact between the leadership and the membership of the Party and the membership's complete lack of confidence in the leadership. The view has been repeatedly expressed to me—and especially by Party members who remained loyal even before the taking over of power—that the individual small Party member has been forgotten by the leadership. . . .

... I myself have had sufficient evidence, in the course of discussions, of the lack of a comradely spirit."

At the end of 1935 Zuchristian was summoned to Berlin to give a report on his work. He did not return to his post.

THE NAZIS CAMOUFLAGE THEMSELVES

Zuchristian was replaced by Erich Schnaus, who was sent to Madrid to reorganise the Nazis in Spain. He was then on the staff of the Foreign Organisation; previously he had been leader of the Madrid local section. In rather less than eighteen months' work in Germany he reached the level of assistant-leader of a Blackshirt storm troop, and ranked as one of the Gestapo confidential agents in the Foreign Organisation. It was this Gestapo man who, as he puts it in a letter to the Foreign Organisation, dated March 27, 1936, was to "make the sections in Spain ready to strike."

The sections' "readiness to strike," at a time when the People's Front was in power, could only be brought about with the use of camouflage. Already in 1935 the Foreign Organisation had sent model constitutions in Spanish to the local sections, so that the latter could register themselves as harmless associations and so protect themselves from attack by the authorities. So far as these model constitutions went there was no

Nazi headquarters for Spain nor any Provincial headquarters, and of course no Foreign Organisation. What existed were merely completely innocent, decentralised associations whose aim was to keep their members informed on the cultural, artistic and social life of Germany. The constitution expressly prohibits any discussion of Spanish political or religious questions. The Barcelona local section, the National Socialist Union, *Alemana Nacional*, was described as follows in its statutes:

"An association entitled Union *Alemana Nacional*, N.S.D.A.P., has been formed to provide its members with information on the cultural, artistic and political life of Germany. Members are expressly forbidden to discuss Spanish political and religious questions."

The official address of the local sections was, as a rule, the German Consulate.

Towards the end of 1935 the head of the Nazi organisation in Spain received confidential information from the Fascists that attacks by the Spanish authorities were to be expected. By the New Year there could no longer be any doubt but that the coming elections would result in a defeat for Spanish Fascism. The headquarters of the Nazi organisation in Spain made its preparations. On January 8, 1936, a letter with the following content was despatched to all local sections:

"Strictly confidential."

Dear Pg.

The conditions now prevailing in Madrid make us think it advisable to take precautionary measures, and to be extremely careful during the next few weeks. I therefore request you to put all written material not necessary for your work in a secure place, preferably packed and sealed, at the DK (German Consulate). In the event of a complete cessation of postal correspondence being necessary you will receive from me a telegram reading as follows: 'Contrato firmado, Juan'—on the receipt of which all communication through the post must be suspended until further notice. You must then also immediately remove all material from your home or other place of storage at the time. This letter must be destroyed at once. With comradely greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours . . ."

On February 4, 1936, the head of the Nazi organisation in Switzerland, Gustloff, was shot in Davos by a student named Frankfurter. The Swiss Government issued an order prohibiting central Nazi organisations in Switzerland—that is to say, the Central headquarters and the Provincial headquarters. The Foreign Organisation was afraid that other countries might follow this example, and in a cipher telegram to Spain ordered that even greater precautionary measures should be taken.

On February 16, 1936, the Spanish elections took place, bringing an overwhelming victory to the People's Front. The Nazi officials grew more nervous. The following instructions were issued from the Nazi headquarters in Spain two days after the elections:

"Feb. 18, 1936.

To all local sections, supporting units, etc.

Until further advice all postal communication with Party offices inside and outside Spain is to be suspended. This comes into force immediately.

All Party documents and Party letter-heads are to be brought without attracting attention to the official Reich Consulates, packed and sealed and deposited there. Where this is not possible, the material must be put into some secure place.

This letter must be burnt immediately on receipt.

Heil Hitler !

... Adjutant."

"THE PLEASANT GATHERINGS OF OUR CUSTOMERS ..."

When the first shock was past and it became evident that an intervention by the Spanish authorities was not to be feared, Erich Schnaus set about the reorganisation with which he had been charged. We print below a long circular issued by the German Labour Front on March 28, 1936, which shows without ambiguity the line of the reorganisation. Apart from the instructions as to the new form of correspondence,

which was to be conducted as "purely business correspondence," the safe keeping of lists of addresses and communication with Germany, the most decisive change related to the form of meetings. For the future, large section meetings were forbidden; their place was to be taken by meetings of small groups in the form of social gatherings. The work was to be transferred to the "shock troops."

The circular from the German Labour Front was itself written in the "new style": the members are called customers, and the political situation is referred to as the "business situation." The circular runs as follows:

"Strictly confidential."

Barcelona, March 28, 1936.

Dear Sir,

The present business situation compels us, in the interests of our representatives, to take decisive measures. In the last few weeks a number of business reports have come in which impel us to give the following instructions, which must be strictly observed:

Business Papers and Letters. All business papers lying at an agency must be carefully scrutinised to see whether they are completely dealt with. In this case they must be burnt by the representative in person, so as to guard against their coming to the eyes of competitors. Documents and business circulars dated earlier than 1/10/35 must be out of date and are to be destroyed, as they are taking up space unnecessarily. Documents still required must be put in

packages and sealed and deposited in a safe place, so that they are secure from competitors.

Correspondence. Our written propaganda must be conducted on a completely neutral sheet, and all information must be sent on white paper. As the individual representatives and heads of agencies are perfectly well known, it is not necessary for titles to be written, such as 'Head of Agency,' below the signature.

The letter itself must be in a comradely tone. In general, letters should conclude as follows: 'I remain, with German greetings, Yours . . .' To avoid any difficulties and uncertainties arising, in future the name should be typed under each signature; for example:

Signature

Fr. Schulze

(a) For all further details regarding the form and opening of propaganda and letters, please see enclosed specimen.

(b) Agencies which have stationery bearing the business mark or the name of the agency must destroy these. Signature stamps are no longer to be used, and must be put away.

Meetings. The pleasant gatherings of our customers are as far as possible to be restricted, in order to give competitors no knowledge of our business methods. They must be replaced by meetings of smaller groups in the form of social gatherings, etc.

Form of Address. In no circumstances should any indication of a Department appear on the envelope. I call special attention to this because I am constantly receiving letters on which my title 'General Agent' is given, or on which there is nothing but my title and postal box. The name of the writer must always be put on the back of the letter as the sender.

Lists of Addresses. These are to be kept in such a way that they are always accessible but so that competitors cannot put their hands on them.

Postal Communication. The use of postcards is forbidden, in order to maintain business secrecy. All communications, even the most trivial, must be sent in closed envelopes. There will be no more printed communications apart from our newspapers.

Reports in our Firm's Bulletin. Space considerations require these to be reduced to a minimum. No names should ever appear in future. As meetings of customers are to be restricted, notices should be limited on this ground alone. On the other hand, all gatherings of a social character, such as celebrations, excursions and sporting events, which are organised by our customers outside their purely business interests, are to be published in the bulletin.

Transmission of Money. This must be made in the name of the Agent's cashier.

Circulars. In future these will be signed by the departmental heads of our General Agency with their full name but with no indication of any office held.

Correspondence with Friends in Germany. In future all letters from Berlin also will be written only on white, neutral paper and forwarded here. We will follow the same course. The carbon copies of these, signed in full, are to be sent to the General Agency as before.

I beg all agents to carry out the above instructions with exact care, to avoid any hindrances in the building up of our business.

Please write to me by return confirming the receipt of this letter.

The number of the General Agent's quarters will shortly be altered. Further particulars will follow.

I use this opportunity once again to point out that we business people must naturally avoid any political activity in the country in which we are stationed.

With German greetings.

Signed: LEISTERT.

REGISTERED."

A letter from Erich Schnaus, dated April 1, 1936, addressed to the signatory of the circular, Leistert, head of the German Labour Front, provides a commentary on this circular. Schnaus expresses his satisfaction with the measures taken, which had been discussed between him and Leistert during a visit to Madrid; he then continues:

"This alteration of our business customs must, however, in no case lead to a decline in our business activities. On the contrary, the transformation, inasmuch as it makes the service of our customers more mobile, must result in an increased turnover.

Otherwise it has no value. Reports on our competitors show that their directors have divided opinions regarding the new method of manufacture. We have to reckon on the fact that the enlargement of our competitors' business will bring about such a tightening up of the financial position that the shares of the competitors' undertakings on the Bourse will not be in a position to hold their ground. For this reason it is particularly necessary for us to send appropriate instructions to our agents and customers in order that they may be prepared to meet any situation."

This letter says plainly that the National Socialist leaders in Spain were preparing, as early as April 1, 1936, for coming battles, that they were counting on discord and tension within the parties supporting the government, and that above all they were expecting an attack on the People's Front, in face of which the shares of this undertaking "would not be in a position to hold their ground." This letter is one of the most important documents found in Barcelona. Three and a half months after it was written, the rebel uprising broke out. The letter is the first evidence that the National Socialists had been kept informed of the intended rebellion.

"REACT WITH DOUBLED ENERGY TO PROHIBITIONS AND DIFFICULTIES . . ."

The Nazi letter files lay in safety at the Embassy and the Consulates. The "customers" were reorganised in

small groups. The "Pg's" became Herr So-and-so. The rubber stamps had disappeared, and with them the headed letter-paper. Now it was necessary to give the "customers" a new leader. Erich Schnaus could not remain long in Spain; and moreover, he was too well known in Madrid. Disclosures of his activities were already being published in the anti-Fascist press. His choice fell on Hans Hellermann in Barcelona.

Why was he selected? Hans Hellermann had come to Barcelona in the spring of 1933. He is the type of foreign legionary which National Socialism particularly likes to send abroad. He was an old Nazi. Unemployment had driven him into the arms of National Socialism. In his native town of Schwelm he worked his way up to leader of a storm troop. Severe conflicts with his father, who was no longer inclined to put up with his son's mode of living, made Hellermann think of going abroad.

The political atmosphere in the Spain of 1933-34 was very much to the taste of the storm troop leader. He soon worked his way up to head of the Barcelona local section. He kept the section in hand, and steered it past the rocks of the scandals. Erich Schnaus, in a letter, dated March 27, 1936, described him as follows:

"Party member Hellermann has been able in rather less than two years to bind together the Barcelona colony, which had been split in every direction, and to safeguard the Party's primacy; at

the same time he has thereby proved his capacity for leadership. Hellermann is an old Party member and was a storm troop leader. His training in the storm troops has worked out brilliantly in the Barcelona local section."

And after taking up his new work Hellermann wrote to Schnaus on April 6, 1936:

"People with normal fighting spirit should only react with doubled energy to prohibitions and difficulties. . . . The prohibition of party meetings and correspondence will be used by many 'Hoheitsträger' as a welcome occasion for an interval of rest! When the storm troops were prohibited I had the experience, as a member of the staff, of how after such intervals of rest the work of building up must be begun again from the bottom. It is therefore urgently necessary that a man who is himself dominated by the idea should be there. . . ."

Hellermann had founded the "Importing House Hellermann & Philippi" in the Calle Avino in Barcelona together with another National Socialist, Otto Philippi, who was the "fine gentleman" of the concern. Philippi had been born in South America, and had a perfect knowledge of Spanish. A slight South American accent gave him a certain exotic flavour which was not without its effect on women. He had grown up in Germany, and the connections made during his student life stood him in good stead in his

activities as an "importer." His most important contact was an architect in the Air Ministry, and he busied himself mainly with military technical questions, which brought him into touch with leading military people in Barcelona. He is the type popularly described as a "cyclist"—"Push down, push up: keep your head down!" He is the type to be met with among the guards in concentration camps: brutal against defenceless people, and cowardly in the hour of danger. When the Barcelona militia carried out a search of his house, he literally wept and begged for his life. Not a book, not a single interesting journal, was found in his house. But, on the other hand, the *Stürmer* was lying about in heaps, and one drawer of his desk contained, carefully filed and with christian names written on them, photographs of various naked German and Spanish girls in the most remarkable postures.

Hellermann and Philippi formed a brilliant combination. They were the ideal importers of "National Socialist thought."

The "importing house," whose turnover as shown in the books only reached a few thousand pesetas a month, required four rooms for the conduct of its business. There was a special "Display Room" for the exhibition of the goods which the importing house was supposed to be selling in Spain. The shelves round the walls in a second room were completely filled with files, labelled with innocent business names. The Directors' room breathed Hamburg solidity. Few

visitors were admitted to the fourth room, which can be described as the real work-room of the firm. Here Nazi propaganda material in German and Spanish was carefully piled up. And a closer inspection of the business premises disclosed that a file labelled "Solingen Steel Wares" contained the correspondence with the local sections, while correspondence with the local section in Morocco was hidden in a folder marked "Motor Spare Parts."

In addition to the personal motives that led to the selection of Hans Hellermann as head of the Nazi organisation in Spain there was also a political consideration. In a letter to the Foreign Organisation, dated April 4, 1936, Schnaus expressed the view that it would be more advantageous to transfer the headquarters of the Spanish organisation to Barcelona, as in view of the nationalist attitude of the Catalans there was no fear of their placing obstacles in the way of work directed against Madrid. Events since the rebellion have shown that the hopes placed in Catalonia by Schnaus were an unlucky speculation.

On April 6, 1936, Schnaus appointed Hellermann Nazi Commissioner and head of the Nazi organisation in Spain. Its headquarters were transferred from Madrid to Barcelona. A few days later these steps were confirmed by the Foreign Organisation. On April 25 Hellermann went to Germany for instructions—of course, as a courier of the German Embassy, protected by a diplomatic passport. On his return the following

Auslands Organisation der N.S.D.A.P.
Hamburg

Personalamt

Personalbogen



des Hans Hellermann

(Name und Vorname)

Wohnort (genauer Anschrift) Barcelona, Calle de Jesús, 6, 5^o

Geboren: (Jahr, Tag, Monat) 26. Dezember 1909

Wo? (Ort, Reg.-Bez., Bundesstaat) Schwelm 1/Westf. Regierungsbezirk
Arnsberg 1/Westf. Preussen

Religion: evangelisch-lutherisch

Gehetmatisch (wenn?) nein

(mit wem? Geburtsort) ---

Kind: (Vernamen, Geburtsort, falls einmischen, ob einmischen?) ---

Beruf: 84. Nat. Vertreter

Welche Stellung bisher bekleidet? Kaufm. Korrespondent i/fa. Schmidt & Co., A.-G.
Schwelm 1/Westf.
(Jugendabteilungen)

Schulen, Vorgehen, Studium: Volksschule, Realgymnasium, Oberrealschule.
Kaufm. Lehrling, Angestellter.

Militärische Dienstzeit: (Frontsoldat, Eiden und Ehrenzeichen?) ---

Mitgliedsnummer: (186721)
1-86 721

Eintritt in die Partei: Dezember 1929

Gewalttätige Strafen: ---

Deutsche Botschaft
in Spanien

KURIERAUSWEIS

Vorzeiger dieses, Herr Hans Hellermann
reist am 25. d. Mts. mit amtlichen Schriftstücken und Gepäck
der Deutschen Botschaft nach Berlin. (via Barcelona)


Es wird gebeten, dem Genannten auf seiner Reise jedmögliche
Erleichterung zu gewähren und ihm erforderlichenfalls Schutz und
Beistand zu leisten.

Madrid, den 24. April

1936

Deutsche Botschaft

L.A.



Harkner

Courier's diplomatic pass, issued by the German Embassy in Madrid to Hans Hellermann, head of the Nazi organisation in Spain.

letter was issued by the "Importing House Hellermann & Philippi" to the local sections:

"My very respected business friend,

The opening of the summer season will raise for you also the question of replenishing your stock. Our Herr Hellermann, who has just returned from a journey to Germany, has brought back advantageous offers of every kind in which you will assuredly be interested. As we have only a few samples of the new assortment of goods for which we have taken over the agency, we should be much obliged to you if you would pay us a visit in the next few days.

We await your reply, and sign with German greetings Heil Hitler !

HELLERMANN."

Between the 15th and the 20th of May thirty-two leaders of local sections came to Barcelona in order to look at the "new assortment of goods."

FRONT FIGHTERS REPORT BY JUNE 15 !

Less than a month after Hellermann's journey to Germany he received a letter from Friedhelm Burbach, asking him to be at the airport of Barcelona on May 23, 1936, as an "old acquaintance" would arrive there then. The "old acquaintance" was none other than Burbach himself.

What was the object of his journey? In the files of the Nazi Spanish headquarters a note was found, placed there by Hellermann himself, which contains

the secret of Burbach's journey. The note runs:

“Front fighters report by June 15.

Complete lists of emigrants by June 25.

Check whether codes are there.

List propaganda material.

Gliders.”

This note was dated May 28, 1936. Nothing clearer could be asked for. It says no more and no less than that the Foreign Organisation has asked for all front line fighters to report by June 15; that it requires new black lists of emigrants to be prepared, so that these can be put out of the way at the appropriate moment; that Hellermann was commissioned to check up with the local sections whether they had a code for telegrams from the Foreign Organisation; that he should compile a list of the propaganda material in their possession and what was required; and that finally the Foreign Organisation had special intentions and wishes in connection with the gliding section, the nature of which is not open to doubt. Together with the Schnaus letter quoted above, this note constitutes important material proving Nazi complicity in the bloody events in Spain. The National Socialist groups, as is sufficiently clear from this material, were being made ready for the anticipated rebellion.

The activities of the Hellermann & Philippi Importing House increased in June and July. Fifty local sections had to be mobilised. Among their members

were murder specialists who had won their spurs with the storm troops in Germany. They were to "give technical aid" to the Phalangists and Carlists. Their membership also included experienced pilots, former front line fighters, technicians and engineers, and propagandists. Approximately a thousand Nazis were organised in the local sections. In addition to these there were at least 1,500 other Germans organised in the German Labour Front and under Nazi influence. Two thousand five hundred disciplined men were made ready for the day of the rebellion. This was not carried out in such a way that each man was told what was going to happen. Only the leaders of the most vital local sections were taken into full confidence. The others received instructions without knowing beforehand what was in the wind. But Langenheim, an engineer in Tetuan, Fiessler and Consul Draeger in Seville, Consul Dede in Majorca and others were fully informed, as is shown by their attitude from the first moment of the rebellion—a point dealt with later.

But before we describe the part played by National Socialism in the rebel uprising in Spain, we will give a picture of the activities carried on by the most important departments of the Nazi organisation in Spain. We will show how Nazi diplomats, press directors, Gestapo and Nazified industry worked to undermine the Spanish Republic and made preparations to throw themselves into the arena at the moment when the generals began the rebellion.

CHAPTER IV

NAZI DIPLOMACY IN SPAIN

NATIONAL SOCIALIST DIPLOMACY in Spain has followed an old tradition. Bismarck pointed the way in his saying: "Put the Spanish fly on France's neck." In the period before the war and during the war Wilhelm II's diplomats tried to mobilise the "Spanish fly" against France. National Socialism took up the old game again in Spain in order to realise the encirclement and isolation of France, as indicated by Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, from the side of the Iberian Peninsula.

When National Socialism came to power, it let the diplomatic apparatus abroad continue without any decisive change. And it had an aim in doing this. Herr von Neurath, who had been Foreign Minister under the von Papen and Schleicher cabinets, remained Foreign Minister of the Reich under Adolf Hitler. At the time of its seizure of power National Socialism did not have personalities fitted to replace Stresemann's and Neurath's diplomats; and moreover it desired to use the connections of the German nobility—in whose hands most of the German Embassies were—for its own ends. It also wanted, through the deliberate

non-alteration of the diplomatic apparatus, to give the impression that nothing was going to be altered in foreign policy. But hardly had he reached power when Hitler created, in the Foreign Political Office of the N.S.D.A.P., a school for Nazi diplomats. Propaganda attachés were sent to the Embassies abroad, carrying Goebbels' spirit to the Embassies and consulates. And moreover the Nazification began from within. By the application of the Aryan paragraph the not purely Aryan elements in the diplomatic corps were removed, and intense pressure compelled the old diplomats to enter the National Socialist Party. They were thus placed under the disciplinary control of the Party. Once more German diplomacy showed, as Bismarck put it, that it not only had no talent, but also no persons of character, in its ranks. Already by the middle of 1933 applications for membership of the Party began to come in rapidly from Germany's diplomats abroad. And in a circular dated February 28, 1934, Bohle, regional chief of the Foreign Organisation, was able to say that a vast number of applications for membership of the Party had reached him from German diplomats.

Parallel with the Nazification there began the process which has made the Embassies of the Third Reich abroad into subsidiaries of the Reichswehr, of the Gestapo and of the Propaganda Ministry. The example of Spain shows clearly to what extent this process has developed, and the danger it presents to peace. The

German diplomat abroad is no longer subordinate only to the Foreign Office. In his character of Nazi diplomat he is also subject to the Foreign Political Office of the National Socialist Party, and to its chief, Alfred Rosenberg. In accordance with an agreement dated February 7, 1934, between the Foreign Office and the Nazi Foreign Organisation, a National Socialist diplomat abroad is under the control of the chief of the Foreign Organisation, Bohle. He has therefore to serve three masters, and from these he gets instructions. And if he is also an S.S. group leader, he has yet a fourth chief: Heinrich Himmler, Reich leader of the S.S. and head of the German police.

CHARACTER STUDY OF A GERMAN DIPLOMAT

Since 1926 the German Reich had been represented in Madrid by Ambassador Count Welczeck, who had come from Budapest to Madrid. In a letter dated June 4, 1934 from Zuchristian to the Foreign Organisation, Count Welczeck was described as "an irreproachable man of fashion and a skilled diplomat." He belonged to that category of German diplomats of whom it is rumoured that privately they are most sharply opposed to the Hitler regime and are furious at what has happened in Germany, and that they continue to work with the new regime only for the purpose of preventing the worst. It is not known who invented this rumour—probably the Ministry of Propaganda or Count

Welczeck himself, in order to enable him to carry out his work with greater ease and effect. For the documents relating to Count Welczeck tell a different tale. They show a diplomat wholeheartedly serving National Socialism—a man who, shortly after Hitler's accession to power, hurried to enter the National Socialist Party and sought to make the political sins of his past forgotten by his greater zeal for the Party.

We mentioned above that in 1933 a race to get on the Party register began among the German diplomats. Entry into the Party not only, as we indicated above, brings with it subordination to many principals; it also means a very great strengthening of the position of the Nazi groups abroad, and gives them the opportunity of using the extra-territorial apparatus for their underground work. In 1933 the so-called "Hoheitsträger"—the heads of the national, provincial and local Nazi organisations in each country—suddenly appeared alongside the diplomatic representatives of the German Reich. It is true that from a formal standpoint the German diplomat is under Bohle of the Nazi Foreign Organisation; but he knows that he dare not incur the displeasure of these "Hoheitsträger." He knows that his admission to the Party will depend on their judgment of him; in fact, as time went on, custom made it a law that consuls abroad could neither be appointed nor removed without the consent of the "Hoheitsträger." In a letter from Hellermann, head of the Spanish Division, to the Vice-Consul Willi Beisel in

San Sebastian, dated June 17, 1936, the point is made in the following terms:

“It is therefore absolutely essential, in view of the fact that I am a Hoheitsträger and as such have a recognised right of intervention in the appointment and dismissal of Consuls, that you should inform me of such an exchange of letters. . . .”

Thus *de facto* the “bearer of greatness” has become the real representative of the Third Reich, and the diplomat has become his subordinate. A circular of February 28, 1934, from Bohle of the Foreign Organisation to all Commissioners abroad, heads of Nazi organisations in each country, etc., shows clearly that the German diplomat is entirely at the mercy of the Nazi officials’ goodwill. The circular is of such importance that it is given in full below.

“55/34.

Head of the Foreign Organisation
in the Staff of the Führer’s Deputy.

Circular Letter.

(Strictly confidential: only for the official use of the political leaders indicated below).

To all Commissioners abroad, heads of organisations and confidential agents for countries, heads of District organisations, local sections and supporting units of the N.S.D.A.P.

The agreement between the Foreign Office and the Foreign Organisation of the N.S.D.A.P., which was enclosed to you with my Circular Letter No. 50/34, regarding the admission into the Party of members of the Diplomatic service of the German Reich, has resulted in my receiving since then a vast number of applications for membership. It is a matter of course, as I have already indicated in my Circular Letter No. 50/34, that when these applications are being examined the political leaders will in the first place be asked for their opinion.

In order to avoid placing an unnecessary load on the apparatus of the Foreign Organisation by individual enquiries, I hereby give the following instruction:

The above-named political leaders are to send or cause to be sent within the area of their authority, on receipt of this Circular Letter and *by return*, information regarding each individual official, employee and worker in the Diplomatic Service, *each on a separate sheet of paper*. Only trusted members of the Party, who from the standpoint of the movement are entirely reliable and possess the necessary qualifications, are to be charged with the compilation of these reports.

I must emphasise the great responsibility which rests on each individual political leader arising from this enquiry. In the compilation of these reports personal issues must be eliminated, and regard must

be had only to the great cause. Each individual leader should realise the great confidence that is being placed in him by this enquiry.

Reports should cover:

Former activity for the Party.

Career.

Lodge, if belonging to one.

Descent and relatives.

Descent and relatives of wife.

Former political activity or tendency.

Attitude to former regime.

General appreciation from the standpoint of the Party.

To these details must be added an opinion as to whether the person concerned is considered worthy of admission into the ranks of our movement.

In making the general appreciation, the considerations enumerated in Circular Letter No. 33/34 are to be taken into account.

Heil Hitler !

(signed) E. W. BOHLE.

(signed) EHRICH

Adjutant.

Hamburg, February 28, 1934.

Dr. E./F."

This circular gave full scope to the arbitrary will of the "Hoheitsträger" to whom it was addressed.

GERMAN DIPLOMATS UNDER OBSERVATION

On May 2, 1934, the head of the Spanish Division, Zuchristian, sent a reply to the circular reproduced above. This reply shows the standpoint from which the "selection" was carried out among the diplomats of Germany. A National Socialist might be married to a Malayan; but marriage with a Frenchwoman is a ground for non-admission into the Party. The comment on press-attaché A. Bruns is:

"Married to a Frenchwoman. Cannot be admitted."

And E. Larssen, head of the Embassy Chancery, was refused admission with the words:

"Advocate of democratic ideas. Not a fighter."

It was of no avail for former democrats to "strive" to understand the new epoch. Zuchristian gives the following opinion in connection with Chief Inspector E. Alte of the Madrid Embassy:

"Formerly a declared opponent. A democrat. Not in agreement with the conception of a Führer. Strives to understand the new epoch. Cannot recommend his admission."

Poor man ! Perhaps now he really understands the new epoch !

Zuchristian received a gentle reproof for not giving a sufficiently detailed statement regarding Count

Welczeck and the higher Embassy officials in his letter of May 2, 1934. Therefore on June 4, 1934, he expressed the following opinion on the Ambassador:

“(1) Attitude to the N.S.D.A.P. since it came to power must be characterised as completely loyal. Co-operation wholehearted; he gives every assistance.

(2) In Madrid since 1926; previously Ambassador in Budapest. An irreproachable man of fashion and a skilled diplomat.

(3) So far as I know has never belonged to a Lodge.

(4) According to his own statements, of purely Aryan descent; wife Chilean of Basque origin, also pure Aryan.

(5) Has never belonged to a political party (according to his own statement). Former attitude, as far as I know, Conservative-Catholic.

(6) According to his own statements, broke his diplomatic career for some years at one period, as he could not pretend to be in sympathy with the policy carried out after the war.

(7) In my opinion there is nothing against his admission into the Party.”

Zuchristian's opinion on Dr. Voelckers, First Counsellor of the Embassy, was sent on June 15, 1934, as under:

“*Dr. Voelckers.* Could discover nothing regarding his former attitude; since I have known him, he has

always accepted all our wishes up to the hilt; I consider him politically reliable and can observe that he is striving to follow the trend of the time. In my opinion there is nothing against his admission, and I therefore recommend it."

But it was not only the "Hoheitsträger" who made reports on German diplomats abroad. As time went on, it became the practice for other Nazis also to send secret reports on German diplomats to the Foreign Organisation. A letter, dated August 21, 1934, from Section IV of the Foreign Organisation to Walter Ley in Barcelona, says:

"Of course I am interested in the sending of the secret report on the Consulate in Barcelona."

DIPLOMATS AS SMUGGLERS

We learn from the documents found in Barcelona the nature of the "co-operation" and the "every assistance" which Count Welczeck gave to the Nazi organisation, and what were the wishes which the First Counsellor of the Legation "accepted up to the hilt."

On October 15, 1933, the then Foreign Commissioner for Spain and Portugal, Friedhelm Burbach, despatched the following order to the Foreign Organisation:

"6,000 pamphlets in Spanish, packed in handy parcels, addressed: *The German Embassy in Madrid:*

for the use of the Foreign Commissioner of the N.S.D.A.P. for Spain and Portugal.

Despatch should be arranged through the Courier Department of the Foreign Office in Berlin. . . .”

The Ambassador placed his diplomatic courier service at the service of the “Hoheitsträger” without restriction; in fact, the “Hoheitsträger” was himself provided with a courier’s documents, so that he could safely get his compromising correspondence through to Germany and bring instructions back from Germany to Spain. Among other documents we reproduce a courier’s pass, issued by the German Embassy on April 24, 1936, for Hans Hellermann, head of the Nazi organisation in Spain. The Ambassador therefore used extra-territoriality and the privileges of a diplomatic courier for the transport of materials which, as we have shown earlier, were directed against the interests of the country to which he was accredited. And even more: he used the extra-territorial Embassy building as a secure depository for compromising documents and materials of the Nazi organisation in Spain. We have already referred to the various circulars in which the Nazi groups were instructed to safeguard their materials from seizure by the Spanish police and to deposit them at the Embassy and consulates. In a letter dated June 24, 1936, from Hellermann, then head of the Spanish organisation, express reference is made to the fact that Nazi documents were lying in the cellars of the German

Embassy in Madrid. In this letter, which was addressed to the leader of the Madrid local section, August Schmidt, the following passage occurs:

“ Please first have a look through the documents of the Madrid local section which are lying under seal in the cellar of the Embassy. Aren't there some locked cabinets there? I am almost sure that you will find something usable there.”

The locked cabinets referred to are those containing the confidential Information Bulletins and circulars of the Foreign Organisation, containing instructions sent to the sections for their work abroad. These Bulletins and circulars were ordered by the Foreign Organisation to be kept strictly private, and only to be accessible to the heads of the national organisation and the local sections. Small wonder, since they contained a mass of compromising material that showed that the Nazi activities abroad were not at all in conformity with the interests of the country in which they described themselves as guests.

What was good enough for the Ambassador was not enough for the Consuls. They not only kept material under their care: they went further. They actively and in their own persons participated in the smuggling of compromising materials which were directed against the laws of Spain. On November 20, 1935, Cords, “ Harbour Service leader ” of the Nazi organisation in Spain, issued a circular letter enquiring what

possibilities there were of smuggling parcels past the Customs. The circular was as follows:

“Strictly confidential

Re Courier Service.

20 / 11 / 35.

Office chiefs are requested to inform me whether in their area the possibility exists of sending parcels of propaganda material past the Customs without any difficulties.

Please advise me at the same time how many parcels at a time can be got through safely.

Heil Hitler !

(Signed) CORDS.”

The replies which came in answer to this circular show German diplomacy in Spain at the top of its form. For example, Consul Fricke in Cartagena, who was also leader of the Nazi supporting unit in this extremely important naval port of the Spanish Republic, replied as follows:

“Strictly confidential

28 / 12 / 35.

Parcels (propaganda), etc., if not too large, can be received here without difficulty, if they are handed over to Inspector Scholtz of the Neptune Steamship Co. in Hamburg, Freihafen I, Neptunschuppen, all charges paid, for sending on to me here through one of the Neptune Steamship Company's captains. A steamer leaves Bremen for here every fortnight;

length of voyage 14 to 21 days, according to the number of ports called at on the way.

Heil Hitler !
(Signed) FRICKE."

Consul Fricke was not the only one. Kindler von Knobloch, Nazi candidate for the post of Consul in Alicante—where the German Embassy has been situated since August 1936—is even more explicit in his reply. He was quite clear as to the risk involved in this smuggling, and therefore he proposed that the material should be addressed to the German Embassy. Then it could be smuggled through with less danger. This diplomat of the new Germany wrote in an undated letter to Nazi headquarters in Spain:

"We feel that we must call attention to the danger that might arise if on some occasion a consignment of propaganda material was seized. It is then possible that the matter might be fought out on the political field, especially if it was propaganda in Spanish.

Is it not possible to address such material to the German Embassy? In this event the risk would be less if on some occasion we were caught. For then the parcels would not be liable to official declaration, and we could smuggle them through just as well as if they were for the N.S.D.A.P. But if on some occasion we were pulled up, and the address on the parcels was German Embassy, Madrid, then we believe that we should be in a position to put the affair straight here."

If the whole business was not so serious, the naïve way in which this diplomat treats the German Embassy so openly as a smuggling centre would be disarming. But the attitude of another diplomatic colleague, Consul Draeger in Seville, puts this in the shade. Consul Draeger had been repeatedly attacked by the Nazi local section in Seville. They thought him too lukewarm, too intent on his business, and so forth. His consular position was at stake, and this National Socialist—in accordance with the Nazi slogan, that the common good comes before private welfare—was not anxious to lose his secure source of income as Consul. The leader of the Seville local section reported on November 1, 1935, as under:

“Holch Apartado, 52.

Seville, November 1, 1935.

Harbour Service Office.

In connection with the forwarding of propaganda material I wish to report the following:

At the end of July material arrived here for the first time through Lahneck; it was brought from the ship by myself and Consul Draeger, and later sent on by me through a road transport agency to the address of Party member Rade. The receipt for it is in my possession (Calle Barcelona-Seville Agency).

The second occasion was when a lot arrived with Stahleck. I did not receive advice of this, as I was away, and the same applies to Party member

Draeger, and the notice to fetch it away was received by a Party member from Baquera and Kusche, who took a Spaniard with him to carry the parcels, but did not get through the Customs. He then instructed the Spaniard to put the parcels down among some lead ingots lying near the ship, in order to get them away later when there was a better opportunity. But a watch was kept on him, and even after the ship had left he was unable to get the parcels away, and they were destroyed by the Carbineros. Becker's action was, of course, not very skilful, but I am sure there was no neglect of duty. I wrote about this, and will try to find the copy, but it is not to be found in the correspondence file.

The third occasion was when a parcel came, and I intended to fetch it away myself, but on the advice of Baquera's representative, with which I concurred on account of the closer watch being kept on the harbour (the Fascist attack on the Communist meeting-place had taken place only two days before), I gave it back to the political leader on the ship, as it seemed to me impossible to get it through.

Heil Hitler !

(Signed) LEADER OF SUPPORTING UNIT."

Here we have a Consul who smuggles material ashore with his own hands—material that is so compromising that another National Socialist does not dare bring it through the Customs, while on another occasion the

leader of the local section himself leaves it on board the ship because he is afraid of the political consequences that might arise.

HOW A CONSUL WAS "SHOT OFF"

The Hitler regime was not prepared to content itself with making Nazis of the diplomats it inherited from the Republic and training a reliable new generation of Nazi diplomats through Rosenberg's school. From the second year of its rule it set about the systematic filling of consular posts with its own adherents. The Barcelona documents provide further evidence of the revolting hunt for posts which started with the advent of the Third Reich. The special significance of this process in Spain was that it was assisted by the Foreign Organisation, which means that it had the official party stamp. Hundreds of letters from Bilbao, Alicante, Seville, San Sebastian and other towns illustrate the bitter war of defamation carried out against a Consul who did not feel inclined to deliver himself over completely to the arbitrary will of the Nazis, or whose post some Nazi functionary wanted to capture from him. Consul Rehmann of San Sebastian was one victim of such activities "for the common weal."

Consul Rehmann was a partner in the firm of Rehmann & Lerch in San Sebastian. Beisel was leader of the local section in that town. Beisel wanted to be Consul. So he got an understanding with his superior in Madrid, Zuchristian, head of the Nazi organisation

in Spain. In a reply sent by Zuchristian on October 16, 1935, to a letter from Beisel, the following significant sentence occurs:

“Please let me have again a short indication of the grounds which make it seem fitting (a) to shoot off Lerch, (b) to remove the Consul.”

Then the “shooting off” began. On October 22, 1935, Beisel furnished the desired report; in it we learn that the Consul has used an expression which amounts to high treason:

“Since the young Germans have come in with the new movement, a man can no longer drink his glass of beer in peace.”

It was also reported that Rehmann had not joined the Nazi Co-operative Dairy, and that it was only after considerable effort they had succeeded

“in getting him at last to come to the card evenings.”

He was further charged with being friendly with a Jew named Lewin, regarding whom Beisel had himself sent in the following report on December 18, 1935:

“... Last week I was summoned to a meeting of the School Committee at the consulate. After settling the school affairs proper, a letter from Herr Lewin (dated from Madrid) was read, advising us of his resignation from the School Committee here for business reasons.

As no doubt you know, Herr Lewin supports the German school. As the letter had to be answered at once, I was asked for my opinion. I expressed my view that we should approach Herr Lewin again and ask him whether he would not continue on the Committee in spite of the claims of his business. I gave as my reason that of course Herr Lewin would stick to his old habit of not attending the meetings, and so long as he was prepared to continue supporting the school as in the past, it wasn't for us to put any difficulties in the way.

. . . If I were to let him resign without further ado (he has never been more than a nominal member of the Committee) the possibility of his withdrawing his backing might arise. But at present we can't do without it. . . .”

Party member Beisel was glad to accept money from the Jew Lewin. But when the Consul had to be “shot off,” one of the charges against him was friendship with the Jew Lewin.

The Vice-Consul, Lerch, was as sharply attacked by Beisel as Rehmann. It is true that Beisel was rather at a loss when he had to confess, in his letter about Lerch, that:

“Although we knew this gentleman's reluctant attitude towards the Party, we could not easily get hold of him for any hostile expressions.”

But on one occasion nevertheless Lerch was caught giving vent to an expression amounting to high treason. According to Beisel's report, in speaking to a Party member (the office manager) he had let himself be "carried away" and expressed himself as follows:

"It's really a shame that we are sending money to Germany when there's so much here that we might support. When the office manager asked him whether there were now other Germans whom we might support, as he had no knowledge of any Germans needing aid, he replied: 'Yes, there are. And, moreover, we oughtn't to lose sight of the country whose guests we are. I can't give much this time. There's no money coming in from Germany. And if things were to turn bad with us here abroad, not a soul would help us—or have you ever heard of anyone here being helped from Germany?' . . ."

Vice-Consul Lerch dared to put forward the demand that money collected for "Winter Aid" should be devoted to its real purpose, namely, aid, and not sent to Germany. And for that he could be "shot off."

Beisel's campaign against Rehmann seems not to have been completed when the rebellion broke out. The last letter which was found among the documents was dated June 17, 1936, and was signed by Hans Hellermann, head of the organisation in Spain, then in Barcelona. We quote it again, giving it in full below,

as it is typical of the fight by the Nazis to capture the consular positions:

“Pg. Willi Beisel,
San Sebastian

Ref. your letter of 30 / 53 / 6.

Dear Party Member Beisel,

It is not a very pleasant thing for me to hear for the first time in a roundabout way, through the authorities, of correspondence on the matter of the consulate affair. It is also a failure to understand the actual position. The Party has an interest in your being Consul in San Sebastian; the Party will therefore build up your position with all the resources at its disposal, and in the last analysis it is the Party which is involved in a process of getting things straight with the Foreign Office. It is therefore absolutely essential, in view of the fact that I am a Hoheitsträger and as such have a recognised right in the appointment and dismissal of Consuls, that you should inform me of such an exchange of letters. Please therefore always in future send me copies of this correspondence by the same post as you send the original letter. Only in this way can joint work be ensured which will guarantee success for the Party precisely in this delicate question of permeating the Consular Corps of the Foreign Office. With comradely greetings and Heil Hitler !

(Signed) HANS HELLERMANN
Comm. Head of Organisation in Spain.”

Beisel's case was not just an isolated case. There are fifty-six letters in the correspondence of the Division headquarters in connection with the winning of the consular post in Valencia. There Otto Pfeilmeier, leader of the Nazi local section, intended to become at least Vice-Consul. An intrigue developed in which the people involved were Consul-General Koecher at Barcelona, Consul Buch at Valencia, his son Max, who wanted to succeed him, Pfeilmeier, and the heads of the Spanish organisation, Zuchristian and subsequently Hellermann. The Valencia case was outdone by the Alicante case, where Kindler von Knobloch, leader of the supporting unit, would have liked to become Consul. There was a struggle lasting nearly two years. The leading members of the Alicante colony protested against von Knobloch's appointment, because in their opinion he was unfitted to discharge the duties of the position. But the Foreign Organisation soon silenced this democratic protest.

THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF MEN LIABLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE

After the introduction of the general liability for military service, Germans abroad were brought up for examination. This was carried out at the appropriate consulates. But it was no longer the Consul alone who decided the fate of the man concerned. The "Hoheitsträger" was brought in to the examination, and the Consul was made subordinate to him. A letter dated

April 29, 1936, from the German Consul-General for Spain to Hellermann, head of the Spanish organisation, then in Barcelona, reveals what the examination procedure was like:

"As Vice-Consul Zimmermann has already verbally informed you, the German subjects listed on the attached sheet, who are liable for military service, are to be examined here in about a week's time. The greater part of those liable for service who are living here will have to be put back, to prevent their losing their posts. I should be obliged if you would inform me if you know anything unfavourable of the political conduct of any of these men. Further, please let me know whether you or anyone commissioned by you wish to be present at the medical examination of those liable for military service."

The obsequious tone of the letter shows the dependence of the Consul-General on the "Hoheitsträger." We can guess the fate of those of whose political conduct the "Hoheitsträger" knew anything unfavourable. The last sentence calls to mind the medical examinations during the war, when the sergeant-major and not the doctor decided whether the soldier was fit for service.

AMBASSADOR WELCZECK SUPPORTS THE FICHTE LEAGUE

We have already mentioned the activities of the Fichte League, which is working in every country as

the farthest flung outpost of the new German imperialism and the new German war propaganda. We have also referred to the fact that the Fichte League's activities were so compromising that the Nazis, to keep within the law, kept out of the Fichte League and allowed only non-Nazis to carry out the Fichte League's propaganda.

The Nazi sections, therefore, were on the surface quite distinct from the Fichte League. But not Count Welczeck, Ambassador in Madrid. Although he was informed by Burbach, regional chief of the Foreign Organisation, in a letter dated November 19, 1934, that in consequence of the distribution of Fichte League pamphlets from a German steamer it had been forbidden to enter the ports of French Morocco which it previously visited regularly, Count Welczeck remained in close contact with the Fichte League. A letter from Kroeger, leader of the Fichte League in Spain, proves this :

“ A. Kroeger, Barcelona,

Paseo de Garcia, 132.

Barcelona, July 1, 1935.

To Ambassador Count von Welczeck,

Madrid.

My dear Ambassador,

Referring to the conference you held with the Berlin political plenipotentiary of the German Fichte Bund on the occasion of your last visit to the capital.

As you very kindly expressed to Party member Leube your personal readiness to help the educational work of our League to the best of your ability, I am taking the liberty of sending by the same post to the Embassy in Madrid, following up your undertaking, a folder containing one of each of our pamphlets in Spanish and German which have so far been issued, and request you to have these put about in the waiting-rooms.

As Party member Leube has already informed you, by arrangement with Consul-General Dr. Koecher, a further supply of these folders will be on view at the Consulate-General here as well as at the other German Consulates in Spain. . . ."

Pamphlets, the distribution of which had the consequences for German ships described above, were exhibited openly in the buildings of the diplomatic representatives of the Third Reich. These pamphlets, inciting people to fight against constitutional governments with which the Third Reich maintained diplomatic relations, were displayed for every visitor of the German Embassy in Madrid or of German consulates in Spain to see. These pamphlets were described by the Fichte League itself as "fighting sheets." A circular of the Fichte League distributed in February 1936 contained the following:

"Herewith we hand you in addition to the German also the English edition of our Memel

pamphlet. The Spanish, Portuguese and Swedish editions are already in the press. Please help us to get out these new fighting sheets."

Count Welczeck was a typical example of the war diplomats of the new Germany. He has received promotion, and at the time when this book is being written he is Ambassador of the Third Reich in Paris.

CHAPTER V

NAZIFIED GERMAN TRADE

THE NAZI FOREIGN ORGANISATION has its own "Foreign Trade Office" which is directed by Alfred Hess, Commissioner for Economic Affairs. Every local section, every auxiliary, however small, has its economic reporter, who is responsible to the Foreign Trade Office.

It is no accident that the establishment of the Foreign Trade Office took place at almost the same time as the appointment of Dr. Schacht as Reich Minister for Economic Affairs. With the coming into office of Dr. Schacht, the whole of Germany's economic life, including foreign trade, was converted on to a basis of war economy. Its function of securing supplies for the country was done away with. It was converted to meet above all, and without reference to the needs of the population, the country's requirements for armaments and war materials. The Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, although nominally independent, became in fact a department of the Ministry of War.

This conversion was not carried out without far-reaching organisational changes in Germany's economic life. High economic posts were filled by

individuals who could be regarded as reliable in Nazi eyes. An extensive system of watching and spying was introduced. This economic police system abroad was operated by the Foreign Trade Office of the Nazi Foreign Organisation.

It is clear from the first circular of the Foreign Trade Office on the range of duties to be carried out by economic reporters, that its functions were understood in this sense alone. This introductory letter runs as follows:

“The reporter concerned must first of all send in a statement on all Germans in his section. The statement must be as exhaustive as possible, and among other things must give information as to occupation, income, capital, way of living, associations, etc. The information about capital must state whether it is estimated or actual.

He must report on the economic life of his district or region from the following points of view:

Imports: From which countries are imports received?

What is imported?

Who are the importers?

In what quantities or units?

At what prices?

In what currency is payment made, and what is the destination?

Who is the agent, or is there direct importation?

Exports:

What is exported?

Where to and by which routes?

What quantities, and at what prices?

What are the conditions of payment and currency?

Through agents (if so, who are they) or direct?

Manufactures:

List of factories, including all those with more than 10 workers.

What is manufactured or finished?

Where do raw materials or semi-manufactured goods come from?

In whose hands is the management? Nationality of technical and commercial managers?

Who is the owner? If a joint stock company, who holds the majority of shares? Is there any foreign influence? Of what kind? Is the business subsidised by the Spanish State or provincial authority?

Prices of finished products? What is the standing of the firm?

Shipping:

Reporters of local sections on the coast must report on the entrances and clearances at their ports, and forward monthly originals or copies of the statements and reports of the harbourmasters. Any special occurrences must be reported immediately.

Mines:

What mining companies are there? What kinds of ore? Where are exports sent to, and in what

Handwritten: 1.1.35
H. S. L. A. P.
Stussow, Cadiz.

Cadiz, den 4 Januar 1935

Hafendienstamt,

An die

Landesgrenz-nitz. Section

Madrid,

Reich. Kustwacht

Auf Ihr Rundschreiben vom 20.11.35 teile ich Ihnen
hiermit mit, dass ich 2 Pakete Propaganda-Material jedes Mal durch den
Hafen zu bringen bereit bin.

Heil Hitler


Stussow.

Letter from Nazi leader at Cadiz to Cords, "Harbour Service leader" at Madrid, saying that he could get propaganda material past the Customs, two packets at a time.

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Ständige Drucker:

Stuegel, Alicante



Beauftragter:

J. Kindler v. Knobloch
Hafen 1, Cajal 1

M.S.D.A.F. Landesgruppenleitung Spanien
M A D R I D .

Betr.: Kurierpost

In beantwortung Ihrer streng vertraulichen Anfrage vom 20. v. mts. (die am 13. u. m. hier eintraf) teilen wir Ihnen mit, dass wir hier bisher keine Schwierigkeiten gehabt haben, Pakete uneroeffnet von Bord der deutschen Dampfer zu bekommen. Bei einer groeßeren Anzahl von Paketen wuerde natuerlich die Gefahr bestehen, dass wir Schwierigkeiten bekommen.

Eine absolut sichere Stelle, um Propagandasendungen durch den Zoll zu bekommen, gibt es unserer Ansicht nach nicht. Es wird immer mehr oder minder darauf ankommen, dass man Glueck hat. In Alicante ist die Chance, dass alles klappt ziemlich gross, besonders dadurch, dass der unterzeichnete Stuegel, selbst Vertreter der deutschen Reederei Sioman ist und daher mit dem Zoll etc. auf gutem Fusse steht. Eine Garantie dafuer, dass es hier immer gut geht, koennen wir auch hier nicht uebernehmen und wir moechten auch nicht unterlassen, auf die Gefahr aufmerksam zu machen, die dadurch entstehen kann, dass einmal ein Posten Propaganda material gefasst wird. Es ist dann nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die Sache politisch ausgeschlachtet wird, besonders wenn es sich um Propaganda in spanischer Sprache handelt.

Besteht keine Moeglichkeit, solches Material an die Deutsche Botschaft zu adressieren? In diesem Falle wuerde das Risiko geringer sein, wenn wir einmal gefasst wuerden. Die Pakete brauchen da deswegen noch nicht offiziell dekariert zu werden und wir koennten sie so von Bord schmuggeln, wie wenn sie fuer die NSDAP bestimmt waeren. Werden wir aber einmal anhalten und es steht auf den Paketen drauf: Deutsche Botschaft Madrid, dann glauben wir, dass wir in der Lage sein wuerden, die Sache hier in Ordnung zu bringen.

Heil Hitler!

Kindler
Stuegel.

quantities? How far worked up? Process? Are they Spanish, foreign or mixed companies?"

We see that the economic reporter has to spy on Spanish import and export houses, industrial enterprises, shipping and mining companies, as well as German firms. Accordingly, economic reporters were found now and then in the most important trading or industrial undertakings in the district. In Alicante, Valencia and Cartagena they were on the staff of shipping concerns, in Barcelona the registrar of the German Chamber of Commerce was appointed economic reporter of the N.S.D.A.P., in Palma, Majorca, this function was allotted to the secretary of a big hotel.

THE GERMAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE NAZIS

The economic policy of the Third Reich in relation to Spain was based on the principles which Dr. Schacht was in the habit of following in general for the more backward countries. Reduced to a simple form they are as follows:

Germany has an adverse balance of trade. In the year 1935 the Reich imported goods from Spain to the value of 118.3 million marks, while exports to Spain reached a value of only 105.7 million marks. Imports from Spain were confined to raw materials for armaments and foodstuffs (the latter only in so far

as currency was released from armaments). In the year 1935 Germany imported from Spain iron ore to the value of 13.2 million marks, and iron pyrites to the value of 8.1 million marks. In addition there were considerable imports of mercury. The Third Reich exported semi-manufactured and finished goods in exchange, while it took the utmost care to prevent the development of industry in Spain in so far as there was any question of assistance from Germany, so that there should be no competition with German export industries.

In order to establish a basis for carrying out this economic policy in Spain, the Nazi Foreign Trade Office was charged with the Nazification of German firms and those Spanish firms which held agencies for German firms, or came under consideration as suppliers to Germany.

The German Chamber of Commerce in Spain, with its headquarters in Barcelona, was an important instrument in the Nazification of German firms in Spain. We have already stated that the registrar of this Chamber of Commerce was also Nazi economic reporter for Barcelona. Through this personal connection supervision of German and Spanish firms was greatly facilitated. In a letter from the Chamber of Commerce to the Foreign Trade Office, dated May 9, 1936, it is explicitly declared that the board of directors consisted entirely of Aryan Germans, and that the Chamber of Commerce in the Spring of 1936 had 381

members. It is the only German Chamber of Commerce abroad that has two important places of business in its town. This letter of May 9, 1936, provides documentary evidence of the dependence of the Chamber of Commerce on the National Socialists, particularly in the closing sentence, which requests the Foreign Organisation of the N.S.D.A.P. to provide the Chamber of Commerce with a yearly subsidy. This Chamber of Commerce, therefore, appeals not to the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, as would be expected, but the National Socialist Party itself, and thereby proves that it is the instrument of National Socialism in Spain.

NAZIFICATION OF GERMAN FIRMS IN SPAIN

The Nazification of German firms and agents of German firms in Spain was carried out with as much persistence as the Nazification of the Diplomatic Corps. In a great number of circulars the economic reporters are asked for information about the German firms. Circular 4 (series 7) of the economic section of the *Information Bulletin*, issued at the end of June 1934, is concerned with the agents of I.G. Farben, Krupps Ltd., Siemens and Allianz. Further circulars deal with A.E.G., banks and shipping concerns. Altogether questionnaires on 734 German and Spanish firms were sent out by the Foreign Trade Office. The following questions were put:

“ Owner ?

Business managers (commercial and technical) ?

Chief clerk ?

Attitude of the various managers to the new Germany ?

To the German colony ?

To the Nazi section ?

Staff Pure German, including Group 50

. . . . Of German descent

. . . . Natives of the country concerned

. . . . Other nationalities

. . . . Group U.

How many German agencies has the firm ?

How many non-German agencies ?

Is the firm an agent for competing manufacturers ?

Is the agent firm suitable for the agencies mentioned ?

If not, what other firm or firms do you propose in this place ?

Standing of the agent firm ?

Does it work at a profit or at a loss ? ”

We explained in Chapter III what the code means in the question on Staff—Group 50 means National Socialists, Group U signifies Jews.

In circular 6 from the Foreign Trade Office supplementary questions were put, in particular, whether there were Freemasons among the responsible staff of the firms.

A NETWORK OF FREEMASONRY

A letter addressed by Herr Albrecht Krauss of Knoth Ltd. Chemical Manufacturers in Ludwigshafen, to Zuchristian, head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, on May 20, 1935, shows how the struggle against Jews and Freemasons was conducted. Krauss made a tour through Spain, and sent various reports to Zuchristian. The letter referred to comes from Cordova. It is particularly significant both in content and in tone:

“Cordova, 20/5/35

Strictly confidential

Dear Walter,

To-day I will once again resume our interrupted correspondence. I only hope that you have now quite recovered, so that you can take your full part again in our affairs. Lately I too have been concerned about certain things; in fact about political matters, and now there is a case which must be cleared up immediately. Therefore I would ask you to give this matter the greatest attention, and to examine it accordingly. It is a question of the following:

The D.K.W. agency (motors) has been given in the last few weeks to two gentlemen. Their names are: Kirchner and Dr. Liesau. The former is a Freemason; this he always admits quite openly, but politically he is a blank page. He is agent for Demag, Duisburg (cranes, etc.). But in this case it is more a question of Dr. Liesau. The exact details were sent to you yesterday

by Herr Holch, head of the Nazi local section, with whom I previously had a consultation. As you will see from the documents, Dr. Liesau is a swine, one of the good-for-nothings that are very dangerous for us. When the first admissions to the Party began to be made, he also put his name down in Seville, and signed the application form, but he afterwards withdrew his application, on the ground that he wished to be naturalised as a Spaniard. The real reason, however, was undoubtedly that he was unwilling to sign, as was provided, an additional declaration giving an assurance that he was of Aryan descent and not a member of a Freemason's Lodge, etc. The official documents from Germany (government) which are in the hands of Herr Holch, show that Dr. Liesau has Jewish connections. He tried, therefore, to get into the Party originally by signing things which are not applicable in his case, but afterwards apparently the business became too distasteful.

If the man were merely a private individual I should not bother about him, especially as I personally have nothing to do with him. But here it is a question of German interests, of the agency for a big German firm, and therefore we must proceed, at any rate in the case of a new appointment, with the greatest care and scrupulousness. And so it is our damned duty as Nazis to bother ourselves with it.

Therefore I declare as incriminating the following, which has to be proved:

The D.K.W. agency in Seville has just recently been given to a Freemason and a man of Jewish connections, who formerly attempted to get into the Party by the misrepresentation of facts. I ask you to examine this for yourself, and to find it correct.

As for points which can be proved—

You know that with regard to Freemasons in general nothing can be proved, just because they are a secret society. What I set out below are views which are held by me as well as by the Party leadership in Seville. And we old campaigners have so much experience that we don't get on the wrong scent in these things.

So, as I say, there is a whole nest of Freemasons and their hangers-on in Seville, who have a splendid cover in Seville and also in Madrid. In Seville the cover is Vola di Gomez, or rather Vola di Diergo Gomez (olive exporters). Her house is the meeting-place of leading Spanish Freemasons. The woman is over 70, an eccentric, living in companionate marriage with her business manager, Heinemann (aged 29). Liesau is a friend of this house. And the German Consul here (Rotari) is hostile to nobody, and will certainly not do anything to injure any of these people. The reason is clear. It must not be forgotten that Liesau's main job is as chemist to the tobacco factory, and he holds the agency only as a subsidiary post. (He is also agent for Haid in Madrid.)

Now I have publicly stated that in my opinion Dr. Liesau is not the right man for the D.K.W. agency. I

have also had a discussion with him, which however was without result, as I refused to state my reasons in order not to give him the possibility of being in a position to refute them. The affair is far-reaching. It is not merely a question of substantiating Dr. Liesau's unsuitability for the D.K.W. agency, but also of exposing his confederates. This, my dear Walter, is the *key point* of the whole affair. And this point has got to be cleared up *in Madrid*. As a result of my challenging attitude in my interview with Dr. Liesau, he said things, because he was angry, which otherwise he would probably not have told me so openly. His chief advocate, it appears, is at the Embassy in Madrid and he actually threatened me with the man, without mentioning his name. (This man also probably belongs to this Freemason circle, and serves as a spy against us.) When I told Holch about this, he said that he already knew this from another source. In addition his partner Kirchner told me that he goes in and out at Enrique Trauman's (or Trautmann—a Jew) in Madrid, like a son of the house. This man therefore is also one of the circle. Trauman sells steel furniture.

In addition Frau Gomez is said to finance the shop here in Seville, therefore she may also be of interest to us. This woman is on intimate terms with almost the whole of the German colony here. Most of the colony here is a brood horribly mixed up with Jews and Freemasons. So please give your attention to this matter. And the more quickly it is dealt with, the greater seems

the chance of success. Of course the whole thing must be most thoroughly prepared.

I will of course gladly answer at once any questions which will help to clear the matter up in the end. I am also prepared, if necessary, to come to Madrid some Saturday and /or Sunday with Herr Holch, for a discussion.

In clearing up this affair, such questions as the following are sure to crop up:

Who is the Finanz-Auto in Spain? Is the agent for D.K.W. in Barcelona, Martinengo, merely a puppet? Does the Motor Union (D.K.W.) in Germany know what is going on here? Have the people in Germany influence over the Spanish concerns? etc.

The thing to be aimed at is: Kirchner and Liesau must not secure the D.K.W. agency, and above all *who* wangled this business? Once we know the enemy, we can deal with him.

Write again soon. For to-day, accept my very best wishes and

Heil Hitler !

Your

(signed) ALBRECHT."

THE STRUGGLE FOR A.E.G. AND SIEMENS

Jews who were on the staff of German firms were denounced in hundreds of letters, often in the style of the *Stürmer*. In the course of the year 1935 at the latest, the Jews lost their jobs with German firms in Spain.

Only two exceptions, in the case of Telefunken, were permitted, because Telefunken were afraid that two Jewish specialists would go over to their competitors.

The Nazi headquarters in Spain conducted a violent campaign for the removal of all responsible employees who were open to the slightest suspicion of hostility to National Socialism, or even behaved with indifference towards it. Particularly violent efforts were made with regard to A.E.G. and Siemens, I.G. Farben, Telefunken, and the German banks and shipping concerns. Denunciation of the most vicious kind was highly successful in these "economic reports." The director of the A.E.G. in Madrid, Hellermann, was at first accused, in correspondence between the Spanish Division and the Foreign Organisation, of being a Jew; when he had proved his Aryan descent, his wife was suspected of being of Jewish descent; when her Aryan descent was proved, the Foreign Organisation got information about Hellermann from South America. The enquiry was conducted in such a way that the answer could only be: Hellermann is politically unreliable. This case fills a whole bundle of files.

Another black sheep of the Foreign Trade Office is Herr Kellersberger of Siemens-Schuckert Ltd. The following letter shows the dictatorial behaviour of the Foreign Organisation in connection with appointments to responsible posts abroad:

“ May 22, 1935

Commissioner for Economic Affairs—

Herr Director Dr. Reyss,

Siemens-Schuckert A.G.

Siemenstadt, Berlin.

Dear Dr. Reyss,

I have been informed that you propose to appoint Herr Kellenberger, who is at present in charge of your branch in Buenos Aires, as head of your Madrid house.

With regard to this, I find myself obliged, in view of our repeated discussions, to express my surprise at the proposed transfer of Herr Kellenberger to Madrid.

Herr Kellenberger, who has already been employed by Siemens in Spain some time ago, is just as undesirable there as he was in Buenos Aires. It is clear from reports from Spain, which I have before me, that the personal objections to him there are just as strong as in Buenos Aires, considering what is remembered about him. You see therefore that the transfer proposed by you will not improve matters in any way whatever. For the reasons known to you, I consider it absolutely impermissible that Herr Kellenberger, a Swiss, with his proved connections with circles which are known to us as hostile to Germany, should again take up the position of director of one of your branches abroad. You reported months ago that the recall of Herr Kellenberger from Buenos Aires had been decided on. Unfortunately this gentleman is still in his old position, and I must therefore urgently request you to have him recalled immediately.

Heil Hitler ! ”

DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY IN SPAIN

The Nazi organisation in Spain and its economic reporters worked against the development of Spanish industry by every possible means. It is one of the duties of the economic reporters to prevent the setting up of competing enterprises in Spain. The Foreign Trade Office is to be informed of every proposed industrial establishment. This leads to denunciations, which, for many of those who are denounced, may result in being sent to a concentration camp. The merchant Hanns Traub wrote from Berlin, appealing with full confidence to the German Chamber of Commerce in Barcelona to help him in securing orders, so as to develop industry in Catalonia. He received no reply. On the contrary, the registrar of the Chamber of Commerce wrote the following letter on October 25, 1935, to the economic reporter of Nazi headquarters in Spain, R. C. Bober, in Madrid:

“ Ref. Letter from Hanns Traub, Merchant, Landhausstrasse 40, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, dated August 25, 1935, to the German Chamber of Commerce in Barcelona.

The above-mentioned addressed to the Chamber of Commerce a letter of which a copy is attached. The Chamber has not replied to this letter. As the writer and the engineering specialist mentioned by him are apparently engaged, in particular, in transplanting typical German industries to foreign countries, and there developing new industries to

compete with German finished products, it might be regarded as necessary in the interests of German economy to keep this Traub and the German engineering specialist concerned under special observation.

Heil Hitler !

(signed) WENIGER."

Bober made the following note on this communication in his own handwriting:

"The engineering specialist interests me particularly."

"Special observation," "Interests me particularly..." who does not know the significance of such words ?

THERMOMETER EXPERTS ENTICED TO GERMANY

The struggle against industrial development in Spain went so far that German technical workers were brought back to Germany as a means of removing competition with German industry. In the economic correspondence of Nazi headquarters in Spain there are letters dealing with four Thuringian thermometer experts, who were employed at the firm of Garrido Lopez in Barcelona. An economic informer reported this fact to the Consul-General. The latter appealed to the Thuringian government. The Thuringian Minister of the Interior, the governor of Thuringia and

Hitler's Commissioner for Economic Affairs took part in the correspondence. Two of the workers, Pomerence and Gnesetti, an Italian subject, responded to the summons to Germany and, as the correspondence puts it, "gave no cause for objection." A letter from the Thuringian Minister of the Interior contains the following statement about the other two workers, Hertam and Nolde:

"The third, Hertam, suddenly disappeared again, after a ten days' visit to Thuringia; he received no visa of any kind to leave the country, but as it turned out subsequently, went through Czecho-Slovakia to Austria. According to recent information he was supposed to be back now in Thuringia. The efforts to lay hands on him which were immediately made by the State Investigation Department, have been without result. There has been no definite evidence that Hertam has been in Germany again. Presumably it was a case of a false rumour.

The worker Nolde is the foreman, and undoubtedly the best qualified technical worker employed by the Spanish firm. Therefore I attached the greatest importance to his return, and particularly recommended this to the Consul-General in Barcelona. Nolde did not start on the return journey at the same time as the other workers, but travelled later, ostensibly because of illness. The Consul-General informed us that he would go first to his parents in Charlottenburg and

then to Ilmenau. Nolde, however, did not notify his arrival, and further inquiries make it appear almost certain that he has not been in Germany at all. His parents in Charlottenburg have been interrogated by the chief of police there, and declared that their son Erich Nolde has not returned since he left the country in 1931, and in particular did not visit them in the spring of 1934. (According to the report of the Consul-General Nolde is said to have travelled from Barcelona on the first of April 1934.)

The merchant Kroeger made a written statement that he knew from his friend Seeben in Langewiesen that Nolde had been in Thuringia. Seeber has been interrogated. He asserts that he heard the news, that Nolde had been in Thuringia in the spring of 1934, from a certain Becker. Becker, however, can no longer be interrogated; he has died in the meantime. The State Investigation Department also questioned Nolde's brother in Gräfenau. The latter asserted that his brother had not been in Thuringia. Other enquiries made by the State Investigation Department with regard to a visit of Nolde's to Thuringia have also been without any result. Therefore we are probably entitled to assume that Nolde has not been in Germany at all...."

Three important State authorities, the Consul-General, the State Investigation Department and the Gestapo were set in motion, in order to ruin a little Spanish firm which made thermometers. Nolde's family

were subjected to interrogations the nature of which is known from many harrowing reports from Germany. The whole case is a substantial contribution to what is known of the "economic policy of the Third Reich."

ECONOMIC REPORTERS IN PURSUIT OF FOREIGN CURRENCY

The Nazi economic reporters also perform political services in supervising exchange transactions. They are not satisfied with supplying information about Germans who send currency abroad. They are also responsible for reporting whether German firms *at home* "show indifference in dealing with export orders" and thus make themselves responsible for losing some foreign currency for the Reich. A letter from the Foreign Trade Office, dated January 24, 1935, is a direct incentive to spying. The closing phrase of the circular is precisely the same as the assurances given by the criminal police to their agents, spies and informers, that their names will not be given away.

"Spanish Headquarters.

Economic Department.

Obstruction of export trade by German inland firms

We request you to send the following circular to a selected list of absolutely trustworthy Party members:

'Complaints have come in to Party and Reich departments to the effect that certain German manufacturers and suppliers show indifference in dealing with orders

and enquiries for export, and thereby sabotage the efforts of the Reich to increase exports.

Such reasons as "Goods are no longer produced," "we are over-supplied with orders," or "temporary shortage of raw materials" are said to be wrongly alleged. If similar cases have occurred in the course of your duties, I should be obliged if you would let me have full reports, which I shall utilise in a way which will help things along and protect your interests.'

We request you to collect the answers received and to forward them to us.

Heil Hitler !

(Signature) FOREIGN ORGANISER."

**"UNSCRUPULOUS EXPLOITATION OF GERMANY'S
SHORTAGE OF RAW MATERIALS"**

The correspondence of the economic reporters and the Foreign Trade Office throws an interesting light on Germany's internal economic problems. A letter of January 14, 1935, from the Foreign Trade Office shows the subterfuges which German merchants often employed in order to obtain raw materials:

"National Socialist Organisation in Spain"

We have before us a report on the exploitation of the shortage of raw materials by unscrupulous firms, which seems to us sufficiently important to request you to follow up with the closest attention any similar proceedings which may come to your knowledge, and to report on them to us.

Is

(1) A German exporter signed a large contract with an English firm, with which he was on very friendly terms, for a delivery date which in practice was simply impossible. This delivery date was fixed at the express wish of the German exporter. A few days after the date fixed for delivery, the German exporter received a telegram stating that the contract was for an immediate transaction, that the German exporter had failed to adhere to the delivery date, and that acceptance of the goods was cancelled. It was a case of an obvious *sham transaction*, which was intended to enable the German exporter to secure raw materials at world market prices, with the help of a signed contract. The raw materials obtained on this basis were then sold on the home market at a corresponding profit, special attention being called to the fact this was an 'extraordinarily favourable' offer.

(2) The owner of a German firm, who was recently abroad, was told by a large importing house, which buys and advertises German goods, that German exporters very often put to their foreign customers the immoral request that they should increase the quantities to be contracted for to *three times the amount*, with a proviso that two-thirds of the contract may be cancelled at a later date. These German scoundrels are supposed to give their foreign customers a written undertaking that they are entitled to cancel two-thirds of the contract in question. But the cancellation is not to take place before February, by which time

the German exporter intends to have secured and worked up the additional quantities of raw cotton. The suggestion is made to the foreign customer that he should give as a reason for the cancellation of the contract his inability to obtain from his government the necessary permit to export currency, in other words, that the money to pay for the import is not forthcoming.

As soon as you hear of anything of the kind, please take all possible steps to obtain precise information, so that we may be able to proceed further from here.

Heil Hitler !

(signature) ”

NAZI PUBLIC SERVICE

It counts as a crime if a German firm abroad ventures to ship goods by any except German steamers. On September 23, 1935, the Foreign Trade Office wrote to the Economic Department in Spain :

“ In your letter of July 15 you sent us a report on the conduct of Enrique Steinkamp, in which, among other things, information is given showing that Steinkamp has been shipping dried medicinal herbs by an English line instead of by German steamers. . . . ”

Steinkamp had already been denounced on a previous occasion, because he was said to have sent almonds to Germany by an English steamer on

August 17, 1935. In a report from Kindler von Knobloch, head of a Nazi supporting unit, it was emphasised as a particular offence, that Steinkamp had managed to secure a cheaper rate from the English firm. Steinkamp, who had already been turned out of his post as German Consul at Alicante by the Nazis in 1933, lost his appointment as agent of Germanischer Lloyd. The agency was given to the firm of Baquera, Kusche & Martin, whose manager in Alicante was the informer Kindler von Knobloch.

This is not the only case in which a Nazi agent has denounced a German in a foreign country or given an adverse report about him, in order to take his job. On January 11, 1936, Hellermann, head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, sent an unfavourable reply to an enquiry as to the suitability of Seidlitz, a member of the Party, to take over the Reich Railways agency in Barcelona. A few days later Hellermann, who at this time was still head of the Nazi local section in Barcelona, himself applied for the post of Reich Railways agent in Barcelona. In this case the "comradely spirit" of this "Hoheitsträger" only failed to bear fruit because his application was superseded by his appointment as head of the Nazi organisation in Spain.

SPANISH ORE

The economic reporters were urged over and over again to make enquiries about new discoveries of ore and raw materials, and to keep a watch on Spanish

firms which were prospecting for raw materials. From the abundance of evidence we will deal particularly with two cases, which show that the drive for raw materials in Spain led to economic espionage against private enterprises. In 1934 a Spanish firm at Saragossa discovered deposits of copper. The economic reporter at Saragossa succeeded in getting details and having tests made of the analysis which showed that the raw material contained more than 25 per cent copper. On December 20, 1934, he wrote to the head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, informing him of the discovery, and ended his letter with these words:

“ I should be happy if I were rendering a definite service to my country and could make my modest contribution to German rearmament which is to bring us back German liberty.”

The reply from the head of the Spanish organisation was not long delayed. He put various questions to the economic reporter, of which one is particularly significant:

“ How near is the copper to the French frontier ? ”

A second case: The mining engineer Adolf P. Langeheim was head of the local section in Tetuan. He too was eagerly on the look out, on behalf of the Foreign Trade Office, for discoveries of ore. He too reported to the Foreign Trade Office, by making use of confidential information which had come into his

possession from Spain, certain discoveries of molybdenum and vanadium ore. These ores are used for the production of tool-steel and ferro-vanadium, and are of special interest to the armament industry.

This economic espionage, carried out under official instructions, covers a very wide range. The Nazis to-day have about 500 sections abroad. This means that 500 economic spies are engaged in their dark practices in other countries. As far back as July 20, 1935, the Foreign Trade Office boasted, in the *Information Bulletin*, that it had a card-index, in which nearly 3,500 firms were registered. The economic reports of the Spanish organisation leave no doubt about what is entered on these cards.

ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE SPANISH STATE

National Socialism does not confine itself to conducting economic espionage against private firms abroad. It also directs its economic spies against the Spanish State. On February 7, 1935, the following letter was sent from the Foreign Trade Office to the local section in Madrid:

“ Trade Agreement between Uruguay and Spain.

We have been informed by the local section in Montevideo that a trade agreement has been concluded between Uruguay and Spain, and in this agreement a list of articles is mentioned, which make up about 80 per cent of the present purchases of Uruguay in Spain; in the future they are to be subject

to preferential duty in Uruguay in so far as the articles shown on this list will be free of the additional duty of 25 per cent on the normal duty. This list is being kept secret in Uruguay, until it has been approved and authorised by the Spanish government. Therefore it is not possible for us to find out the articles included in it for preferential treatment.

As it is of great importance for the existing trade agreement between Germany and Uruguay, to find out the articles favoured by this preference, we beg you to see if you cannot get a look at these lists there.

Please begin to make the necessary enquiries immediately, and inform us of the result as quickly as possible, and, if you have got the lists, forward them to us.

Heil Hitler !

(signed) BURBACH,

Foreign Organisation."

This letter is an unconcealed and direct incitement to economic espionage against the Spanish State. It is particularly interesting because it shows that the economic reporters not only pursue their secret work in Spain, but that in Montevideo too, and all over the world, the official system of Nazi economic espionage is carried on against private firms, and against States. The activities of the Nazi economic reporters abroad are completely unmasked by this document. No denials, no protestations of legality, can soften down the contents of this letter.

CHAPTER VI

"HARBOUR SERVICE" IN SPAIN

ANYONE WHO UP TO NOW has thought that Madrid, Paris, Zurich, Prague and Brussels are inland towns can be taught something better by the National Socialists, who maintain a "Harbour Service" in these and hundreds of other inland towns. The supreme chief of this Nazi Harbour Service is posted in Berlin, which also is known not to be on the coast.

The central harbour service department has its offices in the building of the Foreign Organisation in Berlin. People at the Foreign Organisation don't like talking about this department, which is enveloped in a veil of secrecy. Its chief, Kurt Wermke, has belonged to the Foreign Organisation since 1931. Although he is Bohle's second assistant, the Party knows practically nothing of his name. He dresses as an innocent civilian, and rarely dons any insignia of Party or of rank.

When we look more closely at this harbour service, we discover that it has devilishly little to do with sea transport. The harbour service is a sub-section of the Gestapo, the "secret State police." Anyone whose name has a cross against it in the card-index of the Harbour Service Department can be certain that the Gestapo

abroad is on his tracks. The Harbour Service Department carries out this supervision, this Gestapo work, in foreign countries. In doing this it makes use of another department of the Foreign Organisation, the “Returned Emigrants” department, which is charged with “the care of the German citizen returning from abroad.” Many a returning emigrant is “cared for” so well that immediately on his return to his native land he is taken straight to a concentration camp or brought before the courts. The head of the Returned Emigrants department is Harald Schulze-Hermann.

In foreign countries Harbour Service and Returned Emigrants Service are combined in the hands of the head of the Harbour Service for the time being. Each Nazi local section and supporting unit abroad has its Harbour Service leader; so has each regional and national headquarters. There were fifty Harbour Service leaders in Spain, and their work is illuminated down to the smallest detail by the documents found in Barcelona.

The first Harbour Service leader in Spain, the man who organised the whole of the Harbour Service work, was Carl Cords. Before the war he was head of a tea importing concern in Casablanca. After the war, in 1921, he went to Spain, and in 1931 secured a post in the Siemens agency in Madrid. Since March 1, 1933, he has been a member of the National Socialist Party. He set about his Harbour Service with great zeal: it evidently gave him great delight to hunt men. His

successor, who took over the Harbour Service management in May 1936, was Alfred Engling in Barcelona; he was twenty-six years of age, and since October 1, 1931, had been a member of the National Socialist Party; he had worked as Harbour Service leader previously in the Barcelona local section. His spurs had been won in Mainz, in storm troop 27/3. The firm Gütermann Silks provided him with a cover for his Gestapo work, giving him a post in its Barcelona agency.

Under the guidance of these two men the Harbour Service leaders in Spain organised and carried through their drive against emigrants, Jews and Spanish politicians of the Left.

KIDNAPPING A MAN

The German student B., who had been in Spain since 1928, attracted the attention of the Granada Harbour Service leader in 1934; on September 2, 1934, the latter sent a long report on the results of having B. shadowed:

“For some days a German student of the name of B. has been going about here, agitating against Germany in a most blackguardly way, and dragging our Führer Adolf Hitler in the mud on every opportunity. I myself have heard it and also been told of it by others. He has been entered three times already on the Black List of the German consulate here;

hence we can infer that we are dealing with a really bad person.

A German living here sent this man to my office by arrangement, and without calling him a swine I spoke to him in such a way that he did not notice that he was in a cleft stick. He has a book with signatures of all kinds, and the first is the Mayor of Madrid, Pedro Rico. . . .

His father was born in Oberdorf a.N. and is now with Siemens in Vienna. His brother is said to have been employed in the Reich printing works in Berlin. He tells people that Hitler is a beast, that people are shot for nothing, that everyone gets put into concentration camps, that children denounce their parents, that there are more unemployed to-day in Germany than there were before, and other things of this sort. . . .

All our laborious enlightenment work which is being carried on by all colleagues among their Spanish friends will be fruitless if such elements have a free run. People believe a traitor to his country of this kind more than they believe decent people, and this is why unbelievable and filthy articles now and then appear in the local papers.”

The letter goes on to report that B. has betaken himself to Malaga; he is recommended to the attention of the Harbour Service leader there. Nor was this attention lacking. Only four days later, on September 6,

1934, the leader of the local section there was able proudly to report to Madrid and Germany:

“ In view of the serious charges made in the letter, I came to an agreement with the consulate here to arrange for the arrest of the man by the Spanish police, in order to get him sent back to Germany by the Sloman Line steamer *Spezia*, which is leaving here for Hamburg on the 10th of this month.

Following on this, the German Consul called on the police authorities here, who at once expressed their willingness to carry out our wishes. Next day when B. again came to see Party member Fiessler in the Travel Bureau of the firm ‘Bakumar,’ to pick up his ticket for Oran, Fiessler held him in conversation until the arrival of the police, who had in the meantime been warned.”

In order to secure the arrest of B. by the Spanish police, the Harbour Service had made some criminal charge or other against him. The Consul had abetted this manœuvre. After the arrest the case went forward according to plan. On October 18, 1934, Malaga advised Madrid:

“ For your information I have to advise you that the above-named was taken on board the steamer *Spezia* by the Spanish police in the regular way on the 15th of this month. There he was received by the group leader of the ship and various Party members

of this town and handed over to the Captain for transfer to Germany.”

The tragedy which was performed on board the *Spezia* is cloaked in the laconic phrase that “he was received” by the group leader of the ship and various Party members of Malaga. There is no report as to his reception in Hamburg, but we know from many other heartrending descriptions what it was like.

“RETURNED EMIGRANTS”

Through its agencies abroad, National Socialism carries on propaganda for the return to Germany of certain strata of the German people, especially technical specialists. While it represents this return to Germany as a patriotic act, at the same time it has them watched by the Harbour Service leaders. On June 21, 1935, the Harbour Service department of the Foreign Organisation sent the following instructions to Nazi headquarters in Spain:

“In answer to your above-mentioned letter I have to advise you that it is desirable for the local sections to provide *every* Party member and German citizen returning to Germany for a lengthy stay, with a credential. One copy of this must be sent to the Harbour Service Department and by it to Department IV. This copy can then have a confidential footnote added regarding the attitude of the person concerned in the political and Party sphere, which

will be passed on by us to the Returned Emigrants Department. . . . ”

The confidential footnote was a man-trap for the trusting “ returned emigrant.” If he had had anything to do with Jews or freemasons, or had taken little interest in the life of the German colony, or had read the papers issued by German emigrants, this man “ called back by his native land ” was denounced by the Harbour Service leader. The letters end with the stereotyped formula: “ We request that arrangements be made to give the above-named the appropriate reception.”

In some cases the reports have “ documents ” attached, such for example as the following sworn statement:

“ The undersigned hereby states under oath that the German Willy Kremers, living in Madrid, expressed absolutely disapproving opinions against the Government, etc. This was in the Edelweiss Restaurant.

Madrid, December 18, 1935.

(signed) JOSEF ROLLFRITZ.”

Denunciations of the returning emigrants for smuggling foreign exchange and buying Registered marks are special favourites. Anyone who bagged a smuggler of foreign exchange received a definite payment per head, according to the amount smuggled. It was not only

the Harbour Service leaders who participated in this hunt for foreign exchange. Thus Zuchristian, head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, on April 8, 1935, denounced a colleague from Siemens who returned from Madrid to Berlin in that month, charging him with having bought Registered marks on the pretext that he was going on leave and by this means had made a considerable profit. The Spanish Bank at which the marks were bought, and the German Bank from which the amount was to be collected, were given in the denunciation.

NOT KEEN ENOUGH ON THE SCENT

The pack of fifty hounds was constantly on the track of the hunted animals. But the Harbour Service Department in Berlin was not satisfied: they were not keen enough on the scent. Things could not go on like that. Over and over again the head of the Harbour Service at Nazi headquarters in Spain was urged on, and over and over again he drove on his subordinates. On July 30, 1935, Carl Cords issued the following circular:

“On instructions received, I request the Harbour Service leaders of the different sections to maintain a regular and extremely close watch on all unhealthy elements in their area, and to advise me with all speed as soon as they have ascertained the necessary data—in the first instance place and date of birth, and last place of residence.

It has struck me that in the recent period I have received many warnings from the consulates, but have heard very little from my Harbour Service leaders. Of course, we should and will work hand in hand with the representatives of the Reich, but on the other hand we want to show the Foreign Organisation that we have correctly understood the purpose of Harbour Service work. . . .”

So we see consulates and Harbour Service leaders in honourable competition in their man-hunts. Innumerable reports testify that both understood the tasks that had been entrusted to them. It is impossible to give even a fraction of the “cases” on which the Harbour Service worked in Spain—they would make a whole book.

REFUGEES WHO HAD NO GROUND FOR THEIR ANXIETY

The Harbour Service leader at Granada—Eduardo Noé, German Consul—reported on October 9, 1934, that two German Jewesses had started a pension in Granada. Cords, head of the Spanish Division Harbour Service, sent on the report to Berlin on October 12, 1934, with the note:

“Both women have been closely watched, but are said to have conducted themselves irreproachably and not to be carrying on any propaganda

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Die Leitung der Auslands-Organisation

Gaukonto: Berliner Stadtbank, Reihe II,
Berlin W 9, Pankow 7-8.
Girokonto: Nr. 2400 unter:
Willy Schreiber
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
Fernsprecher: Sammelnummer B2 (Zanon) 7941



Postanschrift: Berlin W 35; Postfach 50
Einschreiben, Wertsendungen usw. an:
E. W. Böhle, Berlin W 35, Tiergartenstr. 4
Druckanschrift: Eiboh, Berlin

Berlin W 35, den 22. August 1935.
Tiergartenstraße 4

Aussenhandelsamt.
Buch-No. 25 137.
H4/2.

Landesgruppe
Spanien,
für Wirtschaftsstelle.

Betr.: Reichsbahnzentrale für den Deutschen Reise-
verkehr.

Der Vertreter der Reichsbahnzentrale
für Spanien ist Herr C.T. Froehlich,
Madrid, Apartado 1011, Calle de Alcalá. Wir bitten
Sie, uns über oben Genannten ausführlichen Bericht
erteilen zu wollen; vor allem auch darüber, wie
seine Einstellung zum neuen Deutschland, zur dor-
tigen Kolonie und zur N.S.D.A.P.-Gruppe ist. Sollte
Herr Froehlich ein Büro mit Angestellten unterhal-
ten, so bitten wir auch um Angabe, über die Zusam-
mensetzung seines Personals, dahingehend, wie viele
von seinen Angestellten

1. Juden,
 2. Freimaurer,
 3. Deutsche Volksgenossen,
 4. Parteigenossen
- sind.

Heil Hitler!
i.A.

2/9/31

durch Rg. Pader



Letter from Nazi Foreign Organisation in Berlin to Nazi headquarters in Spain, asking for information about the German Reich Railways Agent in Madrid: what is his attitude to the new Germany, and are there among his staff Jews, Freemasons, Germans, Nazis.

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Reichsleitung

Äußerer-Organisation

Ha/U.

Kontokonto: Hamburger Sparkasse von 1827

Kontokonto: Kassenkonto unter:

Willy Schneider, N.S.D.A.P. Auslands-Organisation

Kontokonto: Hamburg Nr. 678 77 unter:

Willy Schneider, N.S.D.A.P. Auslands-Organisation

Kontokonto: 44 45 42/44 45 45



Postanschrift: Hamburg 1, Volkshaus 737,
ohne jeden Zusatz.

Einschreiben, Wertsendungen usw. an:

Ernst Wilhelm Böhr, Hamburg 13,

Harroldshuderweg 22

Druckanschrift: Elbhor, Hamburg

Aussenhandelsamt der A.D.

Buch-No. 13913

Hamburg 13, den 7. Februar 1935

Harroldshuderweg 22

Ortsgruppe

Madrid.

durch Landesgruppe

Spanien.

Betr. Handelsabkommen zwischen Uruguay und Spanien.

Wie uns von der Ortsgruppe Montevideo mitgeteilt wird, ist zwischen Uruguay und Spanien ein Handelsabkommen abgeschlossen worden und in diesem Abkommen wird von einer Liste von Artikeln gesprochen, die ca. 80% der gegenwärtigen Käufe Uruguays in Spanien ausmachen und die in Zukunft eine Bevorzugung bei der Verzollung in Uruguay erfahren sollen, indem diese in der Liste verzeichneten Artikel von dem Goldaufschlag von 25% auf den normalen Zoll befreit werden. Diese Liste wird in Uruguay vorläufig geheim gehalten, bis sie von der spanischen Regierung genehmigt und autorisiert wird. Es ist uns daher nicht möglich, die darin verzeichneten bevorzugten Artikel kennen zu lernen. Da es nun von grosser Wichtigkeit für den zwischen Deutschland und Uruguay bestehenden Handelsvertrag ist, die von dieser Bevorzugung begünstigten Artikel zu erfahren, bitten wir Sie zu versuchen, ob Sie nicht dort Einsicht in diese Listen bekommen können.

Sie wollen bitte mit den dienstbezüglichen Nachforschungen unverzüglich beginnen und uns schnellstens über das Resultat derselben berichten bzw., falls Sie die Listen bekommen haben, uns dieselben einsenden.

Heil Hitler



Letter from Nazi Foreign Trade Office in Hamburg, asking the Nazi local section in Madrid for details of secret trade agreement between Uruguay and Spain.

hostile to Germany; this has also been confirmed by Spaniards. . . .”

This laconic observation shows that the Gestapo also used Spaniards for their spying activities. The reply from the Foreign Organisation, dated December 8, 1934, is also very interesting, as it once again confirms the fact that card-indexes of emigrants are kept at the offices of various Reich authorities:

“The woman named above has been recorded in our archives since 1/6/34; it appears that she is one of the refugees from the German Reich who had no ground for their anxiety. There are no records in connection with criminal police or taxation affairs. Nor are there any points against her in any of the other card-indexes here.”

What an apparatus was set in motion, because two German emigrants—who it is alleged “had no ground for their anxiety”—opened up a little pension: criminal police, Finance Department, Gestapo, and the Harbour Service chiefs at Berlin, Madrid and Granada!

“GERMAN LABOUR FRONT” IN THE GESTAPO’S SERVICE

In its work among Germans abroad the Harbour Service also relied on the auxiliary organisations of the National Socialist Party, especially the “German

Labour Front." German employees abroad, who were driven under the most intense pressure into the local groups of the German Labour Front, were subjected to a well-organised spy system which had a very narrow mesh. The Harbour Service leaders in Spain received monthly reports from the German Labour Front on the conduct of its individual members. On October 2, 1935, the head office of the German Labour Front in Spain launched the following denunciation:

"On his last visit to Bilbao the head of the Labour Front in Spain, Party comrade Anton Leistert, was informed that two German women clerks, one of them married to a Jew and the other said to be friendly with a Jew, are employed in two Government offices in Madrid. . . . There is a strong suspicion that these two clerks are engaged in spying against Germany."

Following on this denunciation the Harbour Service ascertained that one of the women who had been denounced was working in the Spanish Ministry of Labour. Everything was done to dislodge the woman from her post. The German Embassy was brought in; it played on its relations with the Government. Fortunately for the woman concerned the Azaña Government came in after the elections of February 1936, so that the Harbour Service had to abandon its drive against her.

“APPROPRIATE HANDLING” WITH THE
GERMAN EMBASSY’S HELP

The German Embassy was in general always readily at the disposal of the Harbour Service. It was not niggardly when it was necessary to clear up “cases.” One of the cases, dealt with in many letters and reports, was that of a German who had fled from Germany, and who asserted that he had sound records in his possession which proved Goering’s participation in the burning of the Reichstag. These records, since the burning of the Reichstag, have been offered to all German anti-Fascist organisations abroad; but none of them were to be taken in by this obvious fraud. But it was otherwise with the German Embassy in Madrid, which was afraid that new material proving Goering’s complicity in the Reichstag fire might turn up. It therefore put at the disposal of the Harbour Service leader the considerable sum of 2,500 pesetas, to get rid of the whole affair. The Harbour Service leader of Barcelona reported in a letter dated January 10, 1936:

“*Ref. Fritz Hanke.*

As you know, in the meantime the German Ambassador has granted 2,500 pesetas for the ‘appropriate’ handling of this case . . .”

Harbour Service leader Engling put the word appropriate in quotation marks. The correspondence does not tell us whether what was meant was the

bribery of a police officer or forcible entry into a prison or the kidnapping of Fritz Hanke.

SUPERVISION OF GERMAN SHIPS

The German seaman in a foreign port who is welcomed and entertained by the local Nazi section does not dream that the Harbour Service expresses its joy at the German ship's arrival by a close watch on its crew, and that it sends monthly reports on the German ships that have visited the port. A letter from the Foreign Organisation, dated June 10, 1936, gives us some information as to the contents of these reports:

"In order to make it possible to summarise statistically the supervising work of Spanish headquarters, it is necessary to send in monthly a Harbour Service report in duplicate, drawn up on the following lines:

1. Local section.
2. Name of ship visited.
3. Date of visit.
4. Crew: how many men.
5. How many Party comrades.
6. How many Storm Troop men.
7. Short report on any joint excursions, invitations, and so forth, showing how many officers, crew, Party members and members of the local section took part.
8. Special notes."

It was naturally the “special notes” that were of most interest to the Harbour Service Department. For example, notes that the officers on the Neptune Line steamers *Hestia* and *Hercules* had beaten each other up; or that a sailor of the *Rheinland*, which dropped anchor at Barcelona on November 22, 1935, had been seen with a Jew; or that another seaman, from the steamer *Brocida*, had had propaganda material of the “Black Front” pushed into his pockets in Barcelona on November 3, 1935.

GERMAN PILOTS WATCHED

Even German pilots abroad were kept under strict observation. In this connection, the Luft-Hansa agency of that period did the work of the Harbour Service as is shown by the following letter, dated June 8, 1936, from the Luft-Hansa director Karl Hebart in Berlin to Count Beroldingen, head of Luft-Hansa in Barcelona:

“I have been advised not to use Pilot Leiding on any foreign route, as owing to his pacifist attitude he would not represent Germany in harmony with the government. I should be grateful if you would send me your observations in confidence. As Leiding may be considered for use with the *Eurasia*, I should be grateful for an early reply. . . .”

At a Luft-Hansa banquet, Air Minister Goering declared that it was an honour to be a German commercial pilot, and that German pilots abroad were the

most daring pioneers for Germany. These German pilots, when they arrive tired after a long and arduous flight or luckily avoiding a dangerous storm, certainly do not think that the traffic manager of the Luft-Hansa who greets them in a most friendly way at the landing-ground has already set his dogs on their track. Courage, skill and presence of mind can overcome the forces of Nature; but an unfavourable report from Count Beroldingen can break the pilot's life.

SPYING ON POLITICAL OPPONENTS

The greatest part of the activities of the Harbour Service are naturally connected with spying on German political opponents. The case of Gerhard Thofern, a member of the Black Front, shows up the methods of provocation used by the Gestapo in its fight against the enemies of National Socialism.

On September 26, 1935, the German Embassy warned the Head of the Harbour Service in Spain that the German subject Gerhard Thofern

“was strongly suspected of being head of an anti-German Black Front and of smuggling Communist material into Germany. . . .”

We need not pay any attention to the charge that a member of Otto Strasser's Black Front was smuggling Communist propaganda material into Germany. Let us follow the course of events as the documents record them.

Engling, Harbour Service leader in Barcelona, at once put Thofern under observation. Thofern was secretly photographed, and through the Harbour Service Department in Berlin his photograph was sent to all frontier authorities. His brother-in-law Hahn, a clerk in the branch of a German Bank in Barcelona, was also spied upon.

Fifteen Germans were attending the German Labour Front School of Languages in Barcelona. Another student, Paul Fetzner, came on to the register. He had been sent by the Gestapo to keep an eye on the other students. He was used by Hellermann and Engling as their chief agent against the Black Front.

“There won’t be any lack of money,” Engling wrote to Fetzner, who was thus enabled to set about putting his diabolical plan into execution. He wrote to the “Black Front” in Prague, asking them to send a regular supply of their paper and propaganda material, and also Otto Strasser’s books. The result was as the Gestapo expected: Thofern was instructed by his people to get into touch with Fetzner. Fetzner handed over all circulars and propaganda material promptly to Engling, who sent them on to Berlin. The spy reported on the distribution of pamphlets of the Black Front to German seamen. After he thought he had won Thofern’s confidence, he went a step further. He promised Thofern to give him the address of an S.S. man and also the addresses of the students at the

School of Languages, who "are suitable for working on." In several letters Fetzner implores Engling to give him the name of a "usable S.S. man" for him to pass on to Thofern.

The names and addresses of the language students were given to Thofern. At the same time the head of the Languages School was instructed to note which students failed to hand over the Black Front propaganda material. In this way the provocation was attempted in two directions—against Thofern and against the students.

The next step was to carry the provocation into Germany itself. Fetzner had prepared a list of fifteen men in fifteen German towns, to whom Thofern was to send Black Front material. These fifteen men were to be made confidential agents of the Black Front and to form the nucleus of Black Front organisations in Germany. In this way the Gestapo hoped to be able to get on the tracks of the real trusted agents of the Black Front. The plan did not come to maturity, because Fetzner suddenly began to be aware that Thofern was becoming suspicious.

These provocatory methods, by which a snare is set both for political opponents and for their own friends, are used by the Gestapo against all political adversaries. There is a letter dated April 6, 1933, signed by Bohle himself, which shows that even before its seizure of power the National Socialist Party had sent spies into the anti-Fascist parties:

“Madrid local section.

Through Spanish headquarters.

In reply to your enquiry regarding Party member Meyen, Madrid, the Hamburg District leadership has just given the following information:

‘In reply to your above-mentioned letter and the copy of the letter from the Madrid local section, we have to inform you that the statements made by Party member Meyen are in accordance with the facts. More precise details are as follows: Meyen entered the Party in Hamburg 1/9/31, and was assigned the No. 681,048. He was sent by our Information Service for the purpose of espionage into the S.P.D. and the Reichsbanner. As his father, a Councillor of a town in Central Germany, was a stalwart of the S.P.D., he already had the necessary credentials for arranging this. However, he was twice absent from here without informing us, and we could not find him. Nevertheless, we knew that he was or is in Madrid, as he got into communication again with his superior from there. But this happened before the change of power, and his superior was not able to make a *written* record of this. His superior however advises us that Meyen must be used with caution, as he apparently has certain limitations, which are probably due to his father’s membership of the S.P.D. The papers and credentials of Party member Meyen are in the hands of his superior here. . . .’ ”

The Fetzner and Meyen cases show us that the Gestapo has taken over and developed the methods of the Tsarist Ochrana. They are characteristic of the Third Reich and its police not merely because of their viciousness. The large scale emergence of provocators shows the Nazis' fear of their political opponents, their fear that the anti-Fascist organisations, through their trusted agents and groups in Germany, may bring the truth to the people and develop the growing distrust until it becomes even an organised resistance. When we remember that National Socialism has over six hundred local sections in the country, and that its auxiliary organisations have at least a thousand groups abroad, we can realise that a regular army of spies and provocators is at work against the enemies of National Socialism. In relation to the amount of money and men used by the Gestapo, the losses it is able to inflict on anti-Fascism abroad are very slight.

COURSES FOR COMBATING COMMUNISM

Reports on Communists fill whole bundles of documents. For example, on April 19, 1936, Erich Schnaus, commissioner for Spain, dolefully reports:

"I should like to give you a very brief account of the present situation of the Germans in Spain. In the political sphere the fiftieth birthday of Thaelmann has been seized upon by the Left Parties as a welcome opportunity of again making propaganda against the

‘Nazi Terror.’ In all the main streets huge posters have been put up showing Thaelmann’s head—‘the friend of the international proletariat’—his head is stated to be once again about to fall. The effects of this propaganda have already begun to show themselves. . . .”

Among the documents are 27 circulars relating to the activities of the Communist Party of Germany. Over and over again the Harbour Service leaders are urged to make contact with Communists abroad, and over and over again they are reprimanded for having secured too little material. On December 20, 1935, the Harbour Service Department in Berlin announced that it was sending an expert for combating Communism. From January 15, 1936, on, specially qualified members of the German Labour Front were to take a special course for the fight against Communism. The political situation in Spain, however, made it impossible to hold these courses.

In a letter dated March 13, 1936, the Harbour Service Department announced that the Marine Transport Department was working out new special instructions for German seamen, in order to bring them into the fight against Communism with greater success than hitherto. On the day following, the Harbour Service leader in Barcelona received a reprimand because he had not been aware of the distribution of Communist leaflets on a German ship. The letter moreover shows

that the leader of the group on board the ship had either not heard of the distribution of the leaflets or had not reported it, and that the report had come from the first officer, who was not a member of the National Socialist Party.

The Consul and leader of the supporting unit in Cartagena, Henrique Fricke, was a special "matador" in the fight against Communism. He sent fortnightly confidential reports on Communist activities.

SPYING ON THE CHURCH

National Socialism's struggle against the Church was also fought out within the German colonies in Spain. On July 26, 1935, the Harbour Service Department issued a special circular instructing:

"a particularly close watch to be kept on German ministers abroad, as reports reaching the appropriate quarter indicate that ministers of religion abroad are supporting the treasonable machinations of certain Church circles."

Thenceforward the Harbour Service took the churches under their special care. The Harbour Service leaders knew that "factual reports are expected from you." On November 13, 1935, Paul Fiessler wrote from Malaga:

"After an interval of over a year, Pastor Peschel again preached to the German colony yesterday evening, and as on the last occasion again thundered

against the lack of faith and conscience of to-day. Just as, according to the Bible, Christ hunted the hucksters and moneylenders out of the temple with a whip, and later Martin Luther rose up against the Catholic Church, so to-day protests in deeds, not words, must be made against the prevailing indifference and laxity. . . . There was a large attendance at the church. The reactionaries were well represented, among them the Jewess Frau Klingenberg. . . .”

At the end of the report it was noted that Pastor Peschel was returning to Germany on January 1, 1936. The reception prepared for this fearless pastor need not be enlarged upon.

SPANISH POLITICIANS WATCHED BY THE GESTAPO

The Harbour Service maintained a number of Spanish agents, to whom the spying on Spanish politicians was entrusted. Special care was given by the Gestapo to President Azaña, reports pages long being devoted to his German visitors and his statements in connection with Nazi Germany. As the Harbour Service leader always speaks only of his “informant,” the names of the Spanish spies are not given in the documents; but the contents of the reports indicate that the Gestapo had its agents in the inner circles of the Spanish Left.

One point of interest must be specially mentioned. The Harbour Service repeated innumerable rumours

which were put about by the Spanish reactionaries against the politicians of the Left. The reports from Cords repeat many lies which since the rebellion have been circulated in the reactionary foreign press, especially the Nazi press. It seems probable that the Propaganda Ministry, using the Gestapo reports from Spain, put these lies into circulation through its journalist agents in Germany and abroad.

SPANISH HOTELS UNDER OBSERVATION

On September 30, 1934, the head of the Harbour Service in Madrid sent a circular to the regional heads of North, South-Central and Eastern Spain, with the information that a number of hotels had approached the German Automobile Club in Munich with a request for recognition. The circular tells us what the German Automobile Club wants to know:

“The D.A.C. is interested in ascertaining whether the owners and managers of the hotels listed are *Aryans* and whether their attitude to National Socialist Germany can be defined as neutral.

I request the regional reporters to collect information in this connection. . . .”

The “information” fills a huge bundle of documents. The best marks are given to the Hotel Cristina in Seville. In 1936 it received its reward: it became the headquarters of the German Air Staff which was working in Seville under General Queipo de Llano.

ATTRACTING TOURIST TRAFFIC FOR THE GESTAPO

Nazi groups abroad are insistently urged to support in every way the propaganda for securing tourist traffic for Germany. In a circular dated May 21, 1934, Zuchristian, head of the Spanish Division, was charged to harness the whole membership of the local sections in the work of attracting tourist traffic to Germany:

"The whole of the Party membership must be continually influencing Spaniards who are in a financial position to visit Germany (lawyers, doctors, architects, merchants, etc.) to spend their holidays in Germany. The special attention of the Spaniards must be drawn to the advantages of the Registered marks, which can be used for the journey to Germany and their stay there. *In cases where direct influence on neutral points is desired, please send name and exact address.*

The attention of the Party membership must be drawn to the fact that the visits of foreigners to Germany are extremely valuable from an *economic* standpoint, as they bring money to Germany, as well as from the *political* standpoint, as the foreigner can best be convinced on the spot of the real conditions in the Fatherland."

But then the cloven hoof comes into evidence. Financial and political advantages are certainly very much desired, but at the same time there is great anxiety as to the possibility of Spanish opponents of

National Socialism visiting Germany. So the circular goes on:

“The Party membership has the obligation to give an immediate report on every individual tourist. Particular mention must be made if it seems necessary to keep a watch on the tourist.”

The Spaniard is therefore first attracted to visit Germany, and then the Gestapo is set on his heels. The slightest inadvertence may bring him into prison. National Socialism takes care of its guests.

SMUGGLING

The Harbour Service Department of the Foreign Organisation maintains a special office in Hamburg which is exclusively concerned with the smuggling of material into foreign countries. Its manager is C. Frisch. This forwarding house despatches propaganda pamphlets, papers, journals and leaflets in all languages of the world, by the most diverse routes. The German air and steamship lines are loyal and important helpers in this work; they carry thousands of hundredweights of agitation and incitement material abroad.

The smuggling of material through diplomatic couriers and diplomats which we have already described was very far from meeting the needs of the Nazi organisation in Spain. So the Luft-Hansa was brought in, as it maintained a daily service between Stuttgart and Barcelona. The Luft-Hansa safeguarded itself

against any accident by bribing Customs officials. In a letter dated December 12, 1934, from Count Beroldingen, head of the Luft-Hansa in Barcelona, to the head office in Berlin, an increase in the Christmas bonuses is justified on the ground that the Customs officer has received a bigger bribe:

“In the first place we must take into account the Customs officer, to whom we have been extremely indebted during the past year. It isn't only that we have saved many thousand pesetas, especially in connection with the replacement parts for the T.O. Service, which were legally liable to duty; besides this there is the fact that this man helped us so much that all these consignments were passed on immediately the next day without delay—only those who know conditions here can fully realise what that means in Spain. These are the things which compel us to be grateful to the man. Also in the numerous cases when manifests arrived incorrectly made out, parcels were missing, etc.—occasions on which he could have fined us straight off 1,000 pesetas—he always arranged the matter without any fuss. . . .”

The bribes for the year 1935 had to be again raised, in consequence of the higher requirements to be met. On December 27, 1935, Count Beroldingen wrote:

“A further reason is that, except for an insignificant portion of the advertising material, we have not paid a single pfennig duty on ‘office necessities’ even
Ls

when they were liable to duty. For the whole year 1935 I estimate the amount saved in Customs charges at about 20,000 pesetas."

Fraudulent passage through the Customs, which cost the Spanish State 20,000 pesetas, and the smuggling of materials directed against the Spanish Republic—such was the interpretation by the Luft-Hansa of the German-Spanish trade agreement. The Luft-Hansa now maintains services almost all over Europe, and this example from Spain gives us an idea of how much is being "saved" on Customs duties and how much material is being smuggled in. A letter from Cords, head of the Harbour Service in Spain, dated January 19, 1936, indicates that three or four parcels a day can be "slipped through"; and this referred only to one Luft-Hansa landing ground abroad, in Barcelona.

The steamship lines had a very simple method of safeguarding propaganda material from seizure by Customs and police authorities. The material was entered as the property of the captain, and in this way safeguarded against any examination. It was carried ashore by German diplomats and clerks in the steamship offices, who also gave considerable bribes to the Customs and police officials.

WHO ARE THE GESTAPO AGENTS?

Just as the Barcelona material indicates the Gestapo's technique abroad, so also it reveals the men who carried

on its dark work. We get evidence of human tragedies and of the lowest human instincts. We see a swamp of revenge and greed for money, sadism and the lust of murder. The people who voluntarily enrol themselves for this work are not enough to meet the requirements. The demand for agents is so great that the Gestapo also presses into its service men who fall into its clutches. Just as the recruiting officers of the Middle Ages secured recruits for the princes by the press-gang, so now the Gestapo compels Germans who have been arrested on any pretext, or on any denunciation, to work for it.

The whole internal atmosphere of the Gestapo can be felt from the Harbour Service correspondence. We see the passion with which the hunting of men is carried on; not a doubt, not a word of regret or compassion—every line expresses only a crude joy in what has been done.

PORTRAIT OF A SPY

To National Socialism the Jew is not a human being, so long as he is merely a Jew. But when he declares his readiness to do the work of a spy, to betray his Jewish comrades, to denounce them, then he ceases to be a Jew so far as National Socialism is concerned: he is promoted to the status of confidential agent. Such was the position of Eugen Schönfeld, Gestapo agent in Barcelona. A case of fraud had brought him to prison; when he was released, he went straight to Engling, leader of the Harbour Service in Barcelona. Another Jew had made the charge of fraud against him; now he

wanted to take his revenge. This is what Engling writes about him in a letter dated December 8, 1935:

"The Hungarian Jew Schönfeld, known to you through my letters concerning Hanke and L., among other things offers us precise information in regard to the Jewish Mutual Aid Association and the sub-committee which meets weekly for the boycott of German goods, publication of the *Antifascist*, etc.—of course, only in return for payment. Sch. will also arrange for us to have further details of the political activity of emigrants living in Barcelona, on the basis of which German citizenship and German passports can be taken from them. His thirst for revenge goes so far that he is now telling the Spanish police which of the emigrants in Barcelona have already had their passports taken away, in order to get the persons concerned thrown out. . . ."

Another letter of the same date adds:

"I now have the opportunity of getting hold of material which Schönfeld is selling, through which it will be possible to lay hold of some twenty exchange swindlers in Barcelona, with their agents, relatives, contacts, houses, etc. in Germany."

We know what kind of people come under the category of "exchange swindlers." The minister of religion who will not bend before the lash of National Socialism; the anti-Fascist emigrant who is starving in a foreign country; the Jew who is striving to find some new

business opening. Twenty victims abroad and their connections inside Germany were sold to the Gestapo by Schönfeld. The sale price is not given in the letter.

In a letter dated December 8, 1935, Cords, head of the Harbour Service in Spain, transmitted a denunciation by Schönfeld of a married couple who had attempted to build up some new existence for themselves away from Germany. The lawyers, the relatives, the business people with whom the married couple were in contact, were all listed; also the way in which the money had been got across the frontier: “A large part of the money was brought across the frontier, tightly rolled up in a candle, in L.’s anus and Frau L.’s vagina”—so runs the report from the head of the Harbour Service to his principal in Berlin. He reconstructs the methods of smuggling the money out, and adds a series of filthy comments which cannot be reproduced here.

WAR MEMORIAL FOUNDATION IN THE SERVICE OF THE GESTAPO

After Hitler’s seizure of power the German Students Association built up their War Memorial Foundation with generous help from the Third Reich. Was it for the purpose of honouring the fallen?

An S.S. man, Joseph Schlickau, who held an engineering diploma, came to Barcelona in 1933 and, as the German Consulate-General reported on August 22, 1934, to the headquarters of the Nazi organisation in Spain,

" . . . is specially occupied with the emigrants. He states that he has made important discoveries and that he has advised the Gestapo of these."

In the spring of 1934 he went from Barcelona to Bilbao, where he worked as confidential agent of the Gestapo in the German consulate, regarding which a number of denunciations had been sent in. The man who was directly responsible for assigning this work to Schlickau was Nussbaum, head of the Gestapo Information Service. Schlickau sent his reports to Nussbaum through the leader of the local Nazi section in Bilbao. This bureaucrat made copies of these reports, and so we are able to read a letter which Schlickau sent to Nussbaum on July 2, 1934, which includes the following:

" In the meantime you will have received my last letter, dated June 2. Meanwhile, especially in these last few days, you will certainly have had all kinds of work and will still have it. . . ."

" All kinds of work "—that meant the shootings of June 30, 1934, two days before the sending of this letter. The man who wrote it and who was working as a Gestapo agent abroad, did not get his money from the Gestapo—as the report from the German Consulate-General shows, he was receiving a stipend from the German Students War Memorial Foundation. This is how National Socialist students honour those who fell in the World War.

There was not a single Nazi functionary or diplomat

abroad who made a stand against the War Memorial Foundation being used to finance spying. These agents of National Socialism have fallen so low that they are no longer even aware of what it is to dishonour the dead.

FROM CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE PEASANT LEADER
OF THE REICH TO GESTAPO AGENT

Documents found in the flat of the former German lawyer R. in Barcelona reveal a human tragedy. He had had a brilliant career. While still young he had risen to be chief of staff of the Peasant Leader of the Reich—that is, to be a Nazi authority in the consideration of peasant questions. He had been sub-leader of a storm troop in the S.S., in Hitler's prætorian guard. People used to swarm round him and flatter him. They wanted posts, benefices. Among the suppliants was an S.S. man named Luedtke. The chief of staff did what he could to find a post for the young S.S. man; but this was not easy, as Luedtke had been characterised by his former principals as lazy and unreliable.

Luedtke continued to press, and when the pressure brought no result, he did what thousands of S.S. men before him had done: he denounced chief of staff R. for homo-sexual delinquencies. Since the Jews and Freemasons have not been sufficient to distract the people from their rising poverty, and since Roehm and his boys were stuck up against the wall, the hunting down of homo-sexuals has been a favourite sphere of the Gestapo's work.

The chief of staff, for whose post many were thirsting, experienced what perhaps in the past he had thought out and done to others. The dreaded S.S. detachment appeared in his office; and when he climbed up into the lorry which was to take him to Columbia House, he, who five minutes earlier had been all-powerful in his sphere of office, was already a broken man.

In a petition dated September 15, 1935, addressed to the Reich Leader of S.S. Courts, R., who had been imprisoned by the Gestapo for several months, described his experiences in Columbia House. This petition is new documentary evidence of the appalling methods of the secret State police, the bodyguard of the Führer.

It was a game of cat and mouse. Over and over again the promise to release the prisoner if he would only confess. Interrogations lasting all day, and not stopping even at night, wore him down. He confessed to "homo-sexual delinquencies" with a friend many years before:

"If I am only now stating in this detailed form my position in regard to the accusations in Part III which became known to me during my examination by the Gestapo and in part after my release, and if this vindication is not contained in the Gestapo protocol, which contains even contradictory statements, this has come about through the following circumstances. Immediately after my arrest I was under examination on two

days. On the first day the examination lasted, with intervals, up to about 10 p.m. The examination consisted in essence in my being asked to admit that I had been in relations with two persons and had made similar approaches to a third. O, D . . . , and Luedtke were meant. Both examinations took place in a form which gave me no opportunity to state my detailed reply to the charges and to furnish exonerating facts for the protocol. Even what I was nevertheless able to say was treated as unimportant, or as material for a further hearing, which never took place. On the other hand Luedtke's assertions were put in the foreground as completely worthy of credence, and I was given no credence at all. Hence I was compelled to realise that no factual clearing up of the matter was possible in this way. I was strengthened in this conviction by the Commissioner's admonition that further 'denials' would lead to the arrest of the whole of the staff of the Reich Peasant Leader. I must realise that then in the examination of some 150 officials 30 would be found abnormal. This would give rise to a great scandal, of which the Gestapo was not afraid. Furthermore the greater part of my acquaintances would be arrested. Apart from that I must count on imprisonment for perhaps a year, because the Gestapo had no reason to hurry its enquiries on my account. In this connection the way in which requests for trials from the concentration camps were dealt with was described to me. But if I would make up my mind to admit some case . . .

S.S. Group Leader Heyderich would be prepared to release me immediately.

On the basis of these warnings, I declared to the Commissioner that the arrest and trial of the whole staff would produce a scandal which could not be made good again. In order to avoid it I was prepared to sign everything he wanted me to sign. I had decided to do this because on the one hand I felt it my duty as an official not to do damage to the standing of my office, and on the other I regarded the promised immediate release as the sole possibility of clearing up the affair in a factual way. The Commissioner, however, refused this way of securing my release and demanded a confession made by myself. As the Commissioner developed a great hurry and told me that Group Leader Heyderich only had a few minutes to spare, all my exonerating evidence fell into the background and only the 'so-called confession' required of me was entered by the Commissioner in the protocol. In this I admitted the above-mentioned incidents with D. . . . But the promised release did not materialise. Group Leader Heyderich had me told, on the contrary, that he wanted to speak to me personally on the following day. The Commissioner suggested that I was to be given a caution. Towards evening next day—after I had eaten nothing all day and in fact since my arrest—I was informed by the Commissioner that Herr Heyderich wanted further and more exact details. If I wanted to be released that day, I must be very quick

with it. The Commissioner made a bagatelle of the significance of the details required for my release, and then dictated the protocol. I did not attempt any more to influence the wording. This seemed to me, on the basis of the Commissioner's promises, completely immaterial, and moreover even apart from this question the protocol was not in conformity with fact. Only this can explain, for example, the presence in the protocol of a phrase which says that irregularities would have taken place with Luedtke had he complied with my inner desires, although no attempt took place. This sentence was also a pre-condition of my release. Otherwise I should never have allowed this phrase of the Commissioner's to stand. For even Herr Luedtke has confirmed that I never gave him any hint of a desire in this direction. Even had I felt myself guilty there would have been no ground for this phrase. What was decisive for my passivity was the prevention of the threatened scandal and the promise of immediate release. After signing the second protocol I was, however, not released, but taken away to the Columba K.Z. As the conditions for signing the protocol were no longer present, and moreover the protocol lay heavily against me as factually incorrect, I petitioned verbally and in writing for a new hearing. But no new hearing took place. I conformed with the regulations prescribed for this, and in spite of the injustice done me I took no special steps. For the impressions received during my imprisonment made me realise that action against

officials of the Gestapo can work out to the serious disadvantage of the prisoner—even when he is judicially set free. I cannot forthwith give further particulars on this point in consequence of the obligation of silence imposed on every prisoner. . . .”

That was the first chapter of the story. It is one additional documentary confirmation of the many reports from the hell of Columbia House. We can understand the sentence before the last even without the “further particulars.”

It cannot be seen from the documents how the second chapter of this drama developed, whether R. after putting in his complaint was again arrested and “worked on,” or whether a threat from the Gestapo was enough to make him submissive and a tool of the Gestapo.

The third chapter of the story took place in Barcelona. The chief of staff, the sub-leader of an S.S. storm troop, the prisoner of yesterday, had become a special agent of the Gestapo. Lashed by the Gestapo into the service of the Gestapo.

I INSIST THAT I AM COMPLETELY NORMAL . . .

Was it an isolated case? No. It was a system. In Barcelona another special agent of the Gestapo was employed. He too had once been a lawyer, and a member of the “National Socialist League of German Jurists.” He too had been accused of homo-sexuality. He too had been imprisoned by the Gestapo. After his

release he too had sought protection against the Gestapo from the National Socialist League of German Jurists. On September 30, 1935, he reported:

“I hereby place on record the statement which I made verbally to Herr Wolfgang Hercher, lawyer and notary, on the sixth of this month.

I am accused of having committed homo-sexual acts. I deny any such inclinations or acts. What led up to the charges which have been made was the following:

In November 1934 there was a cocktail party at the house of one of my clients, a German-Russian emigrant, a lady of title. The party was given by this lady's son. The family concerned is one which is highly respected in Berlin. The lady of the house, whom I have known for a long time and who has a high opinion of me, had previously invited me to her house from time to time, and in this way I got to know her son, who is about my own age. The fact of the invitation should therefore be sufficiently explained.

On the Saturday in question I had had some annoyance in connection with my work, and so I had already been drinking when I arrived at my host's house.

Only a few people had actually been invited. But in the course of the evening a number of men and women appeared who probably had not been originally invited; I do not know at whose invitation they came.

On the evening in question very strong mixed drinks were served, in the American way, *without food*. And

so it happened that in a very short time everybody present was absolutely drunk. How drunk, can be seen from the fact that one of the guests was throwing flower-pots out of the window into the street.

As a result of what has already been described, and probably also because I had not eaten enough for an affair of this kind, in the course of the evening I too got completely drunk. Therefore I lay down on a sofa in a small room, otherwise unoccupied, to sleep it off. When I woke again I realised that there was a man lying beside me; when I was confronted with him at the Gestapo headquarters, it appeared that he was a certain Kaeferstein. He stated that I had made sexual approaches to him. This I denied and still deny.

As soon as I woke up, and was somewhat further sobered by the shock, I went home, using a taxi. I was obliged to go home by taxi, as Kaeferstein has confirmed, because I was in too drunk a state to get home otherwise.

To make the matter clearer I must add that I did not know Kaeferstein before the party. Moreover, except when I was confronted with him at the office of the secret police, I have not seen him since.

Information obtained by the Gestapo, as a result of the flower-pots being thrown into the street, established the names of those who were involved. This information regarding those who had been present at the cocktail party led to my interrogation, and also to that of a certain Herr B., whom I had known for several

years and had met at my client's house. B. was also examined by the secret police. With reference to me he alleged that in 1928 or 1929 there had been sexual actions in which my mistress at that time, B. and I were concerned.

On that occasion my mistress visited me one evening. We drank a bottle of wine. B. came in unexpectedly and remained there. Very late in the course of the evening and when we were in very high spirits, sexual acts occurred between my mistress at that time and myself, and also between her and B. Naturally neither then nor at any other time have I had any unnatural relations with B.

In conclusion I can only emphasise that I am completely normally constituted. I have a mistress and probably will soon get engaged. My absolutely normal character can, incidentally, be confirmed by one of my recent landladies, who even complained of the excessive number of ladies I had visiting me. . . .”

Here was another lawyer who was compelled to make confessions and to recount to the Gestapo exactly and without ambiguity episodes from his past sex life. He too went the way that the chief of staff had trodden. He too landed in Barcelona. From being a hunter of men, he came to be hunted himself. Incapable of a manly decision, he carried on the meanest work of the Gestapo spy, reporting, denouncing, observing, bringing men to misfortune. And all the time himself in fear

of again falling into misfortune—that is, into Columbia House. How terrible the tortures must have been to make both these Gestapo spies afraid, even when they were out of the country, to kick against the pricks. In all probability, the Gestapo had insured itself against treachery by hostages in Germany.

Such is the Gestapo's human arsenal. Such are the hounds which it loosed on its political adversaries in Spain. The Gestapo shrinks from no means, even the most inhuman, to attain its ends. National Socialism murders and tortures its adherents when it serves its political aims. It forces its victims to enter its service. It persecutes the Jews, but it uses willing Jews as spies. The Gestapo is flesh of its flesh : without the Gestapo, the National Socialist Dictatorship of to-day is unthinkable.

That the Gestapo has extended its hunting grounds to foreign countries is a menacing warning that National Socialism means to carry the war which it is waging in Germany also beyond the frontiers of Germany. The Gestapo is sent abroad to clear the ground. In Spain, where it spied, kidnapped and robbed people, the Gestapo was the advance guard of the Moroccan mercenaries whom General Franco brought to Spain “to save the nation's freedom.”

N. S. D. A. P.

- Ad. P. Langenhein.

Tetuan den 20 Juli 1935.

A.O.

Berlin.

Aussenhandelsamt.

Lieber Pg. Bisse.

In den Anlagen übersende
Ich Ihnen Abschriften meiner Eingaben an den Amtseiter II.
Pg. Burbach. Ich erhielt die diesbez. Schriftstücke und
Anleitungen von meinem Sohne und hoffe richtig gehandelt
zu haben.

Heil Hitler !

Anlagen:

1. Eingabe des Deutschen Kolonialmannes
in Köln.

2. Fall Ad. Rasmussen.

3. Fall 7. Deutsche gegen das französische
Gebiet.

4. Deutsche Transatlantiker.

Die Angelegenheit von Tetuan wurde von
dem Ribbentrop-Büro aufgegeben. Die
Worte des ersten Briefes sind in der
folgenden Weise:

Letter from Langenheim, Nazi leader in Tetuan, to Bisse, Nazi Foreign Trade Organisation in Berlin, enclosing protest of German colony in Tetuan against discrimination by French. Bisse wrote on it that the protest had been arranged by the "Ribbentrop Büro" in Berlin.

Abschrift.

Das durch den Versailler Vertrag, das Tangerstatut von 1932 und das Gesetz vom 16. Mai 1933 auferzwungene völkerrechtliche Verhältnis der Deutschen Staatsangehörigen zu der internationalen Verwaltung Tangers, veranlaßt die Deutsche Kolonie in Marokko zu folgenden Feststellungen:

- I. Durch den Versailler Vertrag hat Deutschland auf jegliche Rechte hinsichtlich Marokko, nach Frankreichs Auffassung demnach auch Tangers, verzichtet. Es ist daher von einer aktiven Beteiligung an der Verwaltung Tangers ausgeschlossen.
2. Nach den Bestimmungen des Gesetzes vom 16. Mai 1933 bedarf jeder Deutsche Staatsangehörige zur Zulassung in die Tangerzone eines von den französischen Behörden ausgestellten Visums.
 - A. Diese Bestimmung stellt in den Augen der Deutschen Kolonie eine unerhörte Diskriminierung dar, da keine Staatsangehörigen irgend eines anderen Landes einer solchen Bestimmung unterliegen.
 - B. In Zusammenhang mit der diskriminierenden Sonderstellung, die den Deutschen durch den Visumzwang auferlegt ist, haben sich Missstände entwickelt, die nicht nur die allgemeine Diskriminierung täglich offenbaren, sondern auch hier zu einer menschlich unwürdigen und die Ehre aller in Marokko lebenden Deutschen aufs schwerste verletzenden Behandlung durch die Beamten der Statutorgane führen. (Beispiele in der Anlage).
3. I. Die Deutsche Kolonie hält es für ihre Pflicht, die Deutsche Regierung erneut auf die in den nur für Deutschland geltenden Visumzwang liegende Diskriminierung hinzuweisen, und
 - II. Bittet sie die Deutsche Regierung Schritte zu ergreifen, die geeignet sind, die ehrverletzende und schikanöse Behandlung, der die schwer um ihre Existenz ringenden Deutschen in Marokko ausgesetzt sind, abzustellen.
4. Im Anbetracht der herrschenden Zustände fehlt der Deutschen Kolonie jegliches Verständnis dafür, dass Deutsche Schiffelichen Deutsche Touristen zu einem Besuch Tangers veranlassen. Sie würde es als einen Ausdruck deutscher Volksgemeinschaft empfinden, wenn der Besuch deutscher Touristen, der jährlich einem Lande beträchtliche finanzielle Gewinne verschafft, dessen Behörden die Deutschen misshandeln, solange ausgesetzt wird, als keine Veränderung der herrschenden Zustände eingetreten ist.

Heil Hitler!

Tetuan den 16. Juli 1935.

Unterschriften: Ad. L. Langenhein, J. Bernhardt, Alfred Giese.

A. Rahlke, W. Haug, E. Gradolph.

W. Peter, G. W. Wohlschlegel, H. Hoffmann.

O. Wilmer, Otto Ulrich, Hermann Paege.

Theodor Ball, Conrad Kildermann, Pa. H. & O. Wilmer, Bernhardt.

J. A. K. Meyer.

Fratz.

Copy of the protest of German colony in Tetuan against discrimination by French.

CHAPTER VII

STORM OVER MOROCCO

“THE JEW IS DEVOURING YOU, as vermin devour sheep. France protects him. He is the agent and tool of France. Germany locks him up or drives him out. Germany confiscates the property of the Jews. You would do the same, Moroccans, if you were not the slaves of France.”

Such leaflets are circulated in thousands in French Morocco, in the territories of the Sahara, in French Equatorial Africa. They are written in Arabic, and are suited to the mentality of the Arab. They pass from hand to hand in the villages and caravanserais.

Rumours creep through the colonial territories of France. They travel from the ports into the inland country, over mountains and deserts into the remotest corners of Africa. The propaganda of whispers and rumours, carried on by the Third Reich, tells of a German emperor who fell a victim to the Jews; of a great leader, who has made Germany strong and powerful once more, and has made France powerless; or again, of German winged monsters, which can remain in the air for ever. But above all, there are rumours inciting people against the Jews. The Jews are

the curse of the Arabs, they suck the marrow of the Arab people. They drink the blood of Arab women and children, they waste the substance of Morocco, while the Arab gnaws the rags of starvation.

These new tales of a Thousand and One Nights were all to be found in the files at Nazi headquarters in Spain, under the heading "Morocco." The files show where these leaflets and rumours and whisperings come from. The leaflets are smuggled into French territory from Tetuan, the capital of Spanish Morocco.

The rumours are spread among the people in Ifni, a Spanish enclave within French territory, and the final destination of caravans from all parts of the country; from there they are passed on with the caravans into the interior of Africa. Agents land in the Canary Islands, at Las Palmas and Santa Cruz, and try to slip into French Morocco as Danish or Dutch merchants.

LOCAL SECTIONS AND SUPPORTING UNITS IN SPANISH MOROCCO

At the time of Hitler's seizure of power, the Nazis had set up four local sections and supporting units in the narrow strip of land which forms Spanish Morocco. They were established at Tetuan, Melilla, Ceuta and Larache. There were two more local sections at Las Palmas and Santa Cruz, and a supporting unit in Ifni.

The heads of the local sections and supporting units were camouflaged as merchants and engineers. The mining engineer Adolf P. Langenheim, an old

Moroccan and a young Nazi, had been resident in Morocco since 1905. During the war he was in Spain. He returned to Morocco in 1921. There he was manager of a Spanish mining company, and from 1934 he was head of the local section in Tetuan. Herbert Wilmer was head of the supporting unit at Larache. He was the proprietor of the import and export firm, H. Toennies, a subsidiary of H. & O. Wilmer, who also had a branch in Tetuan. The head of the supporting unit at Melilla was Eugenio Kraemer; he too had an importing and exporting business, and in addition held some German agencies. He was assisted in his work by Gerardo Braun, merchant, who was Leader of the German Labour Front in Melilla.

The first Nazi organiser in Morocco was a man of the name of Karl Schlichting, who appeared in the guise of tutor to the family of Adolf P. Langenheim. Karl Schlichting came to National Socialism via the German Fichte League. His letters express a fanatical hatred of France. In spite of the fact, mentioned above, that National Socialists were forbidden to work abroad as members of the Fichte League, he was distributing Fichte League pamphlets right up to the last day of his residence in Morocco, about the middle of 1934.

THE KEY TO THE EAST

When mining engineers and merchants carry on propaganda they become regular poets. Quite often the engineer Langenheim would take up his pen in order to

describe the beauties of Morocco to his fellow-countrymen in the Third Reich. A careful study of these articles reveals the origin of the rumours and fairy-tales which are in circulation in French Morocco. There is one article, "Morocco, the Key to the East," in which we find the following passages:

"... And so the Kaiser's visit in 1905, which was too late, and therefore inopportune, left a deep impression in the country, and to-day Moroccan legend paints this entry of the Kaiser into Tangier as the last attempt to save the land of the faithful; at the same time the legend asserts, in a characteristic and remarkable manner, that Jewish intrigues made this visit of no effect. This impression was strengthened by the fact that we were the only power that defended the country's interests in Algeciras. For we alone came out openly on the side of the Sultan, and in favour of a real policy of the open door and the country's independence, and this attitude, side by side with the loyal and honourable conduct of German merchants and industrialists, in their relations with the authorities and with private people, led to an esteem for Germans which could hardly be increased. . . .

. . . Like the Virgin Mary's conception, mystic and incomprehensible, the emergence of the Führer has impregnated the Mohammedan world, above all since his open struggle against the Jews, which is to be

seen to-day, here in this country, in its violent and sometimes by no means bloodless repercussions. And if the Arab, now slowly coming to himself out of the depths of European oppression, turns first against the Jews, this is only the beginning. Everywhere, from India through Egypt up to the borders of Suez, on the edge of the great desert, feeling is rising, and how far must things have gone when in Algeria, which has been bled white in the struggles of eighty years, despairing Arabs shout against Jews and Frenchmen with the cry, 'Long live the Germans!'

And the sons of rich Mohammedans, who visit Paris and Berlin, are filling the life of their native country with new ideas. . . ."

When Langenheim drafted his reports for Nazi headquarters in Spain, he wrote in prosaic commercial style:

"Among the students at the native university of Fez, a strong movement against France has already been formed, which has recently given rise to all kinds of conflicts. This movement already has its own paper, the *Volonté du Peuple*, edited by natives in Fez. And the reopening of the country to us Germans, after we have been kept out for twenty years, takes place in this period of unrest and upheaval, and nothing is easier for the French and their leaders (such as M. Blanc, who has lately retired) than to attribute all the present and future trouble to us Germans and above all to our Party, although we

have hardly had time to make a start with the most careful and discreet preparations."

JEW-BAITING AMONG THE ARABS

Langenheim's predecessor, the so-called tutor Karl Schlichting, spoke still more frankly. He was a specialist in anti-Jewish propaganda. He gave his opinions in a report on anti-Semitic feeling among the Arabs, and the Jewish boycott:

"Meanwhile, like everything else, this Jewish-French move has two sides to it, and although on one side the Jews are attacking us, there is the natural contrary effect with the Berber-Arab population; the latter are coming out once more against the Hebrews, in the main, undoubtedly, from natural antagonism to the Jews, who formerly could not spread themselves much under the native government, but since then of course are making up for this. And as the German has always been a favourite with the Mohammedan, this situation, skilfully used, should have not unfavourable results for German trade. . . ."

Again, on July 18, 1933, he assured Zuchristian, head of the Nazi organisation in Spain:

"The Arabs have kept up their friendship with us for fourteen years, in the firm belief that Germany would rise again. It is now beyond question that the

new Germany has made the deepest possible impression on the Arabs. . . .”

NAZIS PROVOKE UNREST IN FRENCH MOROCCO

The seed bore fruit. In the reports of the local section in Tetuan we find descriptions and announcements of unrest and anti-Semitic excesses in French Morocco. Jews and Arabs had to pay with their lives for Nazi provocation.

“In Casablanca and Rabat, at the end of May, bloody conflicts between Jews and Arabs. The Germans are said to be responsible, because they had distributed Fichte League leaflets. It is as good as certain, however, that it is a case of forgeries, with which the Party has nothing whatever to do.

In Alcazarquivir at the end of June bloody outbreaks between Arabs and Jews. The Germans are supposed to be guilty of having been mixed up with it financially.

A few days later, bloody outbreaks between Arabs and Jews at Tangier. In this case, too, the Germans are said to be responsible.

In all these cases troops have been called out to put down the revolts. . . .”

Schlichting wrote this report to Zuchristian on July 8, 1933. The technique of disavowal was used even in inner-party communications. “Forgeries with which the Party has nothing whatever to do.” Zuchristian

understood. He knew his Schlichting. When the latter was called up before the prefect of police in Tetuan, and accused of having issued the leaflets and sent them to French Morocco, of course he lied manfully.

But in the files of Nazi headquarters in Spain there is to be found the carbon copy of a report which the German Consul in Larache, A. Renschhausen, sent to the Foreign Office on August 28, 1933. The report speaks for itself:

“The Nazi agent in Spanish Morocco, Schlichting (Party member), who is employed as tutor by Langenheim, the mining engineer, has issued propaganda leaflets of the Fichte League in Spanish Morocco, and has also sent them to French Morocco, where they have been seized by the French police in Casablanca. Inquiries were started and all copies on which it was possible to lay hands were seized; Tetuan in Spanish Morocco was established as the place from which they were sent.

As the leaflets contained propaganda against the Versailles Treaty and the policy of reparations, the French notified the Spanish authorities through Madrid of the inadmissibility of such propaganda. The Spaniards immediately accepted and passed on these complaints of the French, and the High Commissioner in Spanish Morocco took stringent measures against the Germans resident there, such as examination of passports, searches, police interrogations, etc. When

the German Consul in Tetuan intervened, the Spanish authorities referred to the fact that such activities are a breach of the rights of aliens, and can in no case be permitted. The underlying reason is no doubt that they are afraid, both in Spanish Morocco and in French Morocco, that German propaganda is fomenting trouble among the Arabs and making the pacification of these colonies more difficult. In addition there is the unfriendly attitude of the Arabs towards the Jews, which is further stimulated by such propaganda. . . .”

Here is documentary evidence of Nazi guilt. The official representative of the Third Reich was compelled to admit that the Nazis were carrying on from Spanish Morocco a systematic undermining of the French Protectorate.

Schlichting himself also acknowledged, in a letter to Zuchristian on February 11, 1934, that he had issued the Fichte League leaflets, which were the cause of the outbreaks:

“Certainly I issued Fichte League leaflets. But what action have the Consuls taken against the lying statements of the Jews? That our Führer is a Jew, that the Nazis cut off the hands of Jewish people, and all the rest of it. Such things may be said, but a Fichte League leaflet is to be made a reason for expulsion? . . .”

TETUAN AS A BASE FOR ANTI-FRENCH
ACTIVITY

It is clear from a letter of Schlichting's, dated January 5, 1934, that Tetuan was the base for anti-French activities:

"The field of work is extending more and more, and includes Oran as well as Tangier. Next month it will penetrate still further into the French zone. To extend the work in a true Nazi sense, the 'export' of an energetic Party member of long standing is, in my opinion, indispensable."

The great extent of the work is fully substantiated by the correspondence that has been discovered. There are constant reports of successes in French Morocco. The work was in no way interrupted or reduced by Schlichting's departure in the middle of 1934. The merchants and mining engineers, who were the heads of the local sections in Spanish Morocco, advanced towards the front. They found a thousand pretexts, in the way of business, for visits to French Morocco, in order to establish new connections there, and to set up new auxiliary centres for the struggle against France. Indeed, the work developed so successfully, that in 1935 the Nazis began to bribe the authorities, as they had done in Spanish Morocco, so as to induce them to close their eyes to Nazi propaganda. Bernhardt, head of the Nazi press department in Tetuan, and employed

by the firm of Wilmer, admitted this quite openly in a letter of July 3, 1935:

"Here too [i.e. in the French zone] we began at once to work on the authorities, just as in the Spanish zone, and with equally good prospects. . . ."

ARAB PRESS FOR HITLER

Side by side with the distribution of leaflets and the propaganda of whispering and rumours, the Nazis did not forget to work on the press. From a report of Johann Bernhardt's of June 5, 1935, we learn that "the German consulate is putting out articles, which are favourably received in the Spanish papers, and the press leader in Tetuan is on very good terms with the newspaper men." He was a little too successful, in fact, in penetrating the Arab press. Bernhardt writes with mild regret in the same report:

"The Arab press is almost overdoing its praises in dealing with German affairs, so that it may easily occur to the reader that there must undoubtedly be German activities behind such positive declarations of approval. . . ."

The arrival of German steamers was used for great propaganda exploits. Whenever German steamers dropped anchor in Moroccan harbours, packets of propaganda material arrived somehow or other on shore and were distributed among the Arabs, as well

as packets with more weighty contents. In the report already mentioned, Bernhardt tells of the visit of the German steamer *Columbus*:

“Not long ago the Norddeutsche Lloyd steamer *Columbus* was here in Ceuta. All kinds of propaganda had been prepared. Unfortunately the result did not turn out very favourably because the weather was wretched. In spite of this, the most important representatives of the authorities went on board, at the invitation of the German Consul. But successful propaganda on a large scale among the masses was lacking. Of the local section only Langenheim, the head, was there. In addition, there was the consular representative in Ceuta. A few people from the German colony had gone on board besides. There is no doubt that, with good weather, the visit of the *Columbus* would have made a splendid impression.”

HITLER'S ARAB WARDS

A specially effective method of arousing feeling among the Arabs in favour of the Third Reich, is the campaign for so-called “Arab wards,” which has special significance in relation to the imperialist ambitions of the Third Reich.

The system of native wards was first agreed upon between Spain and Morocco in the year 1863. Under this system Arab employees of the Spanish diplomatic

missions, and later on Arab agents of Spanish merchants, were placed under the legal protection of the Spaniards. Each firm had the right to two Arab agents, who were called semsars.

In the year 1880 this system of native wards was made general by an agreement between all States which had representatives in Morocco. Germany's capitulation rights in Morocco were abolished by the Versailles Treaty.

In 1934 the German Consuls and German firms began to make the first efforts to re-introduce the semsar system in French Morocco.

Langenheim was the initiator of this re-establishment of the rights of native wards. In a letter of February 1934, he expressed himself in detail about the difficulties, and proposed that at first compensation should be demanded in one or two cases from the French authorities for the sequestered property of Arab semsars. At the end of his report he states:

"On the other side, of course, there is the enormous increase in prestige which the Reich would acquire from such an action among the whole Moslem population, not only in Morocco, but throughout the world. . . ."

"We should probably have ways and means to take the first steps towards preparing for this quite unobtrusively. . . ."

We see that Langenheim was not prompted by humanitarian motives, but simply by considerations of

propaganda. The Nazis in Morocco look down on the Arabs with contempt. In an economic report of Johann Bernhardt's from Tetuan, dated June 5, 1935, the fact is mentioned with great regret, that the Arabs are subject to Spanish law, and can no longer, as formerly, "simply be thrown into prison by the pasha." Bernhardt's attitude to the Arabs is typical of the representative of "National Socialist thought."

The Nazis in Morocco maintained the best possible relations with the Arab Nationalists. In a letter of August 20, 1933, Schlichting emphasised with particular approval the fact that Siebold, the German Consul in Tetuan, had been to lunch with the Arab Nationalist Benunah as a demonstration, just after Benunah had been expelled from the French zone.

CLOSE RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN FASCISTS

The co-operation of Germany and Italy on the "Moroccan front" is evident from a number of reports. Schlichting boasts in a letter of October 2, 1933, that he is on specially good terms with the leader of the Fascists in Morocco, who lived in Tangier. He expressly states that he has made friends with him.

Langenheim, the oldest of the Germans and the man who had been longest in Morocco, had married the daughter of the Italian diplomat Gentile. This greatly facilitated the establishment of the closest relations with the Italian Fascists. They were kept up through the Italian Consul in Tetuan, Dr. Bivio Sbrana, who

took part in the Fascist march on Rome. In a report of Langenheim's dated February 1934, which dealt with consular representatives, friendship with Sbrana was particularly emphasised:

"The Fascist Consul, Dr. Bivio Sbrana, who took part in the March on Rome, made himself known, as soon as he arrived, as an enthusiastic friend of our revolution and of the Party; he said that he had not been able to find any point of contact for useful co-operation with Herr Bohn (the German Consul in Tetuan) although he was directed by Rome to do this. He was all the more delighted to meet Herr Schlichting, the head of our section here. In this way, questions of common interest were frequently discussed. . . ."

DID LANGENHEIM BUY AEROPLANES FOR THE REBELS?

The German-Italian co-operation in Tetuan is all the more significant because the rebel rising started from Tetuan. Tetuan was the headquarters of General Franco. It was to Tetuan that the first Italian and German aeroplanes were delivered. In this connection it is of special interest that a relative of Langenheim who was head of the Nazi local section, a man named Paul Langenheim, was an aviator employed at the Dornier aircraft works. General Queipo de Llano, in an interview which he gave in September to Arthur Koestler, correspondent of the *London News Chronicle*,

declared that the rebels had bought their German aeroplanes from a private individual in Tetuan. There are many indications that Adolf P. Langenheim acted as the rebels' intermediary. It is clear from the correspondence that Langenheim intended to pay a visit to Germany in the middle of July 1936. It is by no means impossible that he had already made arrangements for this visit with General Franco before the rising.

Reports from refugees from Spanish Morocco show that after the rebellion began the Nazi local sections immediately established themselves as some sort of official authority. Those Nazis who had served in the German Army were used as instructors for the Foreign Legion and the Tercio. Nazi commercial men worked in the army organisation. The German broadcasts from the Tetuan radio station were organised by the local Nazi section.

CONCENTRATION CAMP IN THE CANARIES

The Nazi local sections in the Canary Islands put themselves at the service of the rebels immediately the rebellion began. Their first act after the military seized power was to set up concentration camps on the German pattern for those Germans who were hostile to National Socialism. And just as the Italians did at Majorca, the Nazis began to install themselves as masters immediately after the rebels seized the islands. For some time the German colony on the Canary Islands has been of very considerable strength: over

650, most of whom are controlled by the German Labour Front. Eight German steamship lines called regularly at the islands. Since Hitler took power, the firm of Jacob Ahlers in Teneriffe and the Woermann House in Las Palmas have been special centres for Nazi operations, which were also associated with the German Coaling Depot. German engineers and marine experts held leading posts in the construction of the mole. The electricity works are under German management, and have been of great assistance to the rebels.

THE NAZI HAND IN MOROCCO

When Nazi propaganda had thoroughly prepared the ground, the National Socialist party and the Foreign Office considered that, in 1935, the moment had come for a further advance. The Nazi local section in Tetuan was mobilised for a protest against the provisions of the law of May 16, 1933, which are supposed to discriminate against Germans because they are required to have a French visa to go into the Tangier zone. On July 16, 1935, the German colony in Tetuan, under pressure from the National Socialist Party, signed a "protest against the discriminations," and proposed to refuse to let any German ships enter ports in French Morocco until they were abolished. On July 30, 1935, the protest with a covering letter was sent by Langenheim to Bisse, a departmental chief in the Foreign Organisation. Bisse made the following note on this document, in his own writing:

“The letters from Tetuan have been passed by the Ribbentrop Buro. The draft of the first letter was prepared in Berlin.”

The first letter was the protest against discrimination. It was made to order: in fact, to order of the “Ribbentrop Buro.” On July 27, 1935, the Moroccan letters were sent to the Ribbentrop Buro. On October 29, 1935, the German Ambassador in Paris presented a Note “concerning the removal of the existing discriminations against German subjects in Morocco.” We know this from a letter from the Foreign Organisation dated January 13, 1936.

In this case the co-operation between the Foreign Office and the Nazi shock troops abroad is particularly clear. First of all there was the propaganda of the Nazis, which resulted in bloody outbreaks. The French authorities defended themselves and closed the frontiers to the Nazi agitators. At this point the Foreign Office intervened, because Germany's claim to equality had been violated. It organised the protest against the suppression of German interests. The same Langenheim and Wilmer, who were responsible for the bloody outbreaks in French Morocco, put their names to the protest and raised their voices against the injustice that had been done. When Herr Ribbentrop arrived in London on October 26, 1936, he declared:

“In the interest of both our countries, there is a

great deal of work to be done. Germany desires the friendship of Great Britain."

What did Langenheim write in his report? "From India through Egypt up to the borders of Suez, on the edge of the great desert, everywhere feeling is rising." We know now, from the files marked "Morocco," who was fanning the flame. Langenheim and Wilmer and their agents in French Morocco carried the seeds of race-hatred into the Moslem world. They have been scattered as far as India. There too the people who have been incited and deluded raise the cry "Heil Hitler!" This is the kind of friendship with England that is desired by the Nazis.

CHAPTER VIII

SPIES AND CONSPIRATORS

IN THE EARLY DAYS OF JULY 1936 a brisk trade in potatoes was carried on in many of the small taverns of Madrid. The trade was handled by people who never at any other time had anything to do with agriculture; such for example as Lieutenant D. Miguel, who got rid of huge quantities of potatoes on July 15, 1936, in the "El Aguila" restaurant in the Calle Carmen.

A German of the same profession as this Lieutenant, Juan Gunz in Barcelona, was also a great expert in the sale of potatoes. He lived in House No. 71 on the Avenida de Gaudi. This potato merchant's papers were in perfect order: the authorities knew him as the agent of Wilhelm Teubert, windmill engineers of Berlin. The Germans knew him as one of the fifteen thousand of their countrymen who were trying to get a living in Spain. Enquiries made about him produced the report:

"Reliable. Lives in Quiet Circumstances."

How did it come about that an agent of a windmill concern turned with such enthusiasm to the potato trade? He was an ex-officer, an electricity expert who had striven to persuade local authorities and private

concerns of the advantages of the windmill engineers' products; his knowledge of potatoes must have been precious small.

Of course, the consignments of potatoes which Lieutenant Miguel and Herr Juan Gunz had had sent to Spain were of a special kind. The ordinary man would have described the contents of these potato consignments bluntly as "arms." The fact was that No. 71 Avenida de Gaudi in Barcelona was one of the most important centres for the smuggling of arms into Spain, and at the same time the headquarters of the German military spy system in Spain.

The German espionage service had learnt a great deal during the years after the war. Its technique had become much more subtle, and its machine had been greatly enlarged. Its financial resources had grown greater; after the seizure of power by the Nazis they became inexhaustible.

In the course of the search of Juan Gunz's house after the rebellion had begun, very extensive material came into the Militia's hands, and with the aid of this it is possible to describe the Nazi espionage machinery in Spain in some detail.

THE BLACK REICHSWEHR IN SPAIN

The Nazi espionage system in Spain was based mainly on former officers who had emigrated and were prepared to follow any trade on which they could live. Even before the Nazi seizure of power the

Reichswehr had maintained a strong service of agents, who worked in strategically important towns and ports. The special political relations existing in Catalonia made it seem useful to locate the centre for this work in Barcelona. The responsible persons were the German ex-officer Hans Gunz, who called himself Juan Gunz in Spain, and Konrad Heerdt, a lieutenant-captain on the retired list. Heerdt was president of the local group of the Stahlhelm in Barcelona. He had married the daughter of a Spanish general, through whom he had secured extensive connections with Spanish army officers. The general obtained army contracts for him, and his legal business was connected with the supply of sighting apparatus and machine-gun appliances. He used the connections made through these army contracts to secure important military information.

Juan Gunz camouflaged his underground activities by setting up the firm "Central de Fuerza Motriz Aerea Teubert" in Barcelona as the agency of the Teubert concern mentioned above. He negotiated with local authorities and private businesses for the erection of windmill apparatus, and did in fact complete several contracts of this kind.

Juan Gunz and Heerdt, working from Barcelona, established connections throughout the country. Their link with Nazi headquarters in Spain was Hans Stammberger, who was head of the Hitler Youth organisation in Spain until 1934, then played a leading part

in the work of the Nazi local section in Barcelona and subsequently in the Nazi headquarters in Spain. Stammberger had joined the 17th Bavarian Infantry as an ensign in 1910, and in the war had won promotion to Captain and Brigade-Adjutant. In 1930 he went to Spain, taking up a post in the Gutermann Silks agency in Barcelona. From this cover he carried on work for the Gestapo as well as for Gunz and Heerdt. The head of the Nazi organisation in Spain gave him a testimonial saying that he was the type of a front line officer.

Gunz maintained connection with the German Labour Front through Anton Leistert, head of that organisation in Spain. Leistert was an old partisan who from 1919 to 1921 had taken part in the bloody campaigns of the Lüttwitz Volunteers in Halle, Ammendorf and Eisleben. In 1922 he joined the National Socialist Party.

Heinrich Rodatz, agent of the Junkers Aircraft Company in Madrid, worked for Gunz in that city. Rodatz began his career as a naval architect, and spent the war partly in the Canaries and partly in Madrid. In 1916 he was trained as an air-pilot; after the war he returned to Germany, and took part in the Kapp *putsch* as a volunteer. In 1927 he again went to Spain, and within a short time became agent for the Junkers Company.

As a pilot Rodatz had access to all aerodromes in Spain. In this way he prepared the ground for the

delivery of Junker planes to the rebels. In this way he built up connections with officers in the Spanish Air Force, who after the rebellion began dropped death-dealing bombs on Madrid and other open towns in Spain.

Gunz had a second agent in Madrid: Guillermo Gefaell, who lived at 51 Francisco Giner Street. Gefaell's letter to Gunz expresses a deep hatred of the Republican Government of Spain. Writing on May 26, 1936, Gefaell says that Gunz

"with a great deal of labour and energy will overcome the greatest difficulties and will probably proceed to the realisation of his plans in the near future."

He asks for concrete tasks to be set him in order to make his collaboration fruitful. That was rather under two months before the rebellion. What plans could Gunz have brought near to realisation? The situation at the time indicates that no other conclusion can be drawn from the letter than that Gunz was actively preparing the rebellion, and in particular helped to organise the supply of arms to the rebels. We shall deal later with the question of Gunz's participation in the preparations for the revolt.

There was another *putschist* in Alicante: Ex-ensign Wilhelm Hans Joachim Kindler von Knobloch. He had been too young to take part in the war, and in February 1919, when he was sixteen years old, he

joined the Ziethen Hussars as an ensign. He fought with General von Goltz's army against the Soviet Union, and in the Kapp *putsch* he turns up again as leader of a machine-gun section. He recorded in his diary that, being unwilling to enter the army of the Weimar Republic, he made up his mind to enter business. In 1921 he secured a post in the Sloman Shipping Company in Hamburg. He became secretary to the owner, whom Kindler describes as the confidential agent of the Reich Admiralty. In 1923 he went to Spain for the Sloman Line, and from 1928 he was in charge of the Alicante branch. At Alicante he was only a few hours' run by motor from Cartagena, the most important base of the Spanish navy. It was easy for him, as agent for a steamship line, to get access to Spanish naval circles, and so he became the main source of information for the Reichswehr on naval questions.

The German shipping lines in Spain provided a large contingent of spies. In Malaga there was the shipping firm Petersen & Co., agents for the Neptune Line. In 1934 the local Nazi section conducted a campaign against Petersen with the obvious aim of securing the transfer of the agency of the Neptune Line in Malaga to the firm Baquera, Kusche & Martin. The head of the Nazi organisation in Spain intervened and put a stop to the campaign against Petersen. A letter dated October 24, 1934, which Zuchristian wrote to the head of the Malaga Nazi section, makes

it clear that Petersen had been working in the espionage apparatus of the Reichswehr:

"... I also draw your attention to the fact that Petersen was himself at one time active in a certain way on Germany's behalf (and indeed successfully), though it is not possible to say more about this now; nevertheless it gives me grounds for pointing out that not everyone who does not garrulously proclaim himself for Germany is indifferent or even hostile to the Fatherland."

The above-mentioned shipping firm, Baquera, Kusche & Martin, provided Gunz with his chief agent in Morocco in the person of Hans Heinrich Hoffman, manager of the Ceuta branch of the firm.

These were the most important figures in the network which the Reichswehr spread over Spain. They were officers with no career after the war, *putschists* who had flung themselves eagerly into the murder campaigns of the Volunteer Corps against the German workers, adventurers who were prepared to adopt any profession if it provided a living. These officers, who were working for the Reichswehr apparatus in Spain and at the same time built up and maintained connections with the Spanish officer corps, were experienced conspirators. They were well versed in the stratagems of underground work. In the Black Reichswehr and in the Volunteer Corps they had learned how perjured officers covered up their work of undermining the

Republican constitution until the day came for action. They had hated their own Republican Government no less than the Spanish officers hated theirs. They were the right confederates for the Spanish rebels. They spied on them and reported to the Reichswehr what was going on in the Spanish Army. They gave them the benefit of their own experience in their fight against the Spanish Republic. They helped them to prepare the rebellion by arranging secret supplies of arms for them.

THE WINDMILL AGENCY

The windmill agency in Barcelona, which was managed by Gunz, had two Spaniards on its staff. One of these, Juan Vidal Salvo, a Barcelona lawyer, was the author of a book called *Hitler and National Socialism*. The head of the Nazi school, Karl Supprian, reported on Vidal Salvo on December 20, 1934, in the following terms:

“Herr Vidal is very active here in Spanish Fascist circles, and in connection with the publication of his book has tried to get into touch with German circles.”

He succeeded in getting into touch with them. His guide on the way to German circles was the Bolivian Consul in Berlin, Nielsen-Reyes, who worked at the Bolivian Legation. Curious to relate, this Bolivian Consul took a lively interest in early potatoes in Spain;

he was a close friend of Wilhelm Teubert, head of the windmill concern in Berlin; and he was no less closely connected with Juan Gunz. The correspondence shows that Nielsen-Reyes took an active part in Gunz's work; it also shows that he introduced the Spanish Fascist Salvo to Schubert, an engineer who was engaged in the foreign section of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda.

Gunz's second partner was Alvaro de Malibran. This man had good connections with high finance, and particularly with Juan March, the main financial backer of the rebellion. Moreover—and this was of inestimable value for Gunz's work—Malibran had a brother who held a high position in the Spanish Ministry of War. Malibran's brother was an important link between Gunz and Spanish military circles.

In a report to Teubert in Berlin, Gunz made the following observations on Malibran:

" . . . As I already informed you in my previous letter, Herr de Malibran has excellent connections with the circles which are of interest to us, and at the same time he has great influence with the Spanish V.D.I. In the few days during which I—or we—have been in touch with him, we have been able to convince ourselves of the advantage of the closest collaboration with him. Thanks to his connections we have already been able to get a memorandum paid attention to in the War Ministry. . . . In connection with this, Malibran's brother has already

conducted interesting negotiations and has excellent impressions."

And in a letter dated November 13, 1935, Gunz wrote to Teubert:

"I hope you have had my letter of the 10th instant. As I mentioned in that letter, at the moment I am negotiating with a business friend in regard to setting up the Spanish company, and I hope that this time we shall have more success. Herr de Malibran, already mentioned, whose brother, as an officer, also has considerable influence with the Ministries here, has in the meanwhile declared his readiness to secure the necessary connections, etc."

THE "AGENT" IN THE SPANISH MINISTRY OF WAR

The great influence which the officer Malibran had with various Ministries promised Gunz advantages in all directions. He secured all important news of military events; and he was informed when foreign firms tendered for contracts from the Spanish Ministry of War. In this way he was able to put military contracts in the way of German firms and earn a commission for himself. And in this way, more particularly, he was able in a perfectly legal way, a few months before the rebellion, to put through considerable armament orders for the Spanish Army, which, when the rebellion came, passed over to the rebels and formed a very valuable

supplement to the arms which Gunz had supplied through secret channels.

One of Gunz's letters to Teubert clearly shows Malibran's treachery and the fight against supplies being ordered from other States:

"STATE CONTRACTS. Through Malibran's brother we have just received the following urgent and 'strictly confidential' information:

An 'allegedly' expelled German of the name of Erren (or Herren—the exact name couldn't be given to me) is said to have patents for electrolyzers, voltmeters and hydrogen motors. These are supposed to have been 'stolen' in Germany when he was expelled. This 'emigrant' (certainly a Jew) went to England, where he is supposed to be at present offering his invention. Arising out of his negotiations, the said man is now trying, with English help, to get his inventions into the Ministry for military purposes. (For submarines !) The matter is already being considered by the War Ministry here, which is taking such a great interest in it that the patents would have been bought within a few days at any rate if M.'s brother had not intervened at the last moment by bringing influence to bear. As we have ascertained quite confidentially, the licence for these patents was offered to the Spanish State (use of hydrogen motors for submarines) for about 250,000 marks. As you can imagine, we were very much surprised, and we

immediately set all levers in motion not only to get the question deferred, but to ensure that they agreed to await our offers in this connection, which we represented as of far greater interest. But we mustn't lose much time. I regard this matter as one which has to be put through immediately, quite apart from the lucrative value of this business."

In other letters Gunz informed the Bolivian Consul Nielsen-Reyes and Dr. Teubert of invitations to tender for military supplies which were to be expected from the Spanish Ministry of War. He also gave them information, based on reports from his agents, of every alteration in the location of troops, every modernising of weapons and every change made among the higher officers.

"EVERYWHERE NOW WE'RE WELL PLACED
INSIDE . . ."

In December 1935, another good friend of Gunz's secured a high Government post. The reactionary, Escalos, was made Governor-General of Catalonia. On December 19, 1935, Gunz wrote to Teubert:

"Through the last change of government a good friend of ours has been appointed Governor-General of Catalonia. He is a Majorcan, connected with a Majorcan irrigation concern; he is extremely interested in our windmill business and promises us corresponding backing. So everywhere now we're well placed inside!"

This chief agent of the espionage apparatus boasted of his specially good connections with the highest authorities of Catalonia. They were so "well placed inside" that in the same letter he was able to report:

"The best imaginable news comes from Majorca. There, too, feverish work is being done."

The official representative of the windmill business in Majorca was a certain Rosx-Roig; but the real agent was a brother-in-law of Gunz, whose name is not given in the correspondence, but who posed as a "harmless property-owner." But it was not only at Majorca that feverish work was being carried on. In another letter to Teubert, Gunz reports:

"As you see, dear Herr Dr. Teubert, I leave no stone unturned in order to achieve our aim by the quickest possible road. I believe that we are now on the best road. Since I have been associated also with Malibran, we are working feverishly for the realisation of our desires. . . . It is possible that in the very near future another discussion between us will be necessary. . . . For the rest, you can be assured that I am fully aware of the difficulties always associated with the first steps, and therefore they do not alarm me at all, but, on the contrary, I will put in every effort until we reach the goal. At the moment I am working out a 'dossier' with M. . . ."

MM
H. Bisse
Aussenhandelsamt.
Hl/r.

27. Juli 1935.

An die
Reichsleitung der NSDAP,
Büro Ribbentrop, z. Hdn. des Grafen Dürckheim,
Berlin W 8.
Wilhelmstrasse 64.

Unter Bezugnahme auf unsere Unterhaltung sende ich
Ihnen anbei die heute hier eingegangenen Berichte
des Ortsgruppenleiters Pg. Langenheim, Tetuan, über

1. Eingabe der Deutschen Kolonie Marokko.
2. Fall Konsul Renschhausen, Larasch.
3. Bericht Joh. Bernhardt, Tetuan, über Frank. Zone.
4. Bericht über Anlaufen deutscher Touristendampfer
in Französisch Marokko.

Heil Hitler!

(H. Bisse)
Amtsleiter.

Letter from Bisse, Nazi Foreign Trade Office in Berlin, to the "Büro Ribbentrop" at Nazi headquarters in Berlin, enclosing reports from Langenheim, leader of Nazi local section at Tetuan.



Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Schriftwechsel bitte zu richten an: Hr. Schlichting, Tetuan, -partado 7

Tetuan, den 5. Jan. 1934.

Herrn
Halter Zuchristian
Madrid.

Lieber H. Zuchristian!

Ihre werten Schreiben vom 21. und 29. Dez. habe ich mit Dank empfangen.

Dentschhausen: Ich werde Ihnen die Angelegenheit, so bald ich alle Unterlagen erhalten habe, Ihnen zusenden. In diesem Falle werden wir wenig Schwierigkeiten haben, da hier alles begrifflich niedergelegt ist.

Hall - ernhardt: Habe Hamburg davon in Kenntnis gesetzt und warte noch Antwort.

Organisation: Es ist schon richtig, dass mit meinem Fortgang hier Schwierigkeiten auftreten können. Es ist aber unter den hierigen Verhältnissen immerhin schalerig, eine Organisation später, wenn vom Jarokko angeschlossen ist, abzutrennen, weil es dann an einer geeigneten Kräfte fehlt. Die Sache nimmt immer größeren Umfang hier an, da auch der Tanager nun nach Oran dann kommt. Nächsten Monat soll dann weiter in die Franz. Zone vorgegangen werden. Dann jetzt die hierigen Hgg. nicht zur Literatur erörtern werden, dann hätten meine Nachfolger gewisse hier einen schwierigen Stand. Zur Weiterarbeit in wirklich nationaler Sinne wird der "Export" eines energischen alten Parteimannes z. B. unerlässlich sein. Ich habe schon immer mit dem Gedanken gespielt, ob es nicht bei den bevorstehenden Konsulatswechsel möglich wäre, einen Parteigenossen als Legations-Konsul nach hier zu senden, der gewisse vieles erhalten und fördern könnte. Hier fehlt ein Mann wie Herr Korth, der die ganze Geschichte mit seiner Ruhe meistert, der aber auch keine Falschheit duldet. Nun, wir müssen abwarten; die letzten Monate werden mir in organisatorischer und erzieherischer Beziehung noch manche arbeitsreiche Stunde bringen. — — — Dann wird sich meine Genigkeit erst mal gründlich erholen, da ich in der Tat ziemlich heruntergekommen bin.

Gegen Ihre Ernennung zum Landesleiter für Spanien bin ich aufrichtig erfreut. Mag doch Ärger und Verdross, Verrat und Intrigue die ganze Arbeit erschweren, Freude macht es dennoch. Ja, es fragt sich, ob die eigenen Kräfte überhaupt so zur Geltung gekommen wäre, wenn die Widerlichkeiten nicht vorhanden wären. Viel Glück für Ihren neuen Arbeitsbereich!

Mit Kameradschaftlichen, russ und Hitler Heil

Hr

Letter from Nazi Agent in Tetuan to Nazi headquarters in Madrid, reporting on work in Morocco—"Next month it will penetrate still further into the French zone."

LINKS WITH THE SPANISH EMBASSY
IN BERLIN

Dr. Teubert and Consul Nielsen-Reyes were working in Berlin to establish closer connections with the Spanish Embassy there. The Bolivian Consul was the appropriate middleman. On March 7, 1936, Teubert informed Gunz:

"To-day I visited, with Herr Nielsen's introduction, the First Secretary at the Spanish Embassy, Dr. Sartoris. He believes that all will go well with the potato imports. He took me then to the Second Commercial Attaché, Julio Suarez. He took exact particulars. . . ."

Immediately after the rebellion both Dr. Sartoris and Suarez declared their support for it. Of what breed were the "potatoes" to which reference was made in this letter?

Let us first note the date of the letter: the spring of 1936. In that spring General Sanjurjo, who had fled to Portugal to escape arrest by the Republican Government of Spain, visited Germany. He was seen in the company of the attaché of the Spanish Embassy in Berlin. In July 1936, when General Sanjurjo met his death on the flight from Portugal to Spain—whither he was going to take over the leadership of the rebellion—the press stated that the General, with the help of the attaché of the Spanish Embassy in Berlin, had been

buying arms in Germany. It can be taken as certain that Dr. Teubert's "potato" imports referred to the arms purchased by General Sanjurjo.

PIECES OF IRON AND EARLY POTATOES

These "potatoes" occur over and over again in the correspondence between Barcelona and Madrid. On April 16, 1936, Gunz announced the arrival of two "clients" who had made the transaction of business dependent on a journey to Berlin. He wrote:

"As I have already mentioned to you, these people want to see something if it is at all possible, even if only pieces of iron."

Here we have clients journeying to Berlin to inspect pieces of iron! The secret of these pieces of iron is revealed in the next sentence:

"In order to lose no time, please telegraph us direct from there when the despatch of potatoes and also the formation of the company are proposed."

Here we find Herr Gunz's famous potatoes again. In every country arms have been dealt in under other names; to Spain they went as potatoes! They are also mentioned in other letters. On March 2 and March 14, 1936, Gunz wrote to Teubert about the sale of "early potatoes."

The correspondence between Gunz and Teubert also shows who carried out the smuggling of arms. It was no other than the registrar of the German Chamber of

Commerce at Barcelona, Weniger, whose name is mentioned several times in connection with the "potato" consignments.

It must also be noted that Gunz and Teubert took certain precautionary measures to avoid their correspondence about "potatoes" leading to their exposure in the event of a surprise search by the Spanish authorities. In his correspondence Gunz actually had cover letters dealing with the purchase of real potatoes at Palma di Majorca. It goes without saying that these purchases never took place. The letters were only to serve as an alibi in case of danger, just as the agency of the windmill concern was intended to cover up Gunz's machinations.

THE ZEPPELIN PORT IN SEVILLE

Dr. Teubert, who showed the clients pieces of iron and agreed with them about new potatoes, was a man with far-reaching connections. We see from his letters that he had easy access to Wilhelm Keppler, then still Hitler's commissioner for economic affairs. In a letter to Gunz, dated January 21, 1936, he says that he knows Party member Dr. Osselmann, director of the Zeppelin hydrogen works, very well, and that Captain Lehmann of the Zeppelin works is a very close friend of his. He had special relations with the Zeppelin works; and in the same letter Teubert wrote:

"The most important thing is the Zeppelin-Port company at Seville."

The Zeppelin-Port Company in Seville was charged with the preparation of a landing-place for Zeppelins which was to be equipped with all technical requirements, and especially with the organisation of gasworks which were essential for refilling the envelope with gas. National Socialism not only attributed great commercial importance to the Zeppelin line: it had also great strategical importance. If the Third Reich was ever blockaded by hostile fleets in the course of a war, the Zeppelin line would be left for connections with overseas and with the Spanish sources of raw material. That is why the Third Reich was so specially interested in the flying-port at Seville. Here a base was to be organised which would serve Zeppelins as a port of call on their overseas flights.

The agency of the Zeppelin interests in Spain was in the hands of that Consul Draeger who was engaged in Seville with the smuggling in of Nazi propaganda material. Gunz worked very closely with him, trying every channel to secure the organisation of the Zeppelin port in Seville. In this work they relied on Guillermo Moreno Calvo, Secretary of State under Premier Lerroux, and on Count Sandoval, manager of the Zeppelin port. A letter dated November 18, 1934, reports:

" . . . that German interests in Seville have again been advanced a step further."

A letter of March 17, 1935, says that Guillermo Moreno Calvo is a great friend of the Third Reich. On

March 4 of the same year mention is made of the backing given by Count Sandoval to German interests. Through the Zeppelin Company, Gunz was able to form new links with influential groups in the Spanish reactionary parties; through Calvo he was able to bring direct influence to bear on the Lerroux Government, which served as a pacemaker for Fascism in Spain. In this way the German espionage apparatus was able to influence the Spanish Government through channels which on the surface were purely commercial.

OUR GOOD FRIEND GODED

In the letters dealing with the Zeppelin business another link between Gunz and Spanish military circles emerges—a link which also had exceptionally great importance. A letter of October 17, 1935, mentions that Varleta, the Spanish aviation chief, was resigning, and continues:

“He will be replaced by a military man, perhaps by our good friend General Goded, or the well-known Morocco campaigner, General Hillan-Astray, with whom we have indirect connections.”

This “good friend” General Goded was the organiser of the rebellion in Catalonia. Shortly before the rising he had been moved by the Spanish Government to the Balearic Islands. On July 20, 1936, he reappeared in Barcelona, went at once to the Capitanía, the military headquarters, took over the control of the

military region of Catalonia and issued the order for the rising. This was the man described by the German espionage apparatus as its "good friend." It is not difficult to surmise what services he had rendered, and what services he received in return. It can be taken as certain that General Goded was not entirely innocent of participation in Gunz's transactions in potatoes.

The second General mentioned, Hillan-Astray, can claim the doubtful honour of having organised the Tercio, the foreign legion used by the Spanish dictatorship in the terrible campaigns in Morocco. His Tercio constituted General Franco's élite corps, which carried murder and violence into the villages and towns of Spain—"in defence of threatened Christianity." The indirect connection between Hillan-Astray and the German espionage apparatus is further significant evidence of the part played by National Socialism in the Spanish rebellion.

GLIDING IN SPAIN

An important bridge to the Spanish Fascists and officers was provided by the so-called Nazi glider sections in Spain. The Nazi group of glider pilots in Barcelona was headed by Schubert, who had been trained as a pilot in Germany. Another leading figure was Müller-Funk, once squadron leader in Troop 24 of the Brownshirt Standard No. 1. This was the standard headed by the notorious Maikowski, well known

in Moabit as a murderer of the workers. There were other glider sections in Madrid and Seville.

Gliding is in itself a harmless sport. But in Nazi hands it became a method of getting into touch in a perfectly legal way with Spaniards of like political tendency, training them as pilots, and distributing Nazi propaganda material among them. The Air Ministry of the German Reich regarded the development of gliding in Spain, among both Germans and Spaniards, as of very great importance, as is shown by a letter dated April 15, 1936, from the Nazi Foreign Organisation in Germany to the head of the Nazi organisation in Spain:

“Following on a conversation with the Air Ministry I have to advise you that we are interested here in the development of gliding in Spain, both among Germans and Spaniards. As I was told at the Air Ministry, glider pilots should be trained by a German glider section in Madrid. As I considered it inadvisable at present to send glider pilots, I expressed my misgivings on this score. In any case Berlin is prepared to support efforts undertaken over there.

Now in the interests of gliding I should like you to see that I get a report on the places in Spain where gliding clubs exist; the report should be in duplicate, and should give the following details:

(1) Name of the gliding club;

- (2) Number of members;
- (3) How financed;
- (4) Possible requirements of glider apparatus, construction plans, books, etc.;
- (5) Name of the president of the club;
- (6) Where do the gliders practise?
- (7) What is the nature of the ground, and who owns it?
- (8) What personnel is available (experienced glider pilots)?
- (9) To what larger Aviation Association is the club affiliated?
- (10) What is the composition of the members according to nationality?
- (11) Are German schools carrying out the construction of models and experimental flights, and who is conducting this educational work?

Heil Hitler !

(signed) FR. BURBACH."

Here we see Goering as the patron of Spanish glider pilots ! Goering's interest is in itself enough to indicate the real aims pursued by National Socialism in its cultivation of gliding in Spain.

A POLITICAL DELEGATE

The windmill business in Berlin seems to have been made use of not only by the espionage apparatus, but in general by Nazi officials working abroad, as a cover

for their activities. The intermediary for the political departments was Dr. Karl Tubbesing. In a letter from Teubert to Gunz, dated March 5, 1936, Tubbesing was described as "political delegate"; another letter, dated January 21, 1936, states that Tubbesing was a reporter attached to the "Foreign Branch of the German Publicity Board," and that he had been specially commissioned to make an investigation in Spain. The German Publicity Board, as we have seen above, is a section of the Propaganda Ministry of the German Reich.

Tubbesing's journey of investigation did in fact take place in the spring of 1936; he visited Spain in Teubert's company. A big programme was set for their journey: one of Teubert's letters states that they intend to visit Seville, Madrid, Palma di Majorca, Saragossa, and, of course, Barcelona.

The results of their tour can be seen from two letters which Tubbesing wrote on May 21, 1936, to Gunz and to Juan Vidal Salvo. These letters make it clear that Tubbesing was in Spain on behalf of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, and that he concerned himself mainly with an inspection of the offices representing the so-called "Anti-Comintern" organisation.

THE "ANTI-COMINTERN"

The "Anti-Comintern" is an organisation controlled jointly by Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Rosenberg; its

task is to "combat Bolshevism" abroad. The organisation takes under its wing the Fascist parties in the various countries, sending them its representatives and instructors, and having them inspected at regular intervals by its agents. It issues special information material for the Fascist parties—material which has no claim to veracity. The Anti-Comintern headquarters are in Berlin; there is a subsidiary station in Geneva, the so-called "International Marxist Institute," presided over by Theodor Auber. Material for the Fascist parties is sent out from Geneva, and the correspondence of the Anti-Comintern organisation is also despatched from there.

In the letters to Vidal and Gunz mentioned above, Tubbesing writes:

"... When I got back to Berlin I almost went out of my mind with the amount of work, and even now I have not yet been able to cope with everything that was waiting for me. For of course during my absence all my work just lay waiting on my desk. In addition there were the many delicate matters which I brought back with me from Spain—and the material too had to be scrutinised and worked over in detail. Last Friday I was able to give a brief report on my tour. This week I am to discuss everything in detail with my chief, and in June I am to give a great lecture on Spain to a specially selected group.

Next week, too, my Spanish course begins, which I am taking at the special wish of my chief, and which

will soon, it is to be hoped, produce the desired result. If all goes well and the appropriate authorities are informed, then I believe something can come of my recent journey to Spain, in so far as the political situation does not alter too much for the worse. But in the interest of your country we hope this will not be the case.

The fact that I did not write to you much sooner is due to several causes as well as the above. In the meantime I have already seen Herr G. (of course you know whom I mean) and have had a long talk with him about everything that you told me regarding the situation and the circle. G. is very sceptical. Up to now Spain and France have not kept faith. In the first place, the correspondence you know about is being issued in Spanish and sent direct from Geneva to certain points, whence it can be further forwarded. For the rest, he wanted to get into direct contact with you and to consider the next steps to be taken. He also sends me all material now, but I cannot just send it on to you, as I am not sure that you will receive it without difficulty. If the Doctor comes down to see you sooner or later, he will tell you a good deal that I cannot write now. In the following week I also visited V.'s friend Schu. in Promi. He promised me to send you again some of the finest books."

The "many delicate matters" which Tubbesing brought back with him from Spain were the reports

of the agents with the Fascist parties. The "chief" to whom he refers is not Dr. Teubert but Herr Ehrt, head of the Anti-Comintern organisation.

The Spanish course which Dr. Tubbesing was taking was a training course for agitators and instructors of the Spanish Phalanx. Several reports indicate that since 1935 the Anti-Comintern and Dr. Rosenberg's "Foreign Political Office" had been running special courses for their Fascist friends. The students at these courses included people sent by Leon Degrelle, the trusted men of Colonel de la Rocque, and the followers of Konrad Henlein; and Primo de Rivera also sent his best Phalangist to them. This letter was written two months before the Spanish rising, and it is easy to guess what Tubbesing meant when he said that he hoped the course would soon produce the desired result, and that, if all went well, something could come of his recent visit to Spain.

Nor could Dr. Goebbels be missing in this conspiracy. He was the Herr G. to whom Tubbesing refers; Goebbels complained that no advance was being made in Spain and France. The Spanish and the French People's Front formed a barrier to Nazi machinations in these countries. In spite of Dr. Goebbels' scepticism efforts were continued, and for two months before the rising the documents issued by the Anti-Comintern were also published in Spanish.

It may be noted in passing that the Doctor to whom Tubbesing refers in his letter is not Dr. Goebbels but

Dr. Teubert, who was planning a further visit to Spain.

Another figure from the Ministry of Propaganda took a direct part in the conspiracy: the engineer Schubert, "V.'s friend Schu. in Promi." His name is given in the letters from the Bolivian Consul, Nielsen-Reyes; it occurs in the correspondence carried on by Reder, head of the press section at Nazi headquarters in Spain; and here it is found again in Tubbesing's letter written two months before the rebellion. Schubert is one of the foreign specialists of National Socialism, one of the experts brought in by the Nazis for the organisation of conspiracies in other countries.

ROSENBERG'S AGENTS IN SPAIN

Through Tubbesing Gunz had connections with the network of agents controlled by the Nazi Foreign Political Office, headed by Alfred Rosenberg. Rosenberg's agents as well as the agents of the Anti-Comintern were to be found in the important towns of Spain. In Barcelona itself Rosenberg was represented by the head of the Fichte League, Alfred Kroeger, who as an ex-officer maintained "comradely relations" with Gunz and Heerdt. Several letters show that Kroeger made frequent journeys to Germany, where he had conversations with Dr. Teubert and Consul Nielsen-Reyes.

In Madrid Gustav Reder, head of the press section of the Nazi organisation, was the representative of the

Foreign Political Office and of the Anti-Comintern. Reder, whose press activities have already been described in an earlier chapter, had lived in Madrid until he was fifteen years of age and knew Spanish, as he says in his diary, "as only a native knows it." In the summer of 1923 Reder returned to Madrid and within a short time had built up a number of important Spanish connections. After he joined the Nazi Party in March 1932, Reder, along with his press work, was specially charged with maintaining contact with the Spanish Fascists. He had a special confidential agent in the Spanish Phalanx, Louis de Laserna, a doctor of medicine. In a letter dated February 27, 1935, Reder gives the following information about Laserna:

"About 1932-33 he spent roughly eighteen months in Germany, went through the change of power, and is an enthusiastic friend of Germany. At that period he was working in the Anthropological Institute of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Society in Dahlem, under Dr. Fischer. On this occasion too he wants to carry out some studies there. He therefore speaks German fairly well. He is one of the oldest members of the Spanish Fascist 'Phalanx,' and tells me that Primo de Rivera gave him a personal letter of recommendation to Baldur von Schirach, head of the Reich Youth organisation."

Another of Gustav Reder's agents was Jose Rueda Arche, who in 1935 served with the 17th Infantry

regiment. This enabled Arche to provide Reder with a good deal of important information about the feeling in the army. In a letter dated September 17, 1935, Arche reports certain happenings in Malaga harbour, and especially the presence there of an English ship, which was supposed to have some secret mission.

From 1930 to the end of 1934 Reder owned a printing works in Madrid, which was particularly useful for his collaboration with the Spanish Fascists. He printed a large number of leaflets and pamphlets for the Spanish Phalanx, and was also concerned in drafting them.

PERSECUTION OF GERMAN EMIGRANTS

BY ROSENBERG'S AGENTS

In Seville connections with the Spanish Fascists were in the hands of Hugo Hans Christoph Fiessler, who was employed as chief clerk by the shipping firm Baquera, Kusche & Martin. After the outbreak of the rebellion Fiessler, with the help of the German Consul Draeger, organised German volunteers in Seville for General Queipo de Llano's army. He served as a link between the German pilots and the General's staff; he organised the German broadcast from Radio Seville; and not the least of his activities was the organisation of pogroms, carried out by the Spanish Phalanx, against German anti-Fascists in Seville. Refugees from Seville reported that the Spanish Phalanx, instigated by Fiessler, put German anti-Fascists in prison, some of whom are said to have been murdered.

In Malaga Hugo Leube was the representative of the Foreign Political Office; at the same time, he was head of the Nazi local section in Malaga. He too was employed by a firm of shipbrokers, Aduanas y Consignaciones Llonch. He was responsible for connections with the agents in Morocco, as he had visited Morocco several times between 1929 and 1932 and was reputed to be familiar with conditions there. Leube maintained a well-organised espionage system in Malaga. His chief spy was a certain Heinz Mehling. One of Leube's letters, dated September 16, 1934, shows that this Mehling had robbed a Belgian subject of the name of Nathan, in order to get possession of important documents. These documents contained a report on supplies of arms which a former German general had organised for the Arabs from Malaga. In this document, dated August 31, 1934, Nathan, the Belgian, states that after completing his work in Malaga the German general was to proceed to Palma di Majorca.

MAJORCA

Rosenberg's Foreign Political Office paid special attention to the island of Majorca. In 1935, when Gil Robles was War Minister, he gave contracts to German firms for the building of fortifications in Majorca. Among the experts who were in charge of the building operations, an army of spies came to the island, which is of strategic importance and commands the passage through the Mediterranean.

The representative of the Foreign Political Office was Baron von Behr. Hellermann, head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, made the following statement about him in a letter dated June 29, 1936:

“The chief organiser of the successful midsummer fête was a Party member, Baron von Behr, who immediately informed me that he is not attached to the local section in Palma, but to the Foreign Political Office. This information made me very suspicious at first, but when I asked for evidence von Behr proved that he belongs to the Foreign Political Office by showing me a membership card.... Von Behr told me that he was adjutant to Herr von Papen, and showed me photographs, in which he can be seen with Goering and von Papen. . . .”

The friend of Goering and adjutant to Papen was the right man for the Foreign Political Office. From Papen he had learnt the conspirator's methods which the former military attaché to the German Embassy in America employed during the war. From Goering he could acquire the brutality which a conspirator's work demands. The letter quoted above also reported that Behr was very well informed about the affairs of the English colony through his wife, who was English by birth.

On July 4, 1936—a fortnight before the rebellion—the *Journal de Paris* published a report about the activities

of Baron von Behr, and particularly about his connections with Spanish Fascist circles. This report led Dr. Sauter, head of the Nazi press section, to warn the German Consul-General, and to ask that Consul Dede in Palma should be instructed to take the precautions which seemed to be necessary.

After the rebellion Behr took over official duties in Palma. He worked in the closest collaboration with the real master of Majorca, the Italian Count Rossi. Like his confederate Fiessler in Seville, he began to hound down German emigrants. A German doctor and a German pacifist were the victims of this persecution. The *Weltbühne* of November 5, 1936, reported the murder of the German pacifist, Heinz Kraschutski, who was killed by the Spanish Phalanx.

AGAINST ENGLISH CAPITALISM

The co-operation between the Nazis and the Spanish Fascists may be substantiated here in two other cases, which took place in Madrid before the rebellion. One of them shows the economic support that the Spanish Fascists received from the Nazis. At the beginning of July a Fascist weekly paper, *Nuestra Revolucion*, was started in Madrid. Antonio Primo de Rivera, leader of the Phalanx, sent an article to the first number of the paper from prison in Alicante.

The founder of the journal, Ledesma Ramos, was searching round for funds. He received financial support from Antonio Goicoechea, leader of the

Monarchists. He also had help from the German Labour Front, which gave Ramos a letter of introduction to all German merchants in Madrid, with the request to back up the noble aims of the paper *Nuestra Revolucion* by means of advertisements and financial contributions. The letter contained the following:

“ This journal will pillory the destructive influence of English capital in Spain. It will discredit English capitalism in the Peninsula, to the advantage of Nazi trade.”

The leader of the German Labour Front in Madrid who drafted this letter of introduction not only made clear the sympathy which exists between the Nazis and the Spanish Fascists. He also revealed the Nazis' assurances of friendship for England in their true light.

GERMAN REVOLVERS FOR THE FASCIST PHALANX

From May 1936 there was a German agent going about in Madrid, who was known in Fascist and reactionary circles as “ A.E.” This A.E. was the supplier of arms to the Madrid Phalanx. The Madrid police established the fact that A.E. met Lafarga, secretary of the Renovacion party, in the house of the lawyer Torres, Calle Major 6, and sold him six German revolvers. The actual delivery took place on June 30. The agent A.E. drove up in front of the monument

of Pablo Inglesias, where he was met by a man called Latona, to whom he handed over the revolvers. On July 10, the agent A.E. delivered another six revolvers to the same man at the office of the lawyer Torres.

After these two little transactions had gone through without difficulty, the deliveries of arms increased. On July 12, A.E. delivered 60 revolvers and on July 24, 200 revolvers.

The "Traditionalist" Party was also among the customers of the agent A.E. On July 9, he delivered 220 revolvers through the secretary, Vincente Uritia. An employee of Uritia's stated that the Traditionalist Party was on very good terms with the Nazis, and on July 10, placed an order in Germany through the agent A.E. for a supply of Mauser rifles. Delivery was to be made through San Sebastian. It was not carried out.

But it has been proved that a single Nazi agent delivered altogether 492 revolvers with ammunition to Fascist groups in Madrid. The information of the Madrid police certainly does not cover all the deliveries of arms through A.E. But these facts alone give some idea of the extent to which the Nazis were supplying arms to Spain before the rebellion. In the attack on Madrid, General Franco relied on the intervention of the 5th column, that is, of the Fascist groups inside Madrid itself. This 5th column had been provided with arms by the Nazis before the rebellion.

The network of conspiracy and espionage, which

the Nazis had spread through Spain before the rebellion, has been described here only in its most important particulars. What happened in Madrid applies also to Seville, San Sebastian, Saragossa, Alicante, Malaga, Cartagena and other Spanish towns. The former German officer Gunz was at the head of only one of the centres of Nazi military espionage in Spain. He had confederates in the Peninsula, whose documents did not fall into the hands of the anti-Fascists, who managed to escape, or openly joined the Spanish Fascists in the districts occupied by the rebels. But in any case the documentary material that has been found is amply sufficient to expose the policy of Nazi intervention before the rising. The Nazis, the Reichswehr, the Foreign Political Office and the Nazi Foreign Organisation, with the knowledge of the responsible leaders of the Third Reich, were working to undermine the Spanish Republic and were arming its enemies. With the knowledge of Minister Goebbels, Spain was flooded with propaganda material, in order to lay it open to attack. With the knowledge of Minister Hess, an organisation of fifty secret groups was formed, with instructions to work against the Spanish Republic. With the knowledge of Minister Goering, former German officers, *putschists* and adventurers carried on their evil practices in Spain, supplying arms to the rebel officers before the rising, spying against and undermining the security of the Spanish Republic.

The Nazis share the responsibility for the rebel

rising. The Nazi leadership encouraged it, gave it support, both in a political and in a military sense, by organisation and the supply of arms. The Nazis share the responsibility for the death of tens of thousands of loyal and brave Republicans, for the devastation of a freedom-loving people, for indescribable brutalities against women and children, men and old people, for the blood-bath in Spain.

National Socialism tramples over dead bodies to prepare the way for the imperialist ambitions of the new Germany. It does not hesitate to make war in order to carry through its designs of conquest. The Nazi war of aggression began on the battlefields of Spain. There is still time to prevent its extension. It cannot be prevented by yielding and giving way to an aggressive dictatorship. It can only be prevented by the unity of all peace-loving peoples and states against the common enemy of peace, National Socialism.

CHAPTER IX

THE FINANCING OF NAZI WORK IN SPAIN

THE HUGE APPARATUS maintained by the Nazis in Spain required huge sums of money. The documents which were found in Barcelona have made it possible to ascertain at least a part of the actual expenditure. The Nazis' chief sources of finance in Spain and in other countries are Reich government departments, Party organisations and their subsidiaries, and German business concerns. Remittances from Party organisations are sent through the branch office of the Foreign Organisation in Hamburg. Grants from the Ministry of Propaganda and the Foreign Office are transmitted through the diplomatic representatives.

In what follows we deal only with allocations of money to the Nazis in Spain, which can be verified from the documents. We have not given any estimates, but have kept entirely to the figures which were given in the statements of the Nazi organisations themselves.

MONEY FROM HAMBURG

A confidential letter of Burbach's, dated March 20, 1936, and addressed to Erich Schnaus, who at that

time was head of the Nazi organisation in Spain, deals with the organisation's financial position, and contains the following:

"You should also know that at my suggestion a certain sum of money was at one time being sent regularly by a certain office to Party member Zuchristian . . . I should advise you, in view of this information, to ascertain how the money received from Hamburg has been spent. . . . In addition, I take it for granted that payments from Hamburg to the full amount are being placed at your disposal until further notice."

The full amount of these payments is shown by the books. The organisation in Spain received an allocation of 9,000 pesetas a month, 108,000 pesetas a year, from the Foreign Organisation. Out of this the running expenses of the headquarters in Spain, amounting to 3,000 pesetas a month, were met, and twelve leading Nazis, from the head of the organisation downwards, were paid 500 pesetas each, a total of 6,000 pesetas a month.

In addition, the Foreign Organisation subsidised the *Deutsche Echo*, the Nazi newspaper in Spain. In his letter of March 20, 1936, Burbach gave the following information:

"No doubt you know too that I managed to get quite a considerable amount to maintain the *Deutsche Echo*, and this will be paid from now on. . . ."

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Die Leitung der Auslands-Organisation

Kontokonto: Berliner Stadtbank, Rasse II,
Berlin W 9, Platz Nr. 7-8.
Girokonto: Nr. 2400 unter:
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei,
Auslands-Organisation
Fernsprecher: Sammelnummer B 2 (Ruhm) 7941



Voranschrift: Berlin W 15, Platz Nr. 10
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E. W. Bock, Berlin W 14, Thiergartenstr. 4
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Berlin W 15, am 15. April 1936.

Amt II
Ru./Hr.

Der Leiter:
Legation:

Segelflug in Spanien.

17.6.36

Landesgruppe S p a n i e n.

Nach einer mit dem Luftfahrt-Ministerium gehabt-
ten Unterredung möchte ich Ihnen mitteilen,
dass man sich hier für die Entwicklung des
Segelflugs in Spanien, und zwar unter Deutschen
wie unter Spaniern, interessiert. Wie man mir
im RLM sagte, sollen von einer Madrider deutscher
Segelflugguppe Segelflieger angefordert sein.
Da ich in diesem Augenblick eine Entsendung
von Segelfliegern nicht für richtig halte, gab
ich meinen Bedenken hierüber Ausdruck. Jedenfalls
ist man in Berlin bereit, dortige Bemühungen zu
unterstützen.

Nun möchte ich Sie im Interesse des Segelflugs
bitten, dafür zu sorgen, dass ich über die
Plätze in Spanien, an denen Segelfliegergruppen
bestehen, einen Bericht in doppelter Ausfertigung
erhalte, der folgende Angaben enthält:

- 1) Name der Segelflug-Vereinigung,
- 2) Mitgliederzahl,
- 3) Finanzierung,
- 4) Etwaiger Bedarf an Segelflugapparaten,
Konstruktionszeichnungen, Büchern usw.

Letter from Nazi Foreign Organisation in Berlin to Nazi headquarters in
(See continuation overleaf)

- 4) Name des Vorsitzenden der Vereinigung,
- 5) wo üben die Segelflieger?
- 6) wie ist das Gelände beschaffen und wem gehört dasselbe?
- 7) Welches Segelflag-Personal steht zur Verfügung (geprüfte Segelfluglehrer)?
- 8) Welchen größeren Luftsportverband gehört die Vereinigung an?
- 9) Wie ist die Zusammensetzung der Mitglieder nach Nationalität?
- 10) Wird an deutschen Schulen der Modellbau von Segelflugzeugen und Modellflug betrieben und wer leitet diese Ausbildung?

Heil Hitler!

Prober

From the records at the headquarters of the organisation it appears that this payment amounted to 2,000 pesetas a month, or 24,000 pesetas a year. According to this, in 1935, the Foreign Organisation spent a total of 132,000 pesetas on the Spanish organisation.

The German Labour Front gave a "loan" of 60,000 marks (180,000 pesetas) to the Spanish organisation in the year 1935 alone. This money was provided for the purpose of building a Brown House in Barcelona. A letter of November 22, 1935, from the German Labour Front (Foreign Organisation) to Leistert, head of the Labour Front in Spain and Portugal, stated:

"With reference to previous discussions, we are prepared to place at the disposal of the foreign department a loan to the amount of 60,000 marks, free of interest for six years.

This money is to be used to secure the balance required for financing the Brown House in Barcelona. . . ."

THE BUDGET OF THE GERMAN FICHTE LEAGUE

The German Fichte League included in its budget a large sum which was spent on the penetration of Spain. The letter of May 25, 1935, from Walter Zuchristian, which we have already quoted, mentions the fact that the year's budget of the Fichte League in Spain amounted to 250,000 pesetas. Zuchristian referred to this figure in order to propose an increase

in the monthly allocation to the Nazi organisation in Spain.

SUBSIDIES FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE

The Foreign Office made a grant of 20,000 marks (60,000 pesetas) to the Nazi organisation in Spain for building the Brown House in Barcelona, this was decided at a special meeting at the Foreign Office, in which Hellermann and a representative of the German Labour Front took part.

The Foreign Office also financed the speakers for January 30 and May 1 who were sent to Spain from the Reich; the amount allocated to Spain in the year 1935 was 25,000 pesetas.

GRANTS FROM THE MINISTRY OF PROPAGANDA

The Ministry of Propaganda financed the extensive corruption of the press, which was carried out by the national and local heads of Nazi press departments. The letter from Burbach to Schnaus quoted above contains the following paragraph:

“ Please also ascertain the details with regard to the remuneration of Party member Reder, and find out what payments, if any, are at present being received in Barcelona or other places from abroad.”

The payments which came from abroad, in other words from the Ministry of Propaganda, amounted in

1935 to 360,000 pesetas. Out of this money the "ordinary press expenses" of the Nazi organisation in Spain were met; they amounted, according to Reder's records, to 15,000 pesetas a month, and consisted entirely of bribes to journalists and payments for the placing of articles. It is clear from a report from Dr. A. H. Sauter, the most recent head of the Nazi press department in Spain, that visits of Spanish journalists and prominent individuals to Germany were financed with this money. In 1935 the sum of 80,000 pesetas was spent on these visits. In the same year the Ministry of Propaganda spent a total of 100,000 pesetas on the ill-fated attempt to set up a second news agency, in addition to the German News Office. A letter from Zuchristian, dated October 22, 1935, reveals the following facts:

"Press Office.

Ref. Dr. Oestreich, Transocean.

In connection with the above, I made a report some months ago. Dr. Oestreich was sent here from Transocean for the purpose of setting up an agency. Things went wrong, and so Reich funds to the amount of about 100,000 pesetas were lost. He was to be press attaché. His backer was Funk, Secretary of State."

Funk is Dr. Goebbels' deputy in the Reich Ministry of Propaganda.

MISAPPROPRIATION OF WINTER
RELIEF FUNDS

The Nazis proclaimed and advertised the establishment of their so-called winter relief scheme as one of their greatest "social achievements." The documents from Barcelona prove that the winter relief funds, in so far as they were collected abroad, were used purely for propaganda purposes. The Nazi organisation in Spain spent the winter relief funds collected in the year 1935 not on assistance to Germans who were in need of help, but, with the explicit approval of their responsible authorities, on building the Brown House in Barcelona. A letter of June 22, 1936, from the Foreign Organisation to the organisation in Spain expressly states that the winter relief fund was not used for the purpose for which it was collected. The following is an extract from this letter:

" . . . Therefore I repeat my conjecture that this building was carried out at the expense of our necessitous fellow-countrymen in Spain. This can hardly be justified. Until the arrangement of the loan from the German Labour Front, the organisation in Spain lost no opportunity of representing the misery of Germans in Spain in the blackest colours when they reported to us, and they tried over and over again to get a grant of up to 75 per cent of the outlay for these necessitous cases. If they have spent almost all the money on this German House in

Barcelona, either their previous statements must have been grossly exaggerated, or my assumption is correct, that assistance has been restricted to the most urgent cases. . . .”

This criticism from the Foreign Organisation throws a significant light on the methods by which the organisation in Spain tried to get money, but it did not stop the misuse of the winter relief funds. In a letter of June 28, 1936, the Foreign Organisation subsequently approved the misappropriation of the winter relief funds and their use for other purposes. The total amount collected for winter relief was about 60,000 pesetas.

THE COST OF POLICE AGENTS AND SPIES

The documents from Barcelona give the names of thirty-two paid police agents and military spies. This number certainly does not include all the paid spies. But we will base our statement on these figures only. The average pay of one agent in Spain amounted to 1,500 pesetas a month. This was the lowest rate paid by the Third Reich to its spies and informers. For thirty-two agents this came to 576,000 pesetas a year. This figure does not include payments for the employment of special spies, nor bribes to Spanish officers, nor the purchase of documentary material.

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GERMAN ENTERPRISES

The agents of German firms in Spain made heavy contributions to the expenses of Nazi work. These

contributions chiefly took the form of giving posts to Nazi functionaries, who were practically released from any work for the firm and were engaged almost entirely on Nazi activities. All the fifty heads of the Harbour Service held posts in German firms and received full salaries. The same applied to nearly all heads of local sections, and to most of the so-called political leaders. In every local section in Spain there were at least two responsible functionaries paid by German firms. They received 500 pesetas a month each. In this way German shipping, German industry and the German export trade paid a sum amounting in 1935 to 1,200,000 pesetas for Nazi propaganda in Spain.

THREE MILLION PESETAS A YEAR FOR NAZI WORK IN SPAIN

In the expenditure dealt with, a number of items have not been taken into account. The cost of the propaganda material, which the Foreign Organisation smuggled into Spain through the German Embassy by air liners or by shipping companies, has not been included. The free passages by aeroplane or by sea, provided by Luft-Hansa and the shipping companies, have been left out of account, as well as the cost of fares for the Nazi Congress each year. The school maintained abroad by the German Labour Front, and the grants to German schools and churches are not

included, nor is the subsidy to the German Chamber of Commerce.

The following total of the amounts placed at the disposal of the Nazi Spanish organisation by the Third Reich in 1935, that is, in a single year, is arrived at on the basis of the figures given in the documents from Barcelona:

	Pesetas
From the Foreign Organisation	132,000
From the German Labour Front	180,000
From the Foreign Office	85,000
From the Ministry of Propaganda	360,000
Winter relief funds, used for propaganda purposes	60,000
Annual budget of the Fichte League in Spain	250,000
Secret police agents and spies	576,000
Contributions from agencies of German firms	<u>1,200,000</u>
Total	<u>2,843,000</u>

Nearly three million pesetas, according to the evidence of the documents, was spent by the Nazis for political purposes in Spain. If the expenditure which is not recorded in the Barcelona documents were taken into account, this total would undoubtedly be increased by several million pesetas. The Nazis do not shrink from any expenditure to bring the Spanish people

under the heel of Fascism. They have spent millions on propaganda and intrigue, and invested hundreds of millions in arms, munitions and aeroplanes which they handed over to the rebels for the fulfilment of their murderous work.

CHAPTER X

THE "NATIONAL JUNKERS"

ON JULY 21, 1936, three days after the rebellion began, the first three-engined Junker bombing aeroplanes landed in Tetuan. On the same day a headline in heavy type appeared in the Berlin *Boersen-Zeitung*: "Moscow Intervention in Spain."

On August 8, 1936, the German representative, Prince Bismarck, made an official statement to the British Foreign Minister on behalf of the German government:

"... that the German government has not sent any arms or war material to Spain, and will not send any."

The following day a three-engined Junker aeroplane, of the JU52 type, landed on the Madrid civil flying ground at Barajaz. It took off again after the wireless operator had exchanged a few words with the Luft-Hansa representative. Shortage of petrol compelled it to make a forced landing on the flying ground at Azuagar in the province of Badajoz. The crew, consisting of four men, was detained by the government Militia, and sent to Madrid. When they were examined,

the mechanic, Fritz Reiche, stated that the aeroplane had instructions to fly to Seville, that the pilot landed at Barajaz by mistake and left again when he found out that he was in Madrid. He said that the instructions for the flight had been given by Achtenberg, director of the Junker works, and that they had started on the evening of August 8 from Stuttgart, where the aeroplane had made an intermediate landing. The mechanic also admitted that he had been struck by the fact that it was not a commercial aeroplane, but a military machine with the necessary appliances for carrying three machine guns and a bombing apparatus. He further stated that on the same day two other Junker aeroplanes of the same type had left Stuttgart for Seville. Another member of the crew stated, when he was interrogated, that the Junker aeroplanes which were sent to Seville belonged to the so-called special fleet, and that he knew for a fact that up to August 6, 1936, close on thirty Junker aeroplanes had been sent to Seville.

When the news was received that the Junker aeroplane had been detained the German government made a very sharp protest to the Spanish government, demanding the instant restoration of the machine and the release of the crew, on the ground that it was a commercial aeroplane.

On August 24, 1936, the German government announced their acceptance of the non-intervention pact, and pledged themselves not to send arms or war material of any kind to Spain.

On the same day No. 323 of the newspaper *La Tarde* was published at Vigo (a port which was held by the rebels) with the headline "Los 'Junkers' nacionales bombardearon Getafe intensamente" (Heavy bombardment of Getafe by Junker aeroplanes of the Nationalist army).

On August 30, 1936, it was announced that the non-intervention pact had been concluded, with the participation of Germany. On the same day twenty-eight German aeroplanes landed in Cadiz. Large consignments of German war materials, including tanks, were received in Lisbon.

"TO FORESTALL A COMMUNIST RISING"

Nazi methods of denying their actions or of attributing them to their opponents are not new. They were used by the Nazis for the first time on a large scale in connection with the Reichstag fire; they were then revealed to the whole world for the first time. They are part of the permanent equipment of National Socialism in its fight for the domination of Europe. They are part of the equipment of the Nazis' disciple, General Franco; and Franco has not taken the trouble to introduce even the slightest variation of these methods. The officers' junta, just like the Nazis at the time of the Reichstag fire, announced that a Communist rising had been planned for July 28, 1936, and that the Army had to rise in order to forestall the Communists. These apt pupils of the Nazis asserted, just as in the case of

the Reichstag fire, that there was extensive material about the intended rising, which would be published at the appropriate time; as with the Reichstag fire, it was never published. No responsible European statesman, no politician, no journalist, has ever seen this material.

THE THIRD REICH SUPPLIES THE REBELS WITH
WAR MATERIALS TO THE VALUE OF
230 MILLION MARKS

At the headquarters of the rebels, journalists have actually seen German pilots, German aeroplanes, German tanks, German machine guns. On July 30, 1936, Jean d'Esme, correspondent of the *Intransigeant*, reported to his paper that 20 three-engined German Junker machines had landed at Tetuan; these he had seen with his own eyes. On August 6, 1936, the American journalist, Jay Allen, stated in the *News Chronicle* that he had witnessed an air attack by rebel planes on government ships at Ceuta, in which a German Junker aeroplane took part. On August 12, 1936, the *New York Times* published a report from its correspondent in Seville, to the effect that twenty German bombing aeroplanes and five German chaser planes, piloted by German Air Force men, were "at work" there. On August 25, 1936, the special correspondent of the *News Chronicle* reported that the German steamer *Kamerun* had unloaded 800 tons of war materials in

Lisbon, and that a second German steamer, the *Wiesberg*, had also carried material to Lisbon. On September 1, the special correspondent of the same paper in Seville, Arthur Koestler, reported the arrival of three more Junker machines and the presence of the German Fiessler at the headquarters of General Queipo de Llano.

The correspondent of the *New York Times* secured admission to the aerodrome at Cacaes, and reported on September 15, 1936:

"The success of the rebels was made possible by one single factor—General Franco's German air-fleet. The Madrid Militia were holding back the picked troops of the rebel army at Talavera, until the German aeroplanes came into action two days ago. . . ."

The correspondent revealed the secret of Franco's success:

"The secret is that Cacaes has been turned into a gigantic air base, which is swarming with German aviators."

If all the reliable statements with regard to war supplies from the Third Reich to the rebels are taken together, it will be found that between July 18 and November 15, 1936, 237 German aeroplanes were supplied. A document issued by the rebels, which was intercepted, shows that up to November 10, 1936, the

value of supplies of German war materials, excluding aeroplanes, amounted to 230 million marks, that is, over £15,000,000.

COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO INFRINGEMENT OF THE NON-INTERVENTION PACT

In the middle of September, 1936, a Committee of Enquiry was set up in London, which was to investigate infringements of the Non-Intervention Pact. It met on September 24 and on October 1, 1936, and at public sessions heard eye-witnesses who were in the rebel camp at the time of the rising. It examined documents, including those found in Barcelona. Among the exhibits was a German incendiary bomb, with the marking Rhs (Rheinstahl) which was thrown into the government lines on September 8 and failed to explode. After the most careful examination the Committee came to the conclusion that large quantities of war material from German and Italian sources had been supplied to the Spanish rebels before and after the conclusion of the Non-Intervention Pact. The Committee of Enquiry concluded its report with the words:

“ In conclusion, it is abundantly clear to us that the Spanish government has suffered severely from the Non-Intervention Agreement and that it has been denied arms and material essential to it for the suppression of the revolt. At the same time men, arms, and other assistance have been furnished to

the rebels from foreign sources in breach of the Pact.

We are convinced that the Spanish government does not now desire Non-Intervention and that it is in fact the unequal work of the Non-Intervention Agreement which has resulted in their being placed in their present disadvantageous military position.

There can be no doubt that the present Spanish government is a legally constituted and recognised government entitled to all the privileges and advantages of such a position. Intervention in the affairs of such a legally constituted government by other governments, by the preparation of rebellion and by the supply of arms and assistance to the rebels (who in this case have not even been recognised as belligerents) is a gross violation of the principles of International Law and must be likely to endanger peace throughout the world."

PROTESTS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

On September 15, 1936, the Spanish government addressed a Note to the German government, in which it was affirmed that since the beginning of August Spanish government troops had been repeatedly bombed and fired on by squadrons of three-engined Junker aeroplanes. The supplying of German aeroplanes and German war material was established beyond dispute in a White Paper submitted by the Spanish government to the members of the League

of Nations in Geneva at the end of September—a document which the Secretariat of the League of Nations tried to suppress. A supplement to the White Paper, which was circulated in Geneva by the Spanish government on October 2, 1936, stated that on September 20, 1936, twelve German military aeroplanes had arrived.

The Spanish government Note, with additional facts which had become known in the interval, was placed before the Non-Intervention Committee at its meeting in London a few days later by the representative of the Soviet government.

As supplies of arms to the rebels from Germany and Italy did not cease, the representative of the Soviet government made the following statement at the meeting of the Non-Intervention Committee on October 24, 1936:

“The efforts of the representative of the Soviet government to put a stop to the practice of violating the agreement have not found support in the Committee. The last proposal of the Soviet representative in regard to control over the ports of Portugal, which is the main base of supply for the rebels, has also not found support, and has not even been placed on the agenda for to-day's meeting of the Committee. Thus the agreement has turned out to be an empty, torn scrap of paper. It has ceased in practice to exist.

Not wishing to remain in the position of persons unwittingly assisting an unjust cause, the government of the Soviet Union sees only one way out of the situation created : to return to the Spanish government the rights and facilities to purchase arms outside of Spain, which rights and facilities are enjoyed at the present by the governments of the world, and to extend to the participants of the agreement the right to sell, or not to sell, arms to Spain.

In any case, the Soviet government, unwilling to bear any longer the responsibilities for the clearly unjust situation created in regard to the legitimate Spanish government and Spanish people, is compelled now to declare that, in accordance with its statement on October 7, it cannot consider itself bound by the agreement for non-intervention to any greater extent than any of the remaining participants of the agreement."

JUNKER AEROPLANES SET FIRE TO MADRID

The government of the Third Reich replied in its usual way to the irrefutable statements of the Soviet government. It was made known through the Nazi press that the Soviet government was threatening the peace of Europe. At the same time the Spanish Phalanx was allowed to set up official recruiting offices for volunteers in German towns. German Junker aeroplanes bombarded a school at Getafe, near Madrid. More

than a hundred children were victims of the bombardment.

German warships guarded the transport of rebels from Spanish Morocco to Spain. When Alicante was bombarded by rebel aeroplanes, a German warship was lying in the harbour. It alone, contrary to all custom, was fully lighted, and guided the bombing planes with its lights.

During November 1936 deliveries of arms to the rebels continued in increasing quantities, and rebel headquarters no longer attempted to conceal the participation of German and Italian aeroplanes and tanks in the fighting. In the attack on Madrid at the beginning of November, foreign correspondents were permitted for the first time to describe German and Italian equipment. On November 4, 1936, the *Paris Journal* referred to Junker aeroplanes which were taking part in the fighting against Madrid. On November 5 the *Intransigent*, in a description of a tank attack, wrote as follows:

“The Nationalist tanks were immediately in action: huge German tanks, moving on their gigantic caterpillar wheels, with their big gun, their nine machine guns and their two flame-throwers; small, very high-speed Italian tanks for infantry escort, with two machine guns only. . . .”

Spanish rebel airmen refused to bomb Madrid. Nazis and Italian Fascists were only too ready to undertake

this task. German Junker planes and Italian Capronis day after day set fire to historic buildings, hospitals and private houses in Madrid. Hundreds of civilians, women and children were killed and wounded by bombs dropped from German aeroplanes. Madrid was assaulted by German tanks, bombarded by Krupp guns. The free city of Madrid was the first victim of the barbarous methods of warfare used by the Nazis in their war of aggression. The flames in Madrid were the warning beacon of the threatening world conflagration.

THE WAR IN SPAIN—AN INTERNATIONAL QUESTION

Already at the end of July General Franco had declared, in an interview published by the *Manchester Guardian* on July 30, 1936, that the events in Spain

"... are not only a national, but an international question."

The General called a spade a spade. In another interview he openly stated that he would have no hesitation

"in bringing about international incidents of the most serious nature."

Before he gave the signal for the rising he was sure of German and Italian support. On July 11, 1936, the

signature of the German-Austrian agreement removed the most difficult obstacle in the way of a temporary understanding between Italy and Germany. A week later the first shots of the rebellion were fired in Morocco.

On July 27, 1936, the *News Chronicle* published a report, which has not yet been contradicted, describing the relations between General Franco and the Nazi Foreign Office before the rebellion:

“Before launching his revolt General Franco, I learn from a very well-informed German source, had a series of conversations with representatives of the Foreign Affairs Department of the German Nazi Party, headed by Alfred Rosenberg, a department which in Germany is popularly called ‘our other Foreign Office.’ The go-between was a German wine buyer, living in Paris, named Schleier, who is a prominent official of the Paris Brown House.

Schleier was repeatedly in Spain during recent weeks, and besides his talks with Franco also saw in Lisbon General Sanjurjo, who was killed in an air smash when taking off to join the rebels on the second day of the rebellion.

Germany undertook, in case the French government should go to the help of the Spanish government, to bring pressure to bear on France.

The Spanish generals on their side undertook, in case of success, to co-operate with Germany in

matters of foreign policy and to leave the League of Nations.

The afterthought in the minds of the German negotiators was that a Fascist Spain would in the event of war immobilise at least four French Army Corps on the Spanish border and imperil French communications with Northern Africa.

Apart from these political negotiations, certain financial transactions were carried out in the German Ibero-American Institute in Hamburg with representatives of the Spanish millionaire, Juan March, who is reported to have financed the rebellion."

The National Socialist Schleier referred to in the interview is the head of the Nazi organisation in France. The Barcelona material contains references to several visits paid by Schleier to Spain. In the last few months before the rising, General Franco was Governor of the Canary Islands; these islands were a specially secure stronghold of National Socialism in the Spanish possessions. General Franco opened up relations with Rosenberg's agent, Schleier, through the Nazi supporting units at Las Palmas and Santa Cruz di Teneriffe. The Iberian-American Institute, to which reference has been made in an earlier chapter, organised the financial transactions necessary for carrying out the rising. Uncontradicted reports published in the press have stated that General Franco has an account in Hamburg, and that payments for Italian deliveries have been made through Hamburg.

THE RECOGNITION OF FRANCO

On November 18, 1936, General Franco's Junta was recognised by the Third Reich and by Italy as the government of Spain. General Faupel was appointed as German *chargé d'affaires*. Faupel is an Executive Member of the Iberian-American Institute; in the Barcelona documents he is named as the backer of the Catalonian leader, Juan Vidal Salvo, who was one of the partners in the windmill concern in Barcelona. General Faupel has gone to Burgos to cash the credits opened by the Iberian-American Institute for General Franco. National Socialism has put him in as bailiff.

On the day on which Franco was recognised, the world learnt that an agreement had been concluded between Japan and Germany for defence against Communism. That same day Franco announced his intention of blockading and bombarding Barcelona.

It is only in the light of these facts, and also of the fact that in October, 1936, at Berchtesgaden, Count Ciano had also signed a treaty with the Third Reich for defence against Communism, that the full significance of the recognition of General Franco can be seen. Under the pretext of safeguarding Spain from a Communist revolution, General Franco let loose his Foreign Legion, his Moors and his Nazi and Fascist troops on Spanish democracy. "For security against Communism" fertile fields were laid waste, towns and villages fired and destroyed, and tens of thousands of

Spanish fighters for liberty, innocent children, women and old men were murdered. "For security against Communism" the Nazi war of conquest for the domination of Europe was prepared. "For security against Communism" foreign legions of National Socialism were organised and drilled in every country—forces which in fact are intended to deliver the death blow to democracy. And so it has come about that the war in Spain has become the struggle of democracy against Fascism, the struggle for peace. If Spanish democracy is sacrificed to the Nazi henchman, General Franco, the war in Spain will be only the first stage of the Nazi war of conquest. If democracy wins in Spain, the Spanish events will be an important and perhaps decisive stage in the fight to safeguard peace.

At the time when this book goes to press, the struggle for Madrid is being waged with undiminished determination, and the Spanish and International Militia are holding out with amazing courage against an enemy whose armaments are far superior to theirs. More German and Italian aeroplanes, guns, machine guns, tanks and men are on the way, and will be thrown into the fight against the defenders of European peace. The democracies of Western Europe have made no reply to the continuous despatch of arms from Germany and Italy; they have taken shelter behind the ghost of the Non-Intervention Pact. They hesitate to realise that their fate too is at stake in the struggle round Madrid. They are under the illusion, or pretend to be, that the Nazi

aggressors can be deterred by submissiveness and capitulation from their planned war of conquest. But the freedom-loving and progressive masses of the Western democracies understand, and from the first moment have understood, that their fate will be decided on the Spanish fronts. A powerful wave of solidarity with the Spanish fighters for freedom is sweeping the world. Millions of people are breathlessly following the reports from Madrid. The international battalions are sealing with their blood the alliance between the Spanish Militia and the millions throughout the world who desire freedom. The "National Junkers" of Spain are bombarding Madrid and setting it on fire. To-morrow it may be Paris or London: but this must not be. And it will not be, if Fascism is defeated in Spain.